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Introduction 
Understanding the European Parliament elections of 2019  
luana russo, mark n. franklin and lorenzo de sio
Understanding an election to the European Parliament (EP) – any election to the EP 
– is not straightforward. The elections are treated as being akin to a parliamentary 
election, but whereas parliamentary elections in EU member states lead to the for-
mation of a government pledged to carry out policies on which its member parties 
campaigned in the run-up to the election, an EP election leads to no government being 
formed, much less one pledged to certain policies supported by voters. Indeed it is 
not clear to most of those voters what is the purpose of these elections or what is the 
point of voting in them. The most common appeal by national parties is that their 
supporters should vote out of loyalty to those parties. Consequently those without 
established party loyalties (particulary younger citizens) are especially unlikely to 
vote and turnout seldom reaches even 50 percent. Some people also vote to register 
dissatisfaction with government policies or to support policies that they feel are being 
neglected. As a result, government parties (often larger parties) regularly lose vo-
tes at these elections whereas parties espousing ideas with limited appeal (mostly 
small parties) do well. For reasons explained later in the book these phenomena ac-
cord with what is known as Second Order Election (SOE) theory.  
In the ﬁrst three decades of EP elections (1979 to 2009) these elections, despi-
te their ostensive purpose to elect a European parliament, had very little focus on Eu-
ropean matters. Instead they presented a distorted mirror of national political con-
cerns. In 2014 for the ﬁrst time, these elections were clearly "about Europe" but it has 
been argued that they were still just displaying a distorted reﬂection of national po-
litical concerns which, in the aftermath of the Great Recession and the economic strin-
gency that ensued in many EU countries, had also become "about Europe". In 2019 
it was widely expected that the European content of the EP elections that year would 
be even greater than in 2014. That does not seem to have occurred to any notable 
extent; although there are signs of a possibly different process – not speciﬁcally re-
lated to EU issues – leading to some Europeanization of this EP election. 
This is a book about those elections. In it a large group of scholars explore the 
nature of these elections both within each of the 28 countries that participated and 
also taking a comparative cross-national perspective. It tries to shed light on why the-
se elections were important and in what ways they may even have been pathbrea-
king, perhaps initiating a new era in which EP elections have palpable consequen-
ces that may even bring more European citizens to the polls. Certainly, from a tur-
nout perspective, the 2019 EP elections were quite remarkable: the ﬁrst such elec-
De Sio, L., Franklin, M.N. and Russo L. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 2019, Luiss Uni-
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tion in decades to exceed 50% turnout (the increase was of 8.4 percentage points 
with respect to 2004). This increase was observed in 21 of the 28 member countries. 
Along with the increase in turnout, these elections can be considered a ﬁrst for 
other reasons. They are the ﬁrst to test the institutionalization of a 2014 innovation 
that sought to link EP elections to the choice between candidates for President of the 
European Commission – the so-called Spitzenkandidaten. In 2014 the candidate from 
the European party group winning most votes did go on to become President of the 
EU Commission, but will that happen again in 2019? That election also may be the 
ﬁrst to exhibit a common dynamic across all of the EU in swings of vote shares bet-
ween party groups – a "Europeanization" of EP voting. 
The overall effort of this book is to provide a comprehensive and overarching, 
yet systematic and detailed analysis of the election outcome. This goal is achieved 
by explaining the outcome and the implications of the elections both in a wide-ran-
ging perspective – the ﬁrst part of the book –, and within each country separately – 
the second part of the book, in which experts from each EU member country describe 
the elections there in detail.  
 
The first part of the book is composed of five chapters. 
Chapter One, Much ado about nothing? The EP elections in comparative perspec-
tive (by Angelucci, Carrieri and Franklin), takes a close look at the EP groups. The 
authors ﬁnd overall a higher level of fragmentation in the mainstream camp, com-
pared to 2014, and some consolidation in the Eurosceptic group. Also, more re-
markably, they show that aggregate change moves in the same direction as avera-
ge change for every EP party group. This ﬁnding suggest that these elections might 
be exceptional in that, for what is probably the ﬁrst time, it is possible to observe an 
EU-wide dynamic of common variation across party groups. 
In Chapter Two, Party system dynamics, and potential new cleavages? (by Emanuele 
and Marino), the analysis covers all EP elections to date and focuses on three goals: 
(1) to explain he patterns of electoral instability, (2) to compare these patterns (and 
their variation) between national and EP elections, and (3) to explicate the under-
lying dimensions of competition and cleavage structures in the 28 European party 
systems. They ﬁnd that party swing is quite similar at the national and at Europe-
an elections within each country (with the exception of 1999 and 2009), and that 
class cleavages are steadily declining. 
In Chapter Three, Spitzenkandidaten 2.0: From experiment to routine in Europe-
an elections? (by Thomas Christiansen and Michael Shackleton) the authors study 
the extent to which this 2014 innovation had become institutionalized by 2019, and 
explore ways in which the practice already shows signs of evolution, by discussing 
its impact on the inter-institutional dynamics between the European Parliament and 
Council. 
Chapter Four, Explaining the outcome (by De Sio, Franklin, and Russo) focuses 
both on turnout and on party results. Normally turnout at EP elections is quite well 
predicted by structural factors (such as the electoral cycle and the prevalence of com-
pulsory voting). Effects of these factors are conﬁrmed over the past eight elections. 
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However, the analysis suggest that the turnout increase in 2019 cannot be attribu-
ted to any structural factor. This result is surprising, and further research will need 
to investigate this unexpected phenomenon. With regard to party results, the authors 
introduce theoretical and methodological innovations, linking the structural model 
of turnout evolution with the second order model of party choice. Findings de-
monstrate a previously undetected role of the electoral cycle in conditioning the way 
parties gain or lose support as compared with the most recent national election. 
Chapter Five, Impact of issues on party performance (by Maggini, De Sio, Garzia, 
and Trechsel), builds on the previous chapter by testing whether there is some is-
sue content to the results. The analysis of EP electoral gains/losses according to par-
ty issue stances (collected from EU 2019 expert survey), shows that there indeed are 
issue effects on party performance. When discounting second-order dynamics, some 
issue effects even appear signiﬁcant EU-wide, although the most accurate picture is 
one that sees area-speciﬁc effect patterns, with environmentalist, pro-cultural in-
tegration, pro-welfare stances emerging from the North-West, and culturally con-
servative (and pro-market) stances emerging from Central Eastern Europe. This sug-
gests that the 2019 EU elections might actually, perhaps for the ﬁrst time, show some 
genuine issue content that is readable across multiple countries. 
The second part of the book is composed of twenty-eight chapters: one for each 
country. These are detailed electoral reports in which one (or more) experts regar-
ding each of the countries offer a detailed overview of the background and of the 
results. 
The overall structure of the book reﬂects an effort which we already pioneered 
at the CISE (Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali) at Luiss in 2014, by offering – shortly 
after the election – an overview of election results for all countries, plus some con-
tribution covering the result at the aggregate European level. For this book we can 
say that that the 2014 experiment was further enhanced. New, international co-edi-
tors joined the project, a partnership between Luiss and Maastricht University was 
established, the panel of country experts was, if possible, reinforced (leading to de-
dicated chapters for each of the 28 countries), and even the scientiﬁc content of the 
comparative chapters of the ﬁrst part of the book saw an enrichment. However, this 
was done perhaps in an even shorter time span, which allowed us to publish this book 
within one month from EP elections. This was of course only possible thanks to all 
the authors of this book, who delivered interesting analyses and high-quality reports 
in an incredibly short span of time. The impressive list of authors, to whom our dee-
pest thanks go, includes Davide Angelucci, Marcello Carammia, Luca Carrieri, Gior-
gos Charalambous, Henrik Serup Christensen, Thomas Christiansen, Mikołaj Cze-
snik, Lorenzo De Sio, Patrick Dumont, Piret Ehin, Vincenzo Emanuele, Marta Frai-
le, Mark N. Franklin, Diego Garzia, Heiko Giebler, Vlastimil Havlík, Andrija Henjak, 
Enrique Hernández, Louise Hoon, Jaˉnis Ikstens, Mažvydas Jastramskis, Raphaël Kies, 
Michał Kotnarowski, Sylvia Kritzinger, Simona Kustec, Romain Lachat, Irene Lan-
dini, Marco Lisi, Nicola Maggini, Bruno Marino, Michael Marsh, Julie Hassing Niel-
sen, Maria Oskarson, Roderick Pace, Aldo Paparo, Carolina Plescia, Luana Russo, Ar-
jan H. Schakel, Dan Schmit, Michael Shackleton, Kaat Smets, Sorina Soare, Peter Spácˇ, 
introduction
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Marco Svensson La Rosa, Liisa Talving, Eftichia Teperoglou, Gábor Tóka, Alexander 
H. Trechsel, Claudiu Tuﬁs¸, Nikoleta Yordanova. Last, but deﬁnitely not least, we also 
wish to thank Jaanika Juntson and Aldo Paparo, for their invaluable help with or-
ganizational and operational aspects of the project. 
 
part i  
comparative overview

Chapter One 
Much ado about nothing?  
The EP elections in comparative perspective 
davide angelucci, luca carrieri and mark n. franklin
abstract 
 
This chapter analyses the electoral results of the European Parliament (EP) Election 
of May 2019. We adopt a twofold strategy: first, we calculate the shares of votes for 
all the political parties that contested these elections and we then aggregate these 
results to the level of EP group. Thus, we simulate a single European constituency. 
This empirical choice aims at capturing the 2019 EP group performances over the 
EU as a whole, observing differences from the 2014 EP elections. By simulating this 
scenario, the objective is to understand the real electoral increases/decreases of each 
EP group, net of all those institutional settings (e.g., electoral rules in each member 
state, different distribution of seats across countries, etc.) which prime the mecha-
nisms through which the new Parliament will be formed. Second, we analyse the new 
composition of the European Parliament in terms of seats. To the extent that ana-
lysis of the election outcome within a single European constituency clarifies the real 
dynamics of the rise and fall of European parties, this approach will enable us to as-
sess the concrete relationships and potential equilibria that will be established wi-
thin the EP.  
 
electoral results in a european constituency 
 
Previous work has demonstrated a significant electoral volatility at European Par-
liament (EP) elections, largely taking the form of increasing fleeing of votes from par-
ties belonging to the established EP groups, the PPE, S&D, ALDE, the Greens/EFA, 
towards anti-establishment and Eurosceptic parties (old ones as well as new), which 
are members of the ENF, EFDD, NGL-GUE and, partially, the ECR (Bosco and Wer-
ney 2012; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Morlino and Raniolo 
2017). These trends may mirror not solely an electoral realignment, but also the emer-
gence of new ideological foundations in political competition. According to Kriesi 
et al. (2006), globalization (or de-nationalization) has unleashed a new ideologi-
cal division, pitching those supporting cultural liberalism (Cosmopolitans) versus 
those defending a national culture (Nationalists). This integration-nationalism ideo-
logical divide may transform the content of political competition, also including sup-
port/opposition for European integration as its fundamental component. The pro-
De Sio, L., Franklin, M.N. and Russo L. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 2019, Luiss Uni-
versity Press, Rome, 2019.  
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/-anti-European distinction may even, in 2019, have become pivotal in influencing 
inter-party contestation at the EP level. EP elections represent a good vantage point 
to assess electoral gains/losses of the Eurosceptic EP groups (the ENF, EFDD, NGL-
GUE and ECR) vis-à-vis the Europhile ones (EPP, S&D, ALDE and the Greens/EFA), 
simulating a single European constituency.  
Therefore, we identify a Pro-EU bloc, made up by EPP, S&D, ALDE, and the Gre-
ens/EFA. The S&D and EPP have historically represented two main groups, competing 
to gain the majority of seats in the European Parliament (EP) and crucial positions 
in the European Commission (EC). The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and De-
mocrats (S&D) mainly includes parties stemming from the Social Democratic, So-
cialist and Labour traditions, but it has recently comprised progressive parties par-
tially unrelated with this party family, such as the Italian Democratic Party (Carrieri 
2014). On the contrary, the European People’s Party (EPP) is a more complex coa-
lition of parties. Indeed, the EPP had originally assembled parties of the Christian 
Democratic tradition, which have become a minority over time, while other con-
servative parties have been integrated within this group (Emanuele 2014). The Al-
liance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), though with an internal degree 
of heterogeneity, has sought to proﬁle itself as the group of European liberals, mer-
ging the liberal-radical and liberal-conservative parties (Marks and Wilson 2000). 
The Greens/European Free Alliance was founded in 1999, gathering parties with eco-
logist and post-materialist platforms.   
On the other hand, we also identify a Eurosceptic bloc, which has a more com-
plex history. The Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE-NGL) originated in 1995, including many communist or neo-communist par-
ties, but also more environmentalist and libertarian radical left parties. By contrast, 
right-wing Eurosceptic parties have often shifted from one EP group to another. The 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) had originally a preeminent po-
sition within the radical right camp, undergoing several splits (Maggini 2014). In-
deed, some of these have joined the European Conservative Reformists (ECR), foun-
ded by the British Conservatives, has gathered signiﬁcant governing and opposition 
right-wing parties but suffered from some relevant party defections towards a group 
favored by other eurosceptic parties who had formed the European for Nations and 
Freedom (ENF). This latter EP group has achieved the more successful strategy in 
terms of coalition-building, increasing the number of its member parties. Meanti-
me, the EFDD is dominated by Farage’s Brexit Party and the Italian Five Star Movement, 
generally lacking a widespread membership in the EU-28. 
In Table 1 we report the electoral results for each political party in each coun-
try but identiﬁed by the name of the EP group to which that party belongs. We also 
show (in the row marked “Total”) the percentage vote received by each EP group at 
the European level (evidently not the sum of national-level percentages, given the 
huge differences in the sizes of national electorates). We also report, for each coun-
try, variations in EP group electoral performance over the period 2014-2019, which 
are the differences between results achieved in 2019 compared to 2014 by the par-
ties that were members of each EP group in each member state. When we average 
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this statistic across all EU member countries (bottom row of Table 1) we treat the 
outcome of the EP election in each country as equally important, no matter the size 
of that country's electorate. Thus, in what follows we refer both to the overall elec-
toral results as calculated at the European level (totals row), and also at this mean 
of variations across EP groups, which gives us a view of the extent of common trends 
across countries.   
Importantly, the average change across countries always has the same sign as the 
total change across countries (the EPP total vote share is less in 2019 than in 2014 
and its variance across countries is also negative; the ALDE total in 2019 is greater 
than in 2014 and its variance is also positive – and the same for other party groups), 
so ﬁnal outcomes in total votes are not aggregation artifacts. Trends across countries 
are meaningful. 
Both measures of change reported at the bottom of Table 1 tells us that the two 
major EP groups in 2014, the EPP and S&D, both suffered from signiﬁcant electo-
ral losses across the majority of countries. On average, the EPP is the main loser of 
the 2019 EP elections, followed by the S&D. Overall, it is the other way around with 
the S&D being the main loser with the EPP ranked second. On average the EPP lost 
2.8 percentage points as compared to 2014, whereas the S&D lost 1.5 percentage 
points; overall the losses with 3.2 and 6.8. Similarly, the EFDD, the ECR, and the GUE 
all suffered important electoral losses.  
If the main EP groups can be identiﬁed as the losers of this election, the winners 
are the liberals of ALDE (they have gained, on average, 1 percentage point, an ove-
rall gain of 3.6), the Greens and, in particular, the ENF (which attained the highest 
growth rate both on average and overall, as compared to all the other EP groups). Note 
that overall gains/losses are always considerably greater than average gains/losses. 
The remarkable electoral decline of the S&D is explained by the electoral collapse 
that the S&D parties underwent in the four largest EU member states. In fact, the Ita-
lian Democratic Party (PD), the British Labour, the German Social Democrats (SPD) 
and the French Socialists all experienced notable electoral losses. This voting trend 
is due to multifaceted domestic backgrounds, but it clearly weakens the position of 
this EP group. Once electorally hegemonic at the European level. S&D parties have 
lost signiﬁcant share of votes in 17 out of 28 EU member states, across both Western 
and Eastern Europe. So the electoral losses have been widespread and generalized, 
unsettling the electoral primacy of the S&D in the entire continent. Though there are 
some signiﬁcant success stories within this party family, such as the Portuguese, Spa-
nish Socialists, the Danish Social Democrats and the Labour Party in the Netherlands, 
the EPP now electorally outweighs the S&D by 20.9 percent to 18.0 percent. 
If Athens cries, Sparta does not laugh. This statement seems to synthetize the 
EPP electoral performances at the 2019 EP elections. It did not lose as much as the 
S&D but nevertheless lost 3.2 percentage points in the entire continent. This case 
also mirrors a substantial electoral decline in some of the major EU member states, 
such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain, which has dragged down its general per-
formance. The less dramatic losses of the EPP are due to its electoral stability (or mo-
derate growth) in many member states, such as Austria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
much ado about nothing?
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Table 1 - Electoral results by EP group and country. Cells report the percentage of votes calculated as the ratio  
of the aggregate of valid votes of parties belonging to each group and the total of valid votes cast in Europe
party epp s&d alde greens
2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019
Austria 27 34.6 7.6 24.1 23.9 -0.2 8.1 8.4 0.3 14.5 14.1
Belgium 16.2 12.6 -3.6 18.3 16.2 -2.1 25.7 17.1 -8.5 14.6 15.1
Bulgaria 36.9 37.1 0.3 18.9 24.3 5.3 17.3 16.6 -0.7
Croatia 41.4 22.7 -19 29.9 18.7 -11 9.2 9.2 9.4 1.8
Cyprus 37.7 29 -8.7 18.5 24.4 5.9
Czechia 25.9 18.9 -7 14.2 4 -10 16.1 23.6 7.4
Denmark 9.1 6.2 -3 19.1 31.6 12.4 23.2 23.5 0.3 11 13.2
Estonia 13.9 10.5 -3.4 13.6 23.7 10.2 46.7 41.4 -5.3 13.2 1.8
Finland 27.8 25.7 -2.2 12.3 14.6 2.3 26.4 19.9 -6.5 9.3 16
France 20.8 8.5 -12 14 6.2 -7.8 9.9 24.9 15 8.9 13.5
Germany 34.5 28.9 -6.5 27.3 15.8 -11 4.8 7.6 2.8 12.8 21.5
Greece 22.7 33.1 10.4 15.8 9.2 -6.6 0.9 1.5 0.5 1 0.9
Hungary 51.6 52.6 1.1 20.6 22.7 2 9.9 9.9 12.3 2.2
Ireland 22.3 29.6 7.3 5.3 3.1 -2.2 22.3 16.5 -5.8 4.9 11.4
Italy 21.7 9.3 -12 40.8 22.7 -18 1.4 3.1 1.7 0.9 2.3
Latvia 46.6 26.4 -20 13.5 17.8 4.3 2.1 5.4 3.2 6.4 6.3
Lithuania 17.4 19.7 2.3 17.3 15.9 -1.4 30.8 15.6 -15 10.2 14.8
Luxembourg 37.7 21.1 -17 11.7 12.2 0.5 14.8 21.4 6.7 15 18.9
Malta 40 37.9 -2.1 53.4 54.3 0.9 2 2 2.9 0.7
Netherlands 15.2 12.2 -3 9.4 19 9.6 27.5 21.7 -5.8 7.2 11.1
Poland 38.9 38.5 -0.5 9.4 6.1 -3.4 0.3
Portugal 30 30.2 0.3 34 35.9 1.9 8.5 2.6 -5.9 4.2 7.4
Romania 24.7 38 13.3 37.6 25.7 -12 21.8 26.5 4.6
Slovakia 33.3 37.4 4 24.1 15.7 -8.4 6.7 -6.7 0.5 0.8
Slovenia 41.4 37.5 -3.9 8.1 18.7 10.6 9.3 26.9 17.6 11.2 3.7
Spain 26.7 20.3 -6.4 23.5 33.2 9.6 15.4 15.1 -0.3 6.1 5.8
Sweden 24.4 25.5 1.1 36.9 24.3 -13 20.4 14.9 -5.5 19.2 11.5
UK 0.2 3.3 3.2 24.4 13.6 -11 6.9 20.2 13.3 10.1 16.5
Total 24.1 20.9 -3.2 24.8 18 -6.8 9.2 12.8 3.6 7.4 10.2
Mean var. -2.8 -1.5 1
Sources: Official national offices.
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gue ecr efdd enf
Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var.
-0.4 19.7 17.2 -2.5
0.5 3.4 8.4 5 16.1 14.2 -1.9 4.1 12 7.9
10.7 7.4 -3.3 3.6 3.6
-7.6 8.5 8.5 5.7 5.7
27 27.5 0.5
11 6.9 -4 7.7 14.5 6.9 5.2 -5.2 9.1 9.1
2.3 8.1 9.2 1.1 26.6 -27 10.8 10.8
-11 4 13 8.9
6.7 9.3 6.9 -2.4 12.9 -13 13.8 13.8
4.5 6.6 6.3 -0.3 3.8 -3.8 24.9 23.3 -1.5
8.7 8.6 5.5 -3.1 7.7 -7.7 11 11
-0.1 26.6 23.8 -2.8 3.5 0.8 -2.7 2.7 -2.7 0.7 0.7
-10
6.5 22.8 34.8 12
1.4 4 -4 3.7 6.5 2.8 21.2 17.1 -4.1 6.2 34.3 28.2
-0.1 14.4 16.5 2.1 8.3 -8.3
4.7 8.1 5.5 -2.5 14.3 2.7 -12
3.9 4.8 4.8 7.5 10 2.5
-2.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3
3.9 13.8 7.4 -6.5 7.7 17.8 10.1 0.5 -0.5 13.3 3.5 -9.8
-0.3 35.8 45.4 9.6 4.6 4.6 7.2 0.1 -7.1
3.2 18.6 18 -0.7
3.2 3.2
0.3 0.6 0.6 14.3 14.9 0.6 3.6 4.1 0.5 17.5 3.2 -14.3
-7.4 5.5 6.3 0.9 1.7 1.7
-0.3 21.7 11.5 -10
-7.6 7.8 6.8 -1 15.3 15.3 12 -12
6.3 1.1 0.9 -0.2 23.9 9.1 -15 26.6 30.5 3.9 3.2 3.2
2.8 7.7 5.4 -2.4 8.3 6.8 -1.5 6.7 55.3 -1.4 5.2 11 5.8
-0.4 -0.5 -1.1 2.3
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Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. Neverthe-
less, and despite losses in 15 out of 28 EU member states, the EPP vote remains fair-
ly uniformly distributed across the continent, with this EP Group being still electo-
rally entrenched in many important Southern, Western and Eastern countries.  
It is worth noting that the EPP and S&D total sum of votes decreased from 48.9% 
(2014) to 38.9% (2019), indicating a sizeable and rapid electoral downturn of the 
two main pro-EU EP groups, presaging many coalition-making dilemmas in the EP 
and Commission (EC). However, these electoral losses have been partially compensated 
by the increase of the votes achieved by the ALDE and Greens-EFA. These two EP 
groups embody different ideological traditions as compared to the EPP and S&D, but 
clearly belonging to the pro-EU pole. In 2019, the ALDE gains 2.8 percentage points, 
reaching an overall share of 12.8%. This result is mainly due to the voting boost achie-
ved by the French The Republic on the Move (EM) and the British Liberal Democrats. 
ALDE parties also obtained good performances in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and Spain. Though the electoral growth of 
the ALDE parties appears to be indisputable, there are some elements of weaknes-
ses linked to its overall result. In fact, the uncertainty of the UK membership, with 
the Liberal Democrats probably leaving the group with the rest of Britsh MEPs, and 
the peculiar nature of the EM, depending so much on Emmanuel Macron's perso-
nal fortunes, leaves some questions regarding the future of this EP group, which has 
obtained an important, but perhaps ephemeral, result.     
On the contrary, the Greens-EFA electoral growth (+2.8 percentage points) pre-
sents different characteristics, outlining a well-deﬁned electoral pattern. Indeed, the-
se parties have gained signiﬁcant shares of votes in the West and, in particular, in 
North European countries, such as Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lu-
xembourg, the Netherlands and the UK. This result is certainly unsurprising, because 
of the geographic bias of the Post-Materialistic cleavage (Inglehart 1976), which has 
historically set up a favourable window of opportunity for this party family in North-
Western European democracies. Though the Greens-EFA parties have reinforced their 
position in the in West European left camp, they are still electorally marginal in Sou-
thern and Eastern European democracies. This geographical unbalance in the elec-
toral fortunes of the Greens also explains the discrepancies between their electoral 
performance calculated on the whole European constituency (+2.8) and their elec-
toral performance assessed in terms of average variation across countries between 
2014 and 2019 (+0.2). Moreover, it is worth noting that the second-order nature 
of the EP elections has always rewarded these parties in Western Europe, with the 
EP electorate being less constrained by strategic motivations.  
The Eurosceptic EP groups were widely expected to make major breakthroughs 
at this EP elections. Instead, these groups have had only a limited electoral success, 
undergoing (as we shall see) a redistribution of votes and seats among themselves. 
In fact, three out of four of the Eurosceptic groups have lost remarkable shares of vo-
tes. First and foremost, the radical left parties of the GUE-NGL have suffered a no-
table setback, losing ground in their South-Western strongholds (especially Gree-
ce, France and Spain). These parties appeared to present a successful challenge to 
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the austerity policies and the neo-liberal bias of the EU at the 2014 EP elections. In-
deed, the parties belonging to the GUE-NGL became central actors in many natio-
nal party systems. Nowadays, this so-called anti-austerity bloc is electorally stagnating, 
weakening its presence almost everywhere. Meantime, the EFDD has lost 1.4 per-
centage points, suffering from the electoral defeat of one of its major members, the 
M5S in Italy. Though Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party has enhanced its votes as compa-
red to the UKIP in 2014, which was the leading party of this EP group, the EFDD ove-
rall performance has lagged behind in 2019.  
The ECR has also decreased its share of votes, losing 1.8 percentage points. This 
electoral defeat has mainly to do with its lack of coalition-building capacity. In fact, 
this EP group has suffered from many signiﬁcant defections, with AFD (Germany), 
DF (Denmark) and True Finns (Finland) moving towards the ENF. This shift of par-
ties largely explains the ECR voting losses, which has also been accompanied by the 
collapse of the British Conservative party. The political and electoral crisis of the To-
ries, plus the outcome of the so-called Brexit referendum, may have minimised the 
ECR appeal for other Eurosceptic parties. Nevertheless, the ECR has managed to in-
crease its share of votes in some national contexts, such as Croatia, the Czech Repu-
blic, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. While the ECR coalition-building stra-
tegy has been ﬂawed, the ENF has been able to become more inclusive over time. We 
may hypothesize that the Italian Lega entrepreneurial efforts have brought substantial 
payoffs, with this governing party being committed to securing the adherence to this 
group of new and old parties. Unmistakably, the ENF is one of the success stories of 
these EP elections, gaining 5.8 percentage points and becoming the fourth electoral 
EP group. Apart from its coalition-building strategy, many important results have been 
obtained by its traditional members (FPO, LEGA, FN, VB, etc.), with the notable ex-
ception of the Dutch PVV. Nonetheless, the ENF's relative electoral breakthrough has 
appeared to occur under the form of a voting redistribution with the other right-wing 
Eurosceptic groups, which do not allow us to recognize a proper electoral realignment. 
All things considered, despite the gains and losses summarized above, by scru-
tinising the overall percentages of the pro-EU parties and the anti-EU ones we may 
identify some kind of stability in the balance of power within the continent. The pro-
EU camp has decreased its vote share by 3.9 percentage points. This bloc is certainly 
more fragmented as compared to 2014 EP elections, with losses of votes by its two 
major components (EPP and S&D) being moderately offset by the performance of 
the two minor ones (Greens-EFA and ALDE). This is a pattern of electoral stability 
with fragmentation, which clearly summarizes the pro-EU parties’ trajectory in the 
2019 EP elections. Meantime, the Eurosceptic bloc has not boosted its overall voting 
score, gaining only 0.5 percentage points. However, the ENF is clearly taking on a 
hegemonic role within this camp, increasing votes and perhaps its blackmail power 
within the EP. It is worth noting that the ENF may present a more concrete challenge 
towards the pro-EU parties, because of its capacity to reduce the fragmentation of 
the Eurosceptic formations in the EP.  In a nutshell, the shift of the absolute votes 
would draw a pattern of electoral stability, and in spite of some concerns concerning 
the EU’s destiny, it is a “much ado about nothing” scenario. 
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seats for the ep groups 
 
The electoral results of the main European groups at the EU level do not reveal the 
real balance of power within the new European Parliament. Its composition in fact 
derives from the diversified electoral mechanisms within the Union, the different 
allocations of seats between member states, as well as the different electoral dyna-
mics within each member state. After all, we are talking about 28 different elections, 
reflecting very diverse internal scenarios, and electing a different number of re-
presentatives in the EP. Even at a first glance, it is clear how the electoral results cal-
culated on a European basis are not perfectly reproduced in the distribution of se-
ats across the various groups, which compose the European Parliament (Table 2). 
And it is equally clear (as we shall see) that a distribution of seats based on the EU-
wide result would have returned an even more fragmented Parliament than the one 
that will actually take its seats in the coming weeks. 
Therefore, it is now time to delve into the real composition of the new Europe-
an Parliament, analyzing the new equilibria and the strategic options for the seve-
ral key players in town, in light of the next crucial steps to be taken regarding the 
appointments of key ﬁgures of the Union (i.e. the President of the Commission, the 
President of the European Parliament and the President of the Council). 
As we have seen, the losers of these elections are the parties linked to the EPP and 
S&D groups, the parliamentary groups that in past EP legislative sessions held together 
a majority within the EP. Contrary to what we saw in terms of electoral results on an 
European constituency (Table 1), the Populars (EPP) are the big losers in terms of 
seats (Table 2). Overall, compared to 2014, they lost 41 seats, down to 333. The loss 
is not localized but spans across different geographical areas in a rather homogeneous 
way, just as did the loss of votes. In Northern European countries and in Eastern Eu-
ropean countries they lose 14 seats, whereas 13 are the seats lost in countries of the 
Mediterranean area. In general, compared to the 2014 elections, in only 6 countries 
out of 28 do the Populars improve their position in the new EP – a worse result than 
in terms of votes, where they lost ground in 11 out of 28 countries. 
The S&D lose 38 seats compared to 2014, and now get 153 seats. Not differen-
tly from what we observed for the EPP, losses are widespread in many EU countries, 
particularly in Northern Europe and Southern Europe. Nevertheless, the most no-
table drop was recorded in Northern countries: 29 seats have been lost, an even grea-
ter loss than that recorded for the Populars in the same geographical area. The de-
feat in Southern European countries was more contained. Here the sharp decline 
of the Italian S&D representation (-12 seats) was partly dampened by the growth 
of the Social Democrats in Spain (+ 6 seats) and, to a lesser extent, in Portugal (+1 
seat). Finally, the losses of the Social Democrats in Eastern Europe are minimal (-3 
seats compared to 2014).  
Just as we saw in terms of votes, together with the Greens and the members 
of the ENF group, the Liberals of the ALDE are the winners of these elections in 
terms of seats. Taking advantage of the crisis of the traditional parties, which are 
mostly linked to the two historical groups of the EPP and the S&D, liberal forces 
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have been able to gather wide support in the 2019 elections. The figures are re-
markable in Northern Europe, where the success of the ALDE has been impressi-
ve. The group moved from 38 to 70 seats, with an increase of 32 seats in total. The 
parties which are included in the ALDE group obtained a good result also in Ea-
stern Europe: here 10 more seats have been gained as compared to 2014, thus mo-
ving from 19 to 29 MEPs. 
The group of the Greens strengthens its presence in the European Parliament, 
winning 73 seats, 23 more than in 2014. The ‘Green wave’ that in the chronicles se-
ems to have crossed the Old Continent, is however geographically localized, exclu-
sively involving the countries of Northern Europe. Except in Sweden and Austria, whe-
re the parties linked to this Eurogroup lose 2 and 1 seats respectively, the Greens vi-
sibly gained support everywhere in Northern Europe. Overall, in Northern Europe 
the number of seats assigned to the Greens grew by 24 units, an increase that is se-
cond only to that of those parties which are linked to the ALDE. In Southern Euro-
pe and in Eastern Europe, the Greens representation, already meagre in 2014, re-
mains substantially stable. Of the 4 seats occupied in 2014, all are reconﬁrmed in 
2019, with the decisive contribution of Spain and Portugal, the only two countries 
in the area able to elect Green MEPs. The situation remains substantially unchan-
ged, compared to 2014, also in Eastern Europe, where the number of seats for the 
Greens, already small in 2014, falls by one unit. 
Apart from mainstream groups, signiﬁcant losses are recorded both in the radical-
left group GUE and in the right-wing groups ECR and EFDD. For GUE, the number 
of seats goes from 52 to 39, with a generalized drop throughout the continent and 
a prevalence of losses in Southern Europe. For the EFDD group, the loss was 5 se-
ats in a rather homogeneous way throughout the continent. The only exception is 
in fact the United Kingdom, where the parties linked to the group still managed to 
obtain 5 more seats than in 2014 (and this is the ﬁgure that returns an overall po-
sitive balance between 2019 and 2014 in Northern Europe). Even the ECR, taken 
as a whole, loses seats (-11 seats compared to the 2014 elections), but in this case 
it is a geographically localized loss that mainly involves the countries of Northern 
Europe. By contrast, a positive balance clearly emerges in Eastern Europe and, to some 
extent, in Southern Europe. 
Compared to the forecast on the eve of the election, the advance of right-wing 
groups with a strong Eurocritical or even Eurosceptic connotation has been rather 
limited, although still relevant. The EFDD and ENF groups together reach 115 se-
ats, 26 more than in 2014. If we add the seats of the ECR group, where there are also 
some parties that are rather critical towards the EU (Fratelli d’Italia in Italy, for exam-
ple), the right-wing pole of the new EP will be able to count on 174 seats, far from 
the majority of seats and, more importantly, far from being able to become a key pla-
yer in the formation of a new majority. For these groups, the only larger parliamentary 
group with which there is the possibility of dialogue is in fact the EPP, but even by 
adding the total number of seats obtained by the Populars with those of the right-
wing groups, the coalition would not reach the 376 seats that are necessary to have 
a majority in Parliament. In addition to the scarcity of numbers, there exist deep di-
much ado about nothing?
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Table 2 - Seats distribution in the new European Parliament by country, EP group, and regional area.  
Green colours indicate gains; red colours indicate losses 
party epp s&d alde greens
2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019
Northern Europe
Finland 3 3 2 2 4 3 -1 1 2
Sweden 4 6 +2 6 5 -1 3 3 4 2
Ireland 4 5 +1 1 -1 1 1 1
UK 20 10 -10 1 17 +16 6 11
Austria 5 7 +2 5 5 1 1 3 2
Belgium 4 4 4 3 -1 6 4 -2 2 3
Denmark 1 1 3 3 3 5 +2 1 2
Germany 34 29 -5 27 16 -11 4 7 +3 13 24
Luxembourg 3 2 -1 1 1 1 2 +1 1 1
Netherlands 5 4 -1 3 6 +3 7 6 -1 2 3
France 20 8 -12 13 5 -8 7 21 +14 6 12
Total 83 69 -14 85 56 -29 38 70 +32 39 63
Southern Europe
Cyprus 2 2 2 2
Greece 5 8 +3 4 2 -2
Italy 17 7 -10 31 19 -12
Malta 3 2 -1 3 4 +1
Portugal 7 7 8 9 +1 2 -2 1
Spain 17 12 -5 14 20 +6 8 8 4 3
Total 51 38 -13 62 56 -6 10 8 -2 4 4
Central Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 7 7 4 5 +1 4 3 -1
Croatia 5 4 -1 2 3 +1 2 1 -1 1
Czech  
Republic 7 5 -2 4 -4 4 6 +2 3
Estonia 1 -1 1 2 +1 3 3 1
Hungary 12 13 +1 4 5 +1 2 +2 2
Latvia 4 2 -2 1 2 +1 1 1
Lithuania 2 3 +1 2 2 3 2 -1 1 2
Poland 23 17 -6 5 8 +3
Slovenia 5 4 -1 1 2 +1 1 2 +1 1
Slovakia 6 4 -2 4 3 -1 1 2 +1
Romania 15 14 -1 16 9 -7 1 8 +7
Total 87 73 -14 44 41 -3 19 29 +10 7 6
Total - EU 221 180 -41 191 153 -38 67 107 +40 50 73
Source: EP Parliament
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gue ecr efdd enf
Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var. 2014 2019 Var.
+1 2 2 2 -2 2 +2
-2 1 1 3 +3 2 -2
+1 4 3 -1 1 1 -1
+5 1 1 20 4 -16 24 19 +5
-1 4 3 -1
+1 1 +1 4 3 -1 1 3 +2
+1 1 1 4 -4 1 +1
+11 8 5 -3 8 -8 11 +11
+1 3 1 -2 2 5 +3 4 -4
+6 4 6 +2 1 -1 23 22 -1
+24 23 20 -3 41 15 -26 27 29 +2 32 42 +10
2 2
6 6 1 -1
3 -3 5 +5 17 14 -3 5 28 +23
+1 4 4
-1 11 6 -5
26 18 -8 1 5 +4 17 14 -3 5 28 +23
2 2
-1 1 1
+3 3 1 -2 2 4 +2 1 -1 2 +2
-1
-2
1 2 +1 1 -1
+1 1 1 2 -2
19 26 +7 4 -4
-1
2 2
1 +1
-1 3 1 -2 28 39 +11 4 -4 4 2 -2
+23 52 39 -13 70 59 -11 48 43 -5 41 72 +31
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visions within the European right. Although some members of the EPP have called 
for a new dialogue between centre-right and right-wing parties, this road seems to 
be all uphill, primarily because this position is in fact a minority one within the EPP, 
Moreover, even for the supporters of a dialogue with more Eurosceptic parties, this 
strategy should involve only those parties which are most open to negotiation – which 
would probably exclude, for example, the MEPs of the Brexit Party. At the same time, 
an EPP shifting towards the right would deﬁnitively break the alliance with the S&D 
and, most importantly in a EP that is for sure more fragmented than in the past, with 
the Liberals of the ALDE who, at this point, seem to hold a critical position for the 
formation of a majority in Parliament. 
If it is true that the 2019 elections will not be remembered as a success for Eu-
rosceptic parties, it is equally true that the traditional groups of the centre-right and 
centre-left have lost their centrality within the Parliament. The EPP and the S&D to-
gether do not reach the 376 seats that are necessary to have a majority and, as a con-
sequence, the coalition that was majoritarian in the previous legislature will necessarily 
move towards the centre. The most plausible hypothesis is that of a coalition with 
the centrist forces of the ALDE, which already in the previous legislature repeate-
dly supported proposals of the PPE-S&D coalition. It is also the only realistic possi-
bility for the formation of a rather cohesive majority. Indeed, the other possibility 
for the PPE-S&D would be that of including the Greens in the coalition. However, 
the main Greens component from Germany seems not to be willing to negotiate on 
crucial matters such as environmentalism and socio-economic issues. Also, given the 
strong socialist inspiration of the group, its entry into the coalition would skew the 
balance of power between the EPP and the S&D excessively, an eventuality that se-
ems not to be plausible in the immediate future, given that the EPP still remains the 
largest group in the Parliament. 
In the coming weeks the picture will become clearer. The appointments of the 
President of the Commission, the President of the Parliament and the President of 
the Council will be a test for the new parliamentary arrangements. Until the end of 
the previous legislature, these offices were owned by the groups most represented 
in the EP. This time, however, in addition to the EPP and the S&D, there will be ano-
ther player, and it is to be expected that compromise will be more difficult than in 
the past. These difficulties might emerge quite soon in the process of selecting the 
new President of the Commission. Usually, the President of the European Commission 
is selected by the most representative group within the Parliament. However, the in-
clusion of the ALDE in the EPP-S&D coalition might generate internal conﬂicts wi-
thin the coalition itself. The Spitzenkandidat of the Populars is in fact Manfred We-
ber, a long-standing MEP, elected from the CSU in Germany, whose candidacy is stron-
gly opposed by the Liberals (including Emmanuel Macron). Whether this will lead 
to an early deterioration of the internal relationships is still to be seen. However, it 
seems clear that, in a fragmented parliament, the most moderate groups will retain 
a predominant position. 
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Chapter Two  
Party system change in EU countries: 
 long-term instability and cleavage restructuring 
vincenzo emanuele and bruno marino
This chapter deals with the analysis of party system change in Europe after the 2019 
European Parliament (EP) elections. Our task is threefold. First, we explore the pat-
terns of electoral instability in Europe at the 2019 EP elections and compare them 
across countries and over time. Second, we compare trends and variations in elec-
toral instability between national and EP elections, following the expectations de-
rived from the Second Order Election (SOE) theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Third, 
we aim to understand the underlying dimensions of competition and cleavage struc-
tures in the 28 European party systems. From an empirical viewpoint, our analysis 
is based on data taken from a recently published dataset on electoral volatility and 
its internal components in EP elections since 1979 (Emanuele et al. 2019).  
 
electoral volatility in ep elections: national and temporal variations 
 
Starting with the first task, let us focus on the electoral instability of European party 
systems after the 2019 round of EP elections. Table 1 reports figures using the Pedersen 
(1979) index of electoral volatility for the 2019 EP election in the 28 EU countries. 
Overall, electoral volatility (Total Volatility, TV) in 2019 was 23.7. This quite re-
markable level of electoral instability has been driven by particularly highly volati-
le elections in some countries, such as the United Kingdom (50.4), Slovakia (41.6), 
and Italy (37.25). In as many as nine countries, this EP election has been the most 
volatile in each country’s EP electoral history: Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom, inclu-
ding both Western European (WE) and Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries. Moreover, in only three countries (Malta, Austria, and Cyprus) TV has been 
lower than 10, lower than the average volatility in WE national elections after World 
War II (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017).  
As expected, there are some differences between WE and CEE countries (re-
spectively, 20.7 and 28.2). Notwithstanding this – still relevant – difference betwe-
en the two regions, even Western European countries display a clear pattern of in-
stability, as the average volatility exceeds the threshold of 20 set by Mair (2011) for 
considering an election as highly volatile. The key difference that still distinguishes 
Western countries from their Central and Eastern counterparts can be found by di-
sentangling the aggregate index of electoral volatility between its two internal com-
De Sio, L., Franklin, M.N. and Russo L. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 2019, Luiss Uni-
versity Press, Rome, 2019.  
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Table 1 - Electoral Volatility and its components in the 2019 EP elections, European Union
country regv altv othv tv
Austria 2.65 5.6 0.25 8.5
Belgium 0.55 16.8 0.65 18
Bulgaria 4.05 6.55 2.95 13.55
Croatia 8.55 11.75 10.2 30.5
Cyprus 2.75 4.3 1.9 8.95
Czech Republic 3.75 28.15 3.7 35.6
Denmark 4.45 19.4 23.85
Estonia 2.95 16 14.1 33.05
Finland 10.7 1.5 12.2
France 3.3 8.25 2.25 13.8
Germany 1.65 19.35 2.4 23.4
Greece 7.9 13 5.75 26.65
Hungary 6.3 13.4 0.65 20.35
Ireland 1.25 18.95 3.05 23.25
Italy 3.85 31.7 1.7 37.25
Latvia 6.3 21.35 1.35 29
Lithuania 4.75 19.6 8.15 32.5
Luxembourg 1.05 16.5 0.25 17.8
Malta 1.35 1.75 1.05 4.15
Netherlands 6.45 23 0.95 30.4
Poland 4.75 11.45 0.3 16.5
Portugal 6.2 9.05 1.8 17.05
Romania 12.55 6.55 5.9 25
Slovakia 22.25 15.75 3.6 41.6
Slovenia 20.05 11.6 1.25 32.9
Spain 17.25 2.55 19.8
Sweden 3.15 13.35 0.2 16.7
United Kingdom 16.5 31.6 2.3 50.4
Mean WE 3.71 15.33 1.68 20.71
Mean CEE 8.75 14.74 4.74 28.23
Mean EU 5.69 15.1 2.88 23.67
Note: RegV refers to Regeneration volatility, AltV to Alteration volatility, OthV to Other parties volatili-
ty, and TV to Total Volatility. For more information, see Emanuele et al. (2019)
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ponents of Regeneration (RegV) and Alteration (AltV). The former measures the elec-
toral volatility due to the entry and exit of parties from the party system, while the 
latter is the electoral volatility caused by vote switching between existing parties.  
Table 1 shows that what accounts for most of the difference in electoral volati-
lity levels between the two regions is due to RegV: despite the recent wave of new 
party emergence in Western Europe (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Emanuele and Chia-
ramonte 2018), CEE countries continue to represent a sort of ‘world apart’. Indeed, 
RegV is equal to 8.75 in CEE, against 3.7 in WE. In other words, in an average 2019 
EP election in CEE, one or more new parties emerge, accounting for 17.5% of votes, 
or one or more parties that existed in the 2014 election disappear.1 Conversely, the 
electoral shifts among established parties are similar in the two regions, as AltV is 
15.3 in WE and 14.7 in CEE.  
To fully understand the scope of party system change brought about by this round 
of EP elections, it is necessary to put the 2019 results into a longitudinal perspecti-
ve. Figure 1 reports the average levels of electoral volatility in Europe over time. We 
have divided the temporal span of the analysis into four meaningful electoral pha-
ses: the ‘Cold War’ period, 1979-1989; the ‘post-Wall’ period, 1989-1999; the ‘En-
largement’ phase, 1999-2009; and, ﬁnally, the ‘Recession’, after 2009. 
 
 
Figure 1. Components of electoral volatility in EP elections during different electoral phases 
 
party system change in eu countries
1. This finding is consistent with previous studies about the exceptionality of CEE as concern the 
multiplication of ‘electoral hurricanes’ due to new party emergence in national elections (Hou-
ghton and Deegan-Krause 2015).
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By looking more into detail at the data, what strikingly emerges from the ﬁgu-
re is that moving from phase 1 to phase 4, electoral volatility and its two internal com-
ponents have undergone a monotonic increase over time. TV has skyrocketed from 
12.5 in the Cold War period to 23.8 in the Recession. Turning to its internal com-
ponents, AltV shows a fairly constant increase over time, from 8.8 (ﬁrst phase) to 14.7 
(last phase), while RegV is almost stable in the ﬁrst three phases before a sharp up-
surge in the Recession phase (6.6). 
The monotonic increase of TV over time is not merely a descriptive fact but, ra-
ther, a robust ﬁnding. Table 2 shows the results of a multivariate regression analy-
sis of TV (Models 1 and 2) and its internal components (Models 3,AltV, and 4, RegV) 
on time (measured in years) and a dichotomous variable indicating CEE countries.  
Overall, evidence shows the effect of time on the increase in TV is signiﬁcant with 
p<0.012. Furthermore, our analysis shows this increase over time is due only to the 
changing patterns in WE, given that CEE countries display very high but steady va-
lues of TV across the three electoral periods (2004-2009, 2009-2014, 2014-2019). 
This is shown by Model 2, where an interaction between time and the dichotomous 
variable for CEE is added to the linear model. Figure 2 below reports the Average Mar-
Table 2 - Regression analysis of TV and its internal components (AltV and RegV)
model 1 (tv) model 2 (tv) model 3 (altv) model 4 (regv)
b se b se b se b se
Time 0.230** 0.068 0.238** 0.069 0.152** 0.051 0.054 0.036
CEE 9.075*** 1.798 15.82 11.429 2.600 1.340 4.493*** 0.959
Time*CEE -0.219 0.367
Constant 11.74*** 1.584 11.58*** 1.610 8.613*** 1.181 2.200* 0.845
R-squared 0.297 0.298 0.127 0.198
Number of 
elections 147 147 147 147
Number of 
countries 28 28 28 28
*p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001.
2. These findings are robust to alternative specifications: adding an additional dichotomous va-
riable to account for Southern European countries, performing a regression with country clu-
sters, a panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) regression, or a Prais-Winsten regression.
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ginal Effect (AME) of time on volatility at the two possible values assumed by our di-
chotomous variable. As shown in the ﬁgure, the effect of time on TV is signiﬁcant only 
in the case of Western Europe. In other words, a ‘permanent instability’ is what has 
occurred in EP elections in CEE countries since 2004, while an increasingly destructured 
party system is the dominant trend in WE. 
 
Figure 2. Average Marginal Effect of Time on TV in WE (CEE=0) and CEE (CEE=1) 
 
By disentangling TV into RegV and AltV, Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 indicate that 
AltV shows the same increasing pattern over time as TV, with only an important dif-
ference: the dichotomous variable for CEE is not signiﬁcant, which means that the-
re are no differences in the AltV between the two regions, as compared to TV. Con-
versely, in the case of RegV, the effect of time is not signiﬁcant (as already mentio-
ned), while the analysis shows a powerful positive effect of the CEE dichotomous va-
riable. In other words, this means that a certain level of Regeneration volatility has 
always existed in EP elections, and this marks a clear difference compared to the hi-
storical patterns observed in Western European national elections (Bartolini and Mair 
1990; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017).  
 
comparing ep and national elections: still a significant difference? 
 
In the remaining part of this chapter, we raise two further research questions (RQs) 
to address the two tasks formulated at the beginning. First, to what extent do the 
levels and trends of electoral volatility in EP elections match or deviate from those 
observed in national elections in the same countries and phases. Second, whether 
this increasing instability of party systems signals changing patterns of competition 
and cleavage structure across Europe. 
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Starting from the ﬁrst research question, by considering all EP elections occur-
red in the 28 member countries, volatility (TV) is equal to 19 (N=147), while in na-
tional elections, in the same countries and period, TV is 15.1. By disentangling this 
average between WE and the CEE countries, TV in EP elections is 16.4 (N=118) in 
WE and 28.0 (N=29) in CEE. To make a comparison, in WE national elections, TV 
has been, on average, 12.3 and, in CEE national elections, 26.4.3   
As we have previously shown, this average TV in EP elections is the result of a 
sharp and monotonic increase over time (see Figure 1) and this is absolutely consi-
stent with the trends observed in TV in national elections in WE, speciﬁcally with 
regard to the last phase marked by the impact of the Great Recession (Drummond 
2006; Hérnandez and Kriesi 2016; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017). Conversely, 
for CEE, we have evidence of sustained and prolonged instability ever since the de-
mocratic transition. However, recent studies have not detected an increase over time 
for CEE countries, but rather a steady trend or even a declrase (Lane and Ersson 2007; 
Casal Bértoa 2013; Emanuele, Chiaramonte and Soare 2018). 
All in all, and with some surprise, a clear difference between EP and national elec-
tions can be detected only in Western Europe.4 In this regard, the long-established 
second-order election theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980) stresses that, given that the-
re is less at stake in EP elections compared to national elections, voters are freer to 
cast a sincere vote, and they often exploit this opportunity to defect from governing 
parties or, more generally, from major parties to support opposition parties and new 
contenders. As a result, a higher TV is expected in EP elections compared to natio-
nal ones. To accurately gauge whether TV signiﬁcantly differs in two electoral are-
nas (EP and national ones) and to what extent such difference predicted by the se-
cond-order-election theory varies over time, we performed a regression analysis whe-
re the outcome is TV in both European and national elections, and the predictors are: 
a dichotomous variable for CEE countries, a categorical variable for phases (reference 
category: Cold War), and a dichotomous variable where 0 is attributed to TV in na-
tional elections, and 1 to TV in EP elections. Finally, we also added an interaction 
between the variable for EP vs national elections and the phase variable.5 This in-
teraction allows us to test whether being an EP election vs a national one has a si-
gniﬁcant marginal effect on TV across phases. Figure 3 reports the average margi-
nal effects  (AMEs) of the interaction. 
 
 
3. Data on WE have been taken from Emanuele (2015), while, for CEE, from Emanuele Chia-
ramonte and Soare (2018). 
4. This result is similar to the one found by Caramani (2015), whose analysis does not consider 
elections after 2009. This means that the recent Recession phase has not changed the overall 
volatility pattern between national and EP elections. 
5. Results are not shown but are available upon request.
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Figure 3. Average Marginal Effect of EP vs national elections at different phases 
Figure 3 shows that the marginal effect of the dummy distinguishing EP elections 
from national ones has a signiﬁcant effect only during the Enlargement phase. This 
ﬁnding is rather surprising, as it shows that the distinction between EP and natio-
nal elections does not make a difference for predicting TV scores neither until 1999 
nor after 2009. In the ﬁrst two phases, European party systems are still in a phase 
of relative electoral stability, and the above ﬁnding means that EP elections do not 
bring a signiﬁcant additional instability compared to national elections. Converse-
ly, the non-signiﬁcant marginal effect in the Recession phase, characterised – as seen 
earlier – by skyrocketing electoral volatility, witnesses a general convergence towards 
instability, regardless of the type of election. To sum up, this analysis rejects, except 
for the 1999-2009 period and at least for this limited aspect related to the expected 
difference in volatility between the two electoral arenas, the second-order election 
model. 
 
below the surface:  
a changing cleavage structure in european party systems? 
 
What remains to be explored is our second RQ, namely, whether the detected in-
creasing instability witnesses the presence of changing patterns of competition and 
cleavage structure in European party systems. To do so, we have resorted to a tra-
ditional conceptual and empirical tool, namely, bloc volatility (Bartolini and Mair 
1990). The concept of bloc volatility refers to the net change in the aggregate vote 
share for all parties included in a given bloc.6 For a long time, given the predomi-
party system change in eu countries
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thin the same bloc (Within-Bloc volatility).
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nance of the left-right dimension of competition in Europe (Fuchs and Klingemann 
1990), the concept of bloc has been intrinsically connected to that of cleavage and, 
more specifically, of class cleavage (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Bartolini 2000). No-
netheless, the concept and the measurement of bloc volatility can be extended be-
yond the class cleavage, to capture the divide produced by any given cleavage. In this 
regard, besides the class cleavage, recent studies have emphasized the emergence 
of a new important transnational cleavage, that has been thought to structure po-
litical conflict in Europe. Kriesi and others (2006; 2008; 2012) have extensively ana-
lysed the emergence of a ‘demarcation-integration’ cleavage, opposing the so-cal-
led ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalisation. This cleavage is based on three main di-
mensions: one related to the opposition to free trade and open markets (economic 
globalisation vs. protectionism); the second related to the EU dimension (pro-EU vs. 
anti-EU); and the third one related to being in favour or against multiculturalism and 
immigration.7 
To capture the characteristics of the cleavage structure in European party systems 
and their evolution over time, we have calculated, in each country and election pe-
riod, the vote share received by parties belonging to the class and the demarcation 
blocs and also the related class bloc volatility and demarcation bloc volatility. To do 
so, we refer to the classiﬁcation of parties in the two blocs provided in Emanuele et 
al. (2019) and based on both quantitative and qualitative criteria8. According to the 
theoretical framework of Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Bartolini (2000), the strength 
of a cleavage can be captured by two indicators. The ﬁrst, straightforwardly, is the 
aggregate vote share of parties politicising that cleavage: the larger this vote share 
is, the more relevant this division is in the society.  
The second indicator can be captured by the mobility of voters across the clea-
vage line. The interpretation of this second indicator depends on the degree of ma-
turity of the cleavage: in cases of a consolidated cleavage, like the class one, limi-
ted electoral mobility across the cleavage line signals that voters conceive that con-
ﬂict mainly as a dimension of identiﬁcation. Conversely, high electoral mobility across 
the cleavage line witnesses that voters no longer consider that conﬂict as relevant, 
given they cross it between consecutive elections. On the other side, for emerging 
cleavages, like the alleged demarcation one, the ﬁrst phase of political and electo-
ral instauration is usually characterised by a relevant mobility across the cleavage 
line, as voters move towards parties emphasising the new cleavage. Therefore, in this 
context, the new cleavage is mainly a dimension of competition.  
 
7. Different scholars have supported the idea of the existence of this new cleavage by providing 
a vast range of conceptualisation (Bornschier 2010; De Vries 2018; Strijbis, Helmer and De 
Wilde 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018). For more details, see the codebook in Emanuele et al. 
(2019). 
8. For further information on the operationalisation and classification methods, see the code-
book in Emanuele et al. (2019).
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Figure 4. Aggregate vote share for parties in the class and demarcation blocs in EP elections across 
different electoral phases 
Figure 4 patently shows a different evolution of the two cleavages over time. On 
the one hand, the traditional class cleavage has experienced a sharp decline over time 
in the vote share of parties politicising it (Communist, Socialist, and Social-Demo-
cratic ones). This ﬁnding is, of course, not new and largely discussed by the litera-
ture (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992; Drummond 
2006), but what really strikes us is the evolution of the vote share of parties belon-
ging to the deemed demarcation bloc, which has undergone an opposite, increasing, 
trend over time. While, in the 1980s, the ratio between the two blocs was more than 
4:1 in favour of the class bloc, in the last decade, this ratio has shrunk to 1.3:1, with 
a class bloc representing, on average, 26% of the vote share vs. a demarcation bloc 
following with an average of 19.6%. 
 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of TV, class bloc volatility, and demarcation bloc volatility across different phases 
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Yet, this is just the ﬁrst part of the story. Figure 5 tells us the second part, com-
paring the mobility across the cleavage line for the two cleavages. We observe two 
distinct patterns for the two cleavages also in terms of bloc volatility. The class bloc 
shows a fairly stable volatility over time, which is also very limited compared to TV. 
This brings us to a crucial point: notwithstanding the sharp electoral decline observed 
above, class bloc volatility still represents a domain of identiﬁcation for a – more and 
more limited – portion of the electorate. Indeed, it also interesting to note that, in 
an age of increasing electoral instability, bloc volatility, which represents a compo-
nent of TV, has not followed the same upwards trend, which also means that vola-
tility is more and more accounted for by different dimensions of competition besi-
des class. 
The demarcation bloc volatility is different. In this regard, Figure 5 shows that, 
from the ﬁrst to the last phase, the level of electoral mobility across the cleavage line 
has tripled. This is a largely expected outcome in the case of emerging cleavages, whe-
re, at the beginning, bloc volatility is limited because of the very small vote share of 
parties competing on that dimension, and, then, as these parties obtain increasing 
percentages of votes and a larger portion of the electorate abandons older allegiances 
for this new one, bloc volatility consequently rises. This trend signals that demar-
cation bloc volatility represents more and more a domain of competition in Europe. 
Finally, it is interesting to take a look at the national variations of cleavage struc-
ture conﬁguration in Europe. Figure 6 plots the 28 EU countries across two dimen-
sions based on, respectively, the average volatility of parties in the class and de-
marcation blocs. The chart can be divided into four quadrants according to the mean 
values of the two variables. 
 
 
Figure 6. National variations of class bloc volatility and demarcation bloc volatility in Europe 
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Starting from the lower right quadrant, we ﬁnd four ‘consensual’ (Lijphart 1999) 
democracies (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands), where class represents 
a domain of identiﬁcation (class bloc volatility is lower than the European average), whi-
le the demarcation bloc volatility is comparatively high. This means that, next to the 
class cleavage, a new dimension of competition has been consolidating: let us notice 
the presence, in these four countries, of relevant parties belonging to the demarcation 
bloc, such as, among others, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Flemish Interest (VB) 
in Belgium, Alternative for Germany (AFD), and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV).  
A different situation can be found in the upper right quadrant, where the de-
marcation bloc is also on the rise, but the high mobility across the class cleavage is 
likely to witness a reduced capacity of class to represent a domain of identiﬁcation 
for voters. This quadrant mixes Western European countries with Central and Ea-
stern European countries. The former are clearly facing a reshaping of their dimensions 
of competition, with a decline of traditional parties to the advantage of challenger 
parties (France, Italy, the United Kingdom). The latter (Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries) are countries where the class bloc has always been limited (Hun-
gary) or has experienced a deep decline (Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Moreover, in as much as 11 countries (lower left quadrant), both cleavages show 
a pattern of electoral stability. This may be due to the low relevance of the cleava-
ge as a dimension of conﬂict (such as the paradigmatic case of Ireland for class), or 
to the fact that the cleavage has already stabilised, thus becoming a central domain 
of identiﬁcation. Obvious examples of this circumstance are Spain and Portugal, in 
the case of class, and Poland for demarcation. This latter represents an exception in 
the demarcation cleavage, as parties referring to the demarcation bloc total an ave-
rage support of 37.1%, witnessing that, in this country, this cleavage has successfully 
overcome its phase of instauration and consolidation, becoming the main domain 
of identiﬁcation. 
Lastly, in the upper left quadrant, we ﬁnd ﬁve countries (Croatia, Cyprus, Lat-
via, Romania, and Slovenia) where there are no parties at all representing the de-
marcation bloc and where the volatility for the class bloc is comparatively high. Also, 
here, we ﬁnd Estonia, an outlier with the largest class bloc volatility in Europe by far, 
which means that voters massively cross the class cleavage line in consecutive elec-
tions, thus not recognising it as a proper dimension of conﬂict.  
 
conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have explored features of European party systems, both following 
the 2019 EP elections and also from a longitudinal viewpoint, by focusing on electo-
ral volatility. Among our main findings, we have discussed the remarkable electoral 
mobility brought about by the recent round of EP elections. This can be seen as the 
last step of a long-term process of increasing instability, at least in Western Europe, 
while Central and Eastern European countries have been always characterized by a 
permanent instability since their accession to the EU. Interestingly, from a longitudinal 
perspective, a substantial difference in electoral volatility between EP and national 
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elections is detectable only between 1999 and 2009. This piece of evidence signals 
the second-order election model, at least from the viewpoint of electoral volatility, ap-
pears not anymore very suited to fully describe EP elections – and their differences 
from national elections. Finally, we have also focused on the stability and changes in 
party systems concerning the structure and the evolution of the class and the de-
marcation cleavages across Europe. Our analysis has shown a marked decline in the 
class cleavage which, even if  it still represents an important domain of identification 
in many European countries, is now flanked in most countries by the demarcation clea-
vage, which has undergone a process of development or even consolidation.  
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Chapter Three  
Spitzenkandidaten 2.0:  
From experiment to routine in European elections?  
thomas christiansen and michael shackleton
abstract 
 
The Lisbon Treaty ushered in a new mode of appointing the President of the Euro-
pean Commission. The 2014 European elections witnessed the introduction of the 
Spitzenkandidaten process through which European political parties and the Euro-
pean Parliament managed to wrest control over this appointment from the European 
Council. While successful from the Parliament’s perspective in terms of the politi-
cal outcome, the academic assessment of the system led to mixed reviews, and from 
both a political and a legal perspective the process has remained controversial. Ne-
vertheless, in the run-up to the 2019 elections, pan-European campaigns by Spit-
zenkandidaten intensified, with most parties except for the Far Right nominating lea-
ding candidates. This article analyses the maturation of this process, by reviewing 
its evolution from 2014 to 2019, identifying the degree of change and continuity in 
practices and then assessing the impact of the process on party political campaigns, 
election results and subsequent appointment decisions. By way of conclusion, the 
article discusses the degree to which Spitzenkandidaten have become established as 
a routine part of EU politics and reflects on the future prospects of the system.   
 
introduction 
 
One of the key features of the 2014 European elections was the innovation of Spit-
zenkandidaten – leading candidates nominated by the main political parties for the 
post of President of the European Commission. This idea was founded on a new pro-
vision in the Lisbon Treaty, for the European Council to take into account the elec-
tions in proposing a candidate for the European Commission presidency, who would 
then be elected by the European Parliament.1 Providing a particular – some would 
argue extreme – interpretation of this treaty article, the Party of European Socialists 
1. Treaty of European Union, Art.17(7): “Taking into account the elections to the European Par-
liament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by 
a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of 
the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority 
of its component members.”
De Sio, L., Franklin, M.N. and Russo L. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 2019, Luiss Uni-
versity Press, Rome, 2019.  
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took the initiative in 2014 by putting forward the then-President of the European 
Parliament, Martin Schulz, as their candidate. The other parties – Christian-Democrats, 
Liberals, Greens and the European Left - eventually followed suit, leading to pan-
European campaigning including a series of debates among the leading candidates.  
The outcome of this process is well-known: the election of Jean-Claude Juncker, 
the leading candidate of the European People’s Party (EPP) as Commission Presi-
dent. It was regarded as a success for the European Parliament (EP) in its inter-in-
stitutional power struggle with the European Council, where several heads of sta-
te had reservations about ceding the initiative to the EP. As such, it ﬁtted into a wi-
der history of the EP expanding its power beyond the formal text of the treaty – a 
process which has been termed interstitial institutional change in the European Union 
(Farrell and Heritier, 2007; Moury, 2007) – and which included previous innova-
tions such as trialogues and hearings for designated Commissioners.  
This is not to say that this innovation was without controversy. Beyond the Eu-
ropean Council which, as an institution, was somewhat critical about the idea for 
obvious, self-interested reasons, critics have suggested different interpretations of 
the legal text. For example, does “taking account of the elections” necessarily mean 
that the largest party to emerge from the elections has a right to the Commission Pre-
sident position? Does the Treaty not intend that the European Council be the body 
that proposes the candidate for this position rather than the EP or individual poli-
tical parties? 
Given the novelty of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014, initial assessments 
concluded that its introduction had the potential to constitute a transformative mo-
ment for representative democracy at the European level (Shackleton, 2017), but 
that an evaluation of its lasting impact would be more appropriate after the 2019 
experience (Christiansen, 2015). The second instalment of the use of this procedure 
ought to provide clues as to whether the 2014 experiment was a one-off, or whether 
it has managed to establish itself as a routine part of European democratic gover-
nance. While this chapter is written only a couple of weeks after the 2019 election, 
and prior to the subsequent appointments to the main leadership positions in the EU, 
it nevertheless provides a ﬁrst opportunity for such an assessment. In other words, 
this chapter addresses the question of how the Spitzenkandidaten process has per-
formed in 2019, and what this experience tells us about the lasting impact of the sy-
stem. We do so by providing in the next section a brief discussion of how the system 
has been assessed, distinguishing between its perceived advantages and disadvan-
tages. This is followed by an analysis of the 2019 experience, considering both de-
velopments that have strengthened and those that have weakened the operation and 
the impact of the system. By way of conclusion we provide an outlook on the futu-
re prospects of the system based on this analysis. 
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the promise and the limitations of the spitzenkandidaten system 
 
The underlying rationale for the original treaty change and the subsequent introduction 
of leading candidates was the intention to increase the democratic legitimacy of the 
office of the Commission President (and by implication of the Commission as a who-
le). This would be achieved through a more direct link between the outcome of Eu-
ropean elections and the appointment of the head of the European Commission, crea-
ting a tangible connection between voter preferences and the way in which Europe 
is governed. This would be further facilitated by the intermediate steps that the in-
troduction of Spitzenkandidaten engenders: the need to form a party-political coa-
lition in order to achieve the required majority for the election of the Commission 
President, the conclusion of formal or informal agreements among parties concer-
ning the ‘governing programme’ of such a coalition, and the creation of a more sta-
ble majority in Parliament on which the Commission can then base its legislative and 
policy agenda (Ondarza, 2014). 
A corollary of this increase in democratic legitimacy is the greater transparen-
cy of the way in which leadership appointment decisions are taken in the Europe-
an Union. The Commission President is now expected to emerge from a public con-
test rather than from deal-making behind the closed doors of the European Coun-
cil (Baldoni et al., 2014). Election to this position involves prior public commitments 
to certain objectives and adherence to speciﬁc positions, making the holder more ac-
countable to Parliament and the electorate as a whole.  
Furthermore, the strengthened link between Commission and Parliament resulting 
from this process also implies a weakening of the link between Commission and Eu-
ropean Council, which in turn points to a Commission President who is more inde-
pendent of national governments, and hence more able to advance the common Eu-
ropean interest. This system therefore is seen as enabling the European executive 
to be more effective and more impartial in comparison with past practice when mem-
ber states in the European Council could bargain with potential Commission Presi-
dent candidates over favourable treatment in return for their appointment. 
One other important beneﬁt of the Spitzenkandidaten system was meant to be 
the greater salience of the European elections, the greater media attention devoted 
to the individual candidates, and the impact that this would have in terms of public 
awareness, electoral turnout and ultimately the legitimacy of the election results 
(Schmitt et al., 2015). Against the background of a decades-long decline in parti-
cipation rates at European elections (it fell from 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2014 – but 
see Chapter 4), the Spitzenkandidaten system promised a reversal of fortunes in this 
respect by making the European elections both more visible and more genuinely Eu-
ropean (thereby countering their nature as second-order elections). 
While expectations with regard to greater democratic legitimacy, an increase in 
public accountability and a higher electoral turnout were strong arguments in favour 
of the new system, critics have pointed out several weaknesses. One weakness was 
that the President of the European Commission is a president in name only, presi-
ding as she or he does over a College of Commissioners that formally decides by sim-
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ply majority, and which is composed of members nominated by national governments. 
This means that Commission Presidents have less authority over their ‘government’ 
than prime ministers have at the national level (not to speak of actual presidents like 
in the US or France).  
Beyond the Commission itself, any successful candidate not only has to work with 
coalitions in the EP in order to succeed with a particular policy-initiative, but also 
requires majority support in the European Council. In other words, unlike national 
leaders a Commission President is inevitably engaged in a permanent search for com-
promise, ﬁrst within the Commission and then in relations with the other EU insti-
tutions. This in turn means that the kind of promises and even manifestos that can-
didates would be campaigning on cannot actually be taken as indicators of subse-
quent performance in office and are thus misleading for the electorate. This not only 
limits the usefulness of the Spitzenkandidaten system in terms of holding the Com-
mission President to account, but also suggests that – far from providing a stable le-
gislative majority – the system still requires the search for ad hoc support for each 
individual policy proposal (Ondarza, 2019).  
These arguments run counter to the previous arguments on democratic legiti-
macy and stability of governance, indeed – if correct – they amount to the charge 
that the image created by the Spitzenkandidaten is actually counterproductive in rai-
sing false expectations among the electorate. Once voters come to realise that this 
promise of a more accountable and stable ‘European government’ emerging from the 
outcome of elections is not achievable in practice, the impact on support for the Eu-
ropean Union could prove to be negative (Höpner, 2014). 
In addition to these criticisms one also needs to consider the wider limitations 
of such a system. The idea of pan-European campaigning may sound good, but ac-
tually hits the buffers when confronted with the multilingual electoral space that con-
stitutes the EU. No single candidate can actually hope to speak directly to the voters 
of more than a few countries, and on occasion perhaps only his or her own native 
country. While English has become a lingua franca in Brussels, and debates among 
candidates have been held in English, French and German, most EU citizens have 
not been able to listen to communications from leading candidates in their own lan-
guage. Consequently, in 2014 (and most likely again in 2019) the Spitzenkandida-
ten received most attention in Germany where both candidates were able to deba-
te directly in German (Shackleton, 2017). 
This structural impediment to pan-European campaigning contributes to and is 
reinforced by media coverage of European elections that is still very much divided 
along national lines, with – essentially still national – media reporting on national 
lead candidates (which many parties in various members states appoint in addition 
to the EU-level leading candidates). The consequence of this is a generally low le-
vel of name recognition of the leading candidates across the EU (Van der Brug et al., 
2016), and Spitzenkandidaten receiving attention from the media predominantly in 
their own country (Hobolt, 2014). For their part, national political parties have lit-
tle incentive to prioritize candidates of another nationality for Commission President 
above their own candidates standing for the European Parliament.  These practical 
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considerations feed into the much broader question of an elusive European demos 
(Weiler, 1999) and the presence of multiple demoi in the European polity (Nicolaï-
dis, 2004). In other words, the new system cannot remove the structural obstacles 
to pan-European elections, and its pretence of doing so could also be counterproductive 
in terms of the legitimacy of EU governance.  
 
assessing the performance of the spitzenkandidaten system 
 
Against the background of the advocacy in favour and against the idea of Spitzen-
kandidaten it is important to be specific about the manner in which the actual prac-
tice of the system and its impact on EU politics is being assessed. A fairly simple, if 
not simplistic, approach to such an assessment would focus on the basic continua-
tion of the discourse about, and the practice of, the system. In that regard, a repe-
at in 2019 of the 2014 practice counts as a success. However, even such an assessment 
does not take us very far. A more meaningful assessment must include an analysis 
not only of the basic maintenance of the system, but ultimately also of the impact 
it has on the nature of campaigning, electoral behaviour and post-election decision-
making.  
Implicit in the above discussion of “success” for the EP was the idea that a mea-
sure of its performance was the ability to determine who would be the “winner”. Ho-
wever, we would suggest a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes “suc-
cessful” performance of the system. This includes recognition of several elements 
of what the system stands for, not all of which may be realised.  In other words, suc-
cess or failure can be partial.  
Speciﬁcally, a variety of scenarios and outcomes are possible in this regard. First, 
EP and European Council may have different preferences regarding the choice of Com-
mission President, and a resolution of such a disagreement would require one side 
or the other to back down. This would mean that if the EP managed to coalesce around 
a single candidate and to impose him/her on the European Council, the system could 
be seen to have succeeded in ﬁrmly establishing itself. On the other hard, if the Eu-
ropean Council was able to get its preferred choice for Commission President elec-
ted by the EP and that person had not been a leading candidate, then that would be 
seen per se as a sign of failure for both the EP and the idea of the Spitzenkandidaten 
system.  
However, matters are more complex than that. For example, the parties in the 
EP may come to an agreement on one particular lead candidate while the Europe-
an Council, perhaps due to different party political majorities in that institution, may 
push for a different Spitzenkandidat representing one the other European political 
parties. If the European Council succeeded in this strategy, this could be seen as a 
loss for the EP, but nevertheless as a success for the procedure – increasing its chan-
ce of become a routine part of EU politics.  
Indeed, the case could also be made that even if in the end a Commission Pre-
sident is elected who was not among the nominated leading candidates, that would 
not necessarily mean that the system had had no inﬂuence. It would be a matter for 
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empirical assessment whether the European Council had to "buy" the nomination 
by giving in to the EP on other issues (i.e. matters of policy substance or other lea-
dership appointments), and also as to the degree to which an alternative candida-
te would have had to demonstrate particular ability, not required in the pre-Spit-
zenkandidaten era.  
Beyond this assessment of the inter-institutional struggle over the appointment 
of the Commission President, there are wider criteria to be considered. Speciﬁcal-
ly, a measure of success of the system is the nature and extent of the media atten-
tion it generates (“To what extent do pan-European leading candidates help to rai-
se the proﬁle of the European elections?”) and the impact that the system has on par-
ticipation rates in the European elections (“To what extent is turnout at European 
elections related to the presence of leading candidates?”).  
For this paper it has not been possible yet to conduct the kind of empirical data 
collection that would be required to make dependable statements about the syste-
m’s impact on media coverage and voting intentions. It is true, of course, that in 2019 
the turnout at European election had gone up for the ﬁrst time ever, rising above 50 
per cent for the ﬁrst time since 1994.2 It is tempting to attribute this increase to the 
added publicity and political debate generated by the Spitzenkandidaten (Financial 
Times, 2019). However, without further research this remains an assumption rather 
than a proven fact. Instead, in the analysis below we limit ourselves to a prelimina-
ry assessment of the way in which the re-appearance of the system in 2019 has im-
pacted on inter-institutional relations, party politics and leadership appointments. 
 
the impact of spitzenkandidaten system on the 2019 european elections 
 
The first point to note is that, as in 2014, the main political parties did again nomi-
nate leading candidates (see Table 1 below), that these candidates engaged in pan-
European campaigning, that a significant number of public, televised debates were 
held involving some or all the candidates (Financial Times, 2019; Fleming, 2019), 
and that post-election discussions about the future Commission President were do-
minated by the Spitzenkandidaten system (Politico, 2019). As in 2014, the leading 
candidates of the two largest parties, EPP and PES, Manfred Weber and Frans Tim-
mermans, respectively, received most of the attention and debated on a number of 
occasions, both alone and with the other candidates (even if Weber was strangely 
absent from the Maastricht Debate, the biggest debate outside the official debate in 
the EP). At first glance, it therefore seemed as if it was business as usual for the sy-
stem, giving credence to the belief that it had gone beyond a one-off experiment and 
had established itself as an emerging routine.  
 
2. Turnout (in per cent) at European elections: 61.99 (1979); 58.98 (1984); 58.41 (1989); 56.67 
(1994); 49.51 (1999); 45.47 (2004); 42.97 (2009); 42.61 (2014); 50.95 (2019). See Chap-
ter 4 for analysis on this point.
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However, while at the time of writing a decision on the new Commission Presi-
dent is still outstanding, one can already observe how the situation has changed in 
important ways. The 2019 experience exhibited a number of signiﬁcant differences 
as compared to 2014 when it comes to the manner in which the EP and the Euro-
pean Council entered the ‘game’. First, the European Council in 2019 was much bet-
ter prepared than in 2014 when it arguably was taken by surprise at the dynamic that 
the Parliament’s initiative in favour of Spitzenkandidaten produced. It struggled and 
ultimately ran out of time – under pressure from EP and the media – to propose cre-
dible alternatives to the EP’s preferred candidate. In 2019, the European Council knew 
better what to expect, scheduled meetings for 28 June and 21 July in order to de-
bate its options in good time, and appointed its own working group composed of six 
of its members – two each representing the EPP, Socialists and Liberals (De La Bau-
me and Herszenhorn, 2019b).  
Second, by contrast, the EP appeared signiﬁcantly less cohesive than it had been 
in 2014. Whereas previously there was unanimous consent among the four biggest 
groups that had nominated leading candidates that they would support each other 
in order to ensure that the procedure would succeed (Shackleton, 2017), that uni-
ty was broken in 2019 when the Liberals changed position on the idea of Spitzen-
kandidaten. They now regarded it as illegitimate, particularly because of the absence 
of agreement in Parliament and the European Council on the creation of transna-
tional lists for the European elections (Rios, 2019).  Instead they appointed an ‘ex-
pertise team’ of seven senior politicians that was to be regarded as pool for the va-
rious leadership positions that would need to be ﬁlled in 2019. This ‘having your cake 
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Table 1 - Lead candidates nominated for the 2019 European elections by European political 
parties
european political party european political party
European People’s Party (EPP) Manfred Weber (DE)
Party of European Socialists (PES) Frans Timmermans (NL) 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE)
Emma Bonino (IT); Guy Verhofstad 
(BE); Katalin Cseh (HU); Luis Gari-
cano (ES); Margrethe Vestager (DK); 
Nicola Beer (DE); Violeta Bulc (SV)
European Green Party Bas Eickhout (NL); Ska Keller (DE)
Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe 
(ACRE) Jan Zahradil (CZ)
Party of the European Left (GUE) Nico Cué (BE); Violeta Tomic´ (SV)
European Free Alliance (EFA) Oriol Junqueras (ES)
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and eating it’ approach worked well, since it allowed Liberal politicians to partici-
pate in the various debates among leading candidates, while at the same time kee-
ping their options open with regard to the deals that would subsequently be made 
to appoint not only the Commission President, but also the positions of European 
Council President, EP President and High Representative for Foreign Policy.  
Both the better positioning of the European Council and the more fragmented 
support in the EP can be linked to the same source: the opposition of French Presi-
dent Macron’s to the idea of Spitzenkandidaten reﬂecting not only his interest as a 
member of the European Council, but also the fact that in 2019 the Liberals – the 
political party that Macron’s En Marche was intending to merge with after the elec-
tions – actually had a position of strength comparable to EPP and Socialists in the 
European Council, in contrast with their minority position in 2014. Based on the cal-
culation that it would be highly unlikely that the Liberals would emerge as the lar-
gest party from the elections, but that it was perfectly reasonable to expect the Eu-
ropean Council to agree on a Liberal candidate, it made sense for the Liberals to ‘de-
fect’ from the previous coalition of parties supporting the new system. 
To have the third-largest party depart from the previous script certainly weakened 
the system (Eder, 2019). On the other hand, the fact that in 2019 the European Con-
servatives (ACRE) nominated a leading candidate for the ﬁrst time – the Czech MEP 
Jan Zahradil – meant that the Eurosceptic side also had a voice in the debates prior 
to the elections, and thus strengthened the representative character of the system. 
Indeed, in 2014 one of the main objections had been that the debates had not re-
ﬂected the full range of political views since none of the Eurosceptic elements in the 
EP had nominated a candidate. How far the absence in 2019 of a leading candida-
te from the Far Right – Matteo Salvini (Lega, IT), Marie Le Pen (RN, F), the German 
AfD and other right-wing populists had not been able or willing to agree on joining 
the race with their own leading candidate – weakened the system is difficult to jud-
ge in the hypothetical. A populist anti-European contribution to the public debate 
might have added legitimacy to the contest but might also have generated more heat 
than light in the course of the debates.  
This discussion already indicates that party political considerations mattered more 
in 2019 than they did in 2014. What was previously very much an inter-institutio-
nal battle between EP and European Council (i.e. national governments) was by 2019 
much more a contest between the main political parties. For a start, it became evi-
dent already in the campaigning for the elections that the formation of a workable 
coalition in support of a Commission President would be required. According to all 
forecasts, and as conﬁrmed by the election result itself, EPP and PES would be una-
ble to command sufficient votes in the new EP to decide matters among themselves. 
Whereas in 2014 a fairly straightforward deal between these two parties – PES sup-
port for Juncker as Commission President in return for EPP support for Martin Schulz 
as EP President – was enough to unite the EP against the European Council, the ari-
thmetic in 2019 is more complicated. A majority in the newly elected EP now requires 
either the support of the Liberals (who, as discussed above, had failed to back the 
system) or a deal with the Greens and exclusion of the Liberals. Either of these ave-
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nues implied that the European Council would have a strong position in confronting 
the EP’s preferred candidate with its own choice.  
This observed shift from a mainly inter-institutional battle to one dominated by 
party political considerations is also evident from the – arguably remarkable – can-
didacies of several politicians who were serious contenders for the Commission Pre-
sident position: Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the Commission and the 
PES leading candidate, Margarethe Vestager, Competition Commissioner and 
among the slate of ALDE candidates, and Michel Barnier, the EU’s Brexit Negotia-
tor who, while not a leading candidate had been frequently mentioned as a possi-
ble successor to Jean-Claude Juncker. Each of these politicians was regarded, before 
and after the election, as a credible candidate for the Commission position, even though 
none of them was a member of a party that formed part of the government in their 
own country. This aspect of their CV was considered a certain limitation, but it did 
not categorically exclude them from consideration in a way that it would have done 
in the pre-Spitzenkandidaten era. In other words, the arrival of the new system of 
nominating candidates massively enlarged the pool of politicians from which a Com-
mission President would be chosen, and this happened because party affiliation at 
the EU level now mattered at least as much, if not more, than party affiliation at the 
domestic level. Depending on the ﬁnal decision regarding the various leadership posts, 
this change may well constitute a signiﬁcant transformation in EU politics. 
The leading candidates, today, dominate discussions about the choice of the next 
Commission President. However, it also needs to be recognised that not all of this 
talk has been supportive. Beyond the kind of fundamental critique against the sy-
stem launched by Emmanuel Macron and others referred to above, questions were 
also raised about Manfred Weber’s qualiﬁcations for the position, given his lack of 
executive experience – similar to the doubts raised about Martin Schulz’s candida-
cy in 2014, given that he also had made his career in the European Parliament. Still, 
such objections against the system and individual candidates actually demonstra-
te the degree to which the Spitzenkandidaten system has set the agenda for the post-
election appointment cycle. Commentators may have raised issues about Manfred 
Weber’s ﬁtness for the job (De La Baume and Herszenhorn, 2019) as well as his ac-
ceptability to the European Council (Kelemen, 2019), but he was nevertheless re-
garded as the frontrunner throughout the election campaign, given that the EPP was 
predicted to become the largest party in the 2019 parliament (De La Baume, 2019). 
‘Outsiders’ such as Michel Barnier are talked about as possible alternatives to Man-
fred Weber (or to other Spitzenkandidaten) if the European Council could coalesce 
around them (Beswick, 2019), but that also signiﬁes that they are seen (merely) as 
alternatives and evaluated in comparison to the leading candidates. 
Observers and – presumably – political actors have also considered the wider 
range of EU leadership positions that will need to be ﬁlled in 2019 (Russack, 2019). 
Thus, parties having proposed lead candidates for Commission President may ac-
cept that this goal is unattainable for them in the light of the electoral arithmetic, 
but nevertheless have staked a claim to one of the other positions available. What 
in 2014 was a fairly straightforward division of spoils between Jean-Claude Jun-
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cker (Commission President) and Martin Schulz (EP President), has become a more 
complex game in 2019, with the positions of European Council President and High 
Representative also in play. This logic appeared to be one of the drivers behind AL-
DE’s decision to nominate a “Team Europe” in order to have a range of candidates 
for consideration for the various positions. Even the succession of Mario Draghi as 
head of the European Central Bank became caught up in these considerations, if 
only because of informal rules about nationality: for example, if the German go-
vernment were to succeed in its bid to appoint the Bundesbank president to this po-
sition, then this would undermine Manfred Weber’s chances of becoming Commission 
President – and vice versa.  
In other words, the Spitzenkandidaten system in 2019 has a number of corolla-
ry effects on EU politics beyond just the designation of the Commission President. 
In 2019, the system has evolved and become more complex. On the one hand, the 
ambivalent attitude of the Liberals and explicit opposition of Emmanuel Macron and 
other heads of government weakened the system. On the other hand, the larger num-
ber of parties across the political spectrum participating in the system gave it a bo-
ost, even if anti-European populists did not engage with it. Until the decisions about 
the Commission Presidency and other leadership positions have been concluded, it 
is too early to draw ﬁnal conclusions about the system's impact on the 2019 elections. 
What we will offer in the ﬁnal section below is therefore an attempt at some preli-
minary observations about the effects the system has had on EU politics and about 
its future prospects. 
 
conclusion 
 
The title of this chapter promised a judgement on whether the Spitzenkandidaten sy-
stem has established itself as a routine part of EU politics or was a one-off (and the-
refore failed) experiment. The 2019 experience has demonstrated that the system 
did return, and arguably more strongly so, with a wider range of parties and candi-
dates actively participating in it. However, that does not mean that it has already ac-
quired the status of an accepted routine. The idea remains contested, and – perhaps 
precisely because of its initial success in 2014 – this contestation has become more 
intense in 2019. After a heady launch in 2014 the Spitzenkandidaten system has ma-
tured in 2019, but only a successful reprise in 2024 will make it possible to offer a 
firmer judgement as to whether it has become a permanent fixture of EU politics.  
As for the immediate impact in 2019, the outcome of negotiations over who ta-
kes over from Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President will signal whether 
EP or Council have prevailed on this occasion. While this remains unresolved at the 
time of writing, a number of lessons can already be drawn. First among these is that 
the system has proven to be an effective tool for the European Parliament to set the 
agenda and to impose itself on the European Council. The fact that for the ﬁrst time 
since Jacques Delors’ appointment as Commission President none of the candida-
tes, whether lead candidates or ‘outsiders’, was a previous member of the Europe-
an Council is a powerful sign of the new dynamic and the loss of control over the 
53
process that the European Council has experienced. The idea that the European Coun-
cil would simply choose one of their own as a Commission President seems to be a 
thing of the past.  
However, rather than looking at this in terms of absolute winners and losers, it 
is more appropriate to view the Spitzenkandidaten system as part of the wider inter-
institutional relations that continue to evolve. The European Council has responded 
to the challenge laid down by the EP and is learning better how to play the game. 
Furthermore, beyond the horizontal relationship between EU institutions, the ver-
tical nature of the process has become more apparent: in having opened up a new 
pan-European circuit of electoral politics, the system has also strengthened the EU 
level of party politics vis-à-vis the domestic level. National political parties now have 
to recognise the signiﬁcance of EU level politics – from intra-party decision-making 
to party political voting shares in Parliament and European Council – in a way that 
was not the case before.  
This is perhaps the most lasting impact so far: the Spitzenkandidaten system, de-
spite being contested and still emerging, has signiﬁcantly raised the importance of 
party politics at the European level. By 2019, in addition to inter-institutional bat-
tles and bargaining among national governments, the strategies of individual poli-
tical parties, their electoral fortunes and the formation of coalitions and alliances 
have also become essential parts of the process determining the Commission lea-
dership. In 2014 it might have been controversial for Jean-Claude Juncker to declare 
that he wanted to lead a more political European Commission. From the experien-
ce of the 2019 European elections, it is apparent how things have developed further 
since then, as party politics have become a deﬁning element in the process of elec-
ting the President of the European Commission. 
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Chapter Four  
Explaining the outcome. Second-order factors still matter, 
but with an exceptional turnout increase 
lorenzo de sio, luana russo and mark n. franklin
eu elections as second order elections 
 
After thirty-five years, nine elections, and an impressive amount of academic lite-
rature, it is common knowledge that European elections are second-order elections. 
Since the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980), the Second Order Election (SOE) 
theory has been tested in the aftermath of each successive election (among others: 
van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh, 1996; Marsh 1998; Schmitt 2005; Schmitt and Te-
peroglou 2015), and has repeatedly confirmed its effectiveness.  
The main characteristic of a second-order election is to be less salient than a na-
tional Parliamentary election (which is ﬁrst-order), because less is at stake. Howe-
ver, the key difference between other second-order (e.g. local elections) and Euro-
pean elections is that the latter share a key feature with ﬁrst-order elections: they 
are both held at the national level.  
Reif and Schmitt (1980) identify three main distinctive features that mark the 
difference between a national and a European election. Namely, (1) a lower turnout, 
(2) the parties in government will lose votes, and (3) smaller parties will do better 
and bigger parties will do worse. 
Of these three characteristics, lower turnout is the one that is most obviously lin-
ked to the lower saliency of European elections. If little is at stake, why bother ca-
sting a ballot? Building on the assumption that voting in three successive national 
elections creates the habit of voting (Butler and Stokes, 1975; Plutzer, 2002; Fran-
klin, 2004), Franklin and Hobolt (2011) have shown that it is indeed habitual vo-
ters that show up at the EU polls, because EU elections do not sufficiently mobilize 
the non-habitual ones. This partially explains why big parties – and especially par-
ties in government – lose votes (van der Eijk, Franklin, and Oppenhuis 1996; Fer-
rara and Weishaupt 2004; Kousser 2004; Marsh 1998, 2003; Hix and Marsh 2007; 
Reif 1984). In fact, research suggests that voters tend overall to conﬁrm their pre-
ferences at EU elections (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Weber, 2007; Hobolt et 
al.,2009). Big parties and parties in government are generally those that also ma-
nage to mobilize non-habitual voters at national elections. Therefore, low turnout 
will inevitably – and disproportionally – punish them (Franklin and Hobolt 2011; 
Franklin and Hobolt 2015). On top of this, there is evidence that 40% of voters who 
switch party between a national and a European election, go from a big to a small 
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party (Hix and Marsh, 2007). Those who tend to perform consistently better are anti-
EU parties and green parties, whilst socialist parties tend to do worse. This seems 
to be due to a mix of (mostly) protest voting and (very partially) a proper Europe-
an vote (Hix and Marsh, 2007).1 
Regarding issues, these are expected to be more important at EP elections than 
at national elections because the latter engender strategic considerations. Many peo-
ple would rather vote for a party that is likely to have an opportunity to pass its po-
licies into law than to simply vote for the party that is closest to them on their most 
important issues – if that party would be unlikely to actually enact those policies. So 
votes for small parties go along with votes on issues that the voters concerned feel 
strongly about. SOE theory would lead us to expect these to be national issues, but 
there can easily be a pattern of concern for issues felt to have been neglected, for exam-
ple environmental issues. 
Although the volatility of vote preferences might have repercussions on the sta-
bility, and, more in general, on the party system of a country, low levels of turnout 
are more problematic at the EU level. In fact, turnout is widely considered an indi-
rect indicator of legitimacy and quality of democracy (Lijphart 1999; Coppedge et 
al 2011). Therefore, making these elections more salient and actually about Euro-
pe (and not simply a substitute for internal polls of parties’ popularity among voters) 
has been a crucial point both in scholarly discussions and at the political level. For 
example, van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) argued that in order to make elections 
more salient in the eyes of the voters, it was necessary that they would actually fo-
cus on Europe – but this is hard to achieve. An attempt in this sense was the intro-
duction in 2014 of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten. The main idea was to try to rein-
force the link between the President of the Commission and the elections. As Hobolt 
(2014) noticed, this reform did alter the way in which the candidate was selected, 
but did not change the nature of the EU elections (see also Christiansen and Schac-
kleton 2019, in this book). This is of course due to several circumstances, but as Niel-
sen and Franklin (2017) argue, the core problem lies in the fact that even with the 
introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten, the 2014 EU elections failed “to achieve the 
objectives that elections are supposed to achieve: failing to provide direct policy con-
sequences for the voice of people” (p. 9). The real power does not lie in the Com-
mission, but in the European Council and in the club of EU Prime Ministers. Therefore, 
linking the elections to the President of the Commission did not ignite a process that 
would ﬁnally instate the democratic linkage between the EU Parliament and the EU's 
citizens. For these reasons Nielsen and Franklin (2017) argue that EU elections not 
only are second-order – they are also second-rate. If a second-order election lacks sa-
liency, a second-rate election lacks a policy linkage, as the connection between the 
1. It should be born in mind that SOE theory sees EP elections as displaying pale reflections of 
national political processes and concerns. It follows that if national politics show no interest 
in European matters that EP elections will show no such interest either. But the discovery of 
European issue concerns at EP eletions does not in itself run counter to SOE theory if those 
European issues have become evident in the national politics of the countries concerned.
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voters’ choices and policies that will be produced is missing. It could be argued that 
it is actually this second-rate nature that made the EU elections inevitably second-
order in the eyes of national electorates. 
 
contextual influences on ep election turnout 
 
Though turnout at EP elections is invariably low, the level of turnout does fluctua-
te from one EP election to the next, tempting commentators to try to interpret the-
se fluctuations in terms of support for or opposition to the EU or its European Par-
liament. Franklin (2001) argued, with a wealth of supportive evidence, that varia-
tions in EP election turnout could be almost entirely explained on the basis of a small 
number of contextual (or structural) factors, leaving little room for any sort of ver-
dict on the EU or its Parliament. 
First, many European Parliament elections have evidently been subject to a “ﬁrst 
election boost”. Like the ﬁrst elections held in many circumstances (Kostelka 
2017), turnout was elevated at each 20th century EP election that was a ﬁrst-time 
event: the ﬁrst EP election ever held (to the Parliament of 1979); the ﬁrst EP elec-
tion held in the Southern Enlargement countries (Spain and Portugal) to the Par-
liament elected in 1984, and the ﬁrst election held in the Northern Enlargement coun-
tries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) to the Parliament elected in 1994. Only in the 
21st Century did there appear to be no “ﬁrst election boost”, at the ﬁrst EP election 
held in Eastern Enlargement countries. But various reasons can be adduced to ex-
plain this failure of a boost to appear (in particular, electoral fatigue at elections that 
followed closely on referendum campaigns to ratify membership in the EU). 
Second, European Parliament elections occur at different times in the national 
election cycles of member countries. This varies the low importance bestowed on them, 
increasing that low importance somewhat when these elections take place shortly 
before a national parliamentary election, meaning that they can be viewed as 'ba-
rometers' of national party standings (Eijk and Franklin 1996). The contrary is also 
true. When held in the immediate aftermath of national elections, EP elections have 
less importance than average because a better barometer of national party standings 
already exists in the results of that recent national election. 
Third, EP elections are subject to composition effects, as repeated enlargements 
change the EU's complexion by adding countries in which turnout is higher or lower 
than the average turnout of the existing EU member states. In particular, the EU star-
ted out with four members in which electoral participation was compulsory (Belgium, 
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg – 40 percent of then member countries). Over time, 
however, Italy removed its compulsion to vote and only one of the 28 new member 
countries, Cyprus, was a compulsory voting country. Given the 37-percentage-point 
effect of compulsory voting on turnout at EP elections shown in the appendix to this 
chapter, the progres-sively smaller proportion of countries exhibiting this effect would 
naturally cause turnout to decline. 
Finally, a new contextual effect has recently become apparent, also having to do 
with compulsory voting. It has been well-established that when compulsory voting 
explaining the outcome
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is abolished this initiates a long process of downward turnout adjustment as those who 
learned their voting habits under the compulsory regime retain those high-level tur-
nout habits even as new voters fail to acquire the habit of voting at the same high le-
vel. Over the next ﬁfty years, generational replacement slowly reduces the level of tur-
nout to the level of those who had never known a compulsion to vote (Franklin 2004). 
This pattern of behavior applies to countries that had enforced the compulsion with 
sanctions that were apparent, even if not potent (as in Italy). But a number of coun-
tries have compulsory voting laws on the books that are not enforced. In such coun-
tries turnout was high when they acceded to to the EU, even if not as high as in coun-
tries where the compulsion was enforced. Two such countries are Greece and Cyprus, 
both EU member states. What has become apparent in the years since Cyprus beca-
me an EU member is that it has suffered a decline in turnout that looks very like a de-
cline that had recently become apparent in Greece (a decline that had initially been 
masked by the timing of Greece’s second and third EP elections, very close to the next 
national election in each case). The implication is that, in both Greece and Cyprus, 
elections to the EP in a country with un-enforced compulsory voting behave like elec-
tions at which the compulsion has been abolished. It seems that a symbolic compul-
sion is not potent at an election with no apparent purpose. This realization provides 
us with a group of three countries (Cyprus, Greece, and Italy) in which turnout at EP 
elections is in decline for a quasi-structural reason. For Greece and Cyprus this de-
cline started at their second EP elections; for Italy it started at the ﬁrst election after 
compulsory voting was abolished there, in 1994. A ﬁnal country behaves as though 
it were a member of this group. In Malta there was never a compulsion to vote, but 
turnout in years leading up to EU acces-sion was as high as in compulsory voting coun-
tries (Hirczy 1995; Franklin 2004). It seems that an initially widespread habit of vo-
ting responds to the experience of EP elections in the same way regardless of the sour-
ce of that habit, so long as a compulsion to vote is not enforced. 
  
Figure 1. Turnout by different groups of EP-voting countries over time 
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The four contextual effects just listed deﬁne four types of turnout evolution that 
different groups of countries should exhibit at predictable times during the course 
of their individual histories of EP election participation, giving the patterns shown 
in Figure 1. The ﬁgure distinguishes between the ten countries that participated in 
all EP elections (“Original”) and those that acceeded at different times thereafter (“Sou-
thern enlargement”, “Northern enlargement”, “Eastern enlargement”) while also di-
stinguishing, among original EP voting countries, between those that had enforced 
compulsory voting throughout and those that never had compulsory voting. Addi-
tionally, we include a trace for countries with initially high turnout but no enforced 
compulsion to vote. At early EP elections this trace contains Greece and Italy, but tho-
se countries are joined by Cyprus and Malta in 2004. 
The graph shows clearly the ﬁrst election boost enjoyed by southern and northern 
enlargement countries (that boost is less obvious for original non-compulsory vo-
ting countries, but can still be discerned; it is absent for Eastern enlargement coun-
tries). The graph also shows a massive turnout decline from 1994 onwards among 
countries with initially high turnout but no enforced compulsion to vote. Indeed, tur-
nout for all these different groups of countries appears to converge over time. For 
southern and northern enlargement countries this convergence is complete by the 
time of their second EP elections, after which variations in turnout are due to variations 
in election timing (see appendix). For West European countries (other than those 
with enforced compulsory voting) it is as though they had a “natural” level of tur-
nout at EP elections that was rapidly approached with the passage of time, whate-
ver their initial turnout level. Eastern enlargement countries have lower turnout over 
the entire span of their membership in the EU, producing a gap that appears rather 
constant over time as their turnout ﬂuctuates more or less in step with that of the 
other non-compulsory voting countries. 
Just one major anomaly remains to be mentioned. There is an uptick in turnout 
at the end of the series that applies to all EU member countries excepting only the 
countries with some type of com-pulsory or quasi-compulsory voting (in both of which 
traces, however, the rate of turout decline seems to reﬂect the same anomaly). An 
important question attends that anomaly. Is it just a ﬂuctu-ation, such as those we 
see for particular groups of countries in particular years – ﬂuctuations that may be 
largely the result of variations in the timing of elections for different groups? The 
pattern of turnout change in 2019 suggests an effect felt in common across all groups 
of countries, which could hardly be the result of peculiarities of election timing sin-
ce such timing effects are country-speciﬁc. 
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Figure 2. Actual turnout at EP elections and turnout predicted by the structural model 
We can verify the supposition that the 2019 turnout uptick was not due to fac-
tors included in the structural model if we use that model (see appendix, Table A) 
to predict the 2019 turnout outcome and compare the predicted outcome with the 
actual outcome. Indeed, we can do even better, predicting the turnout outcome for 
each year using the same structural model so that we can see to what extent predictions 
match outcomes over the whole sequence of EP elections. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, actual turnout is quite well predicted by the structural 
model, even in 2019. Certainly the structural model does a good job of explaining 
the overall decline in turnout over the whole sequence of elections. And, although 
the ﬁt of predicted to actual turnout was better in EP elections from 1989 to 2014, 
that ﬁt is still pretty good in 2019. What is not good is the the ﬁt of trend in predic-
ted turnout to trend in actual turnout. The EP election of 2019 is the only one in which 
the trend in turnout since the previous election is wrongly predicted in terms of sign 
(positive instead of negative), and the error is huge. Effectively the ﬁt of change in 
predicted turnout to change in actual turnout is zero in 2019.  
So 2019 proves to be quite remarkable in terms of turnout – the ﬁrst election in 
a sequence of 8 successive EP elections where the evolution of turnout since the pre-
vious election diverged com-pletely from what would have been expected on the ba-
sis of structural factors. In our statistical appendix we “explain” this divergence by me-
ans of what statisticians call a “dummy variable”. Usu-ally such variables are poorly 
named, since they are used to indicate well-known factors that are associated with 
speciﬁc cases. In this instance the word “dummy” is unusually appropriate, how-ever. 
The variable indicates only the date when an otherwise unexplicated shock was felt. 
Since the effect is not based on any structural factor yet known to scholars, the 
uptick in 2019 could be due to absolutely anything, and commentators will no doubt 
make hay attributing to it theories concocted for the occasion. Our own guess is that 
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citizens of all member states have been shocked by the Brexit spectacle (including 
citizens of Britain itself), and that a new appreciation of the importance of EP elec-
tions has been the result. But there is no way in which we can conﬁrm that guess with 
data available to us at the time of writing. 
Findings regarding turnout also have implications for other aspects of second or-
der election theory, to which we now turn. 
 
second-order effects on ep party support 
 
The second order theory expects parties to gain votes if they are small parties that 
are not members of the government of the day. However, the theory is not explicit 
about when these gains should occur. An important implication of our structural mo-
del's findings is that any gains in vote share made by small parties should occur to-
wards the start of the electoral cycle, which is when most additional votes are cast. 
In our analysis for this chapter we introduce what we take to be an additional 
innovation. We distinguish between two different ways in which gains to small par-
ties can be measured. At ﬁrst-take, one might presume that gains should be 
thought of relative to total votes cast – absolute gains – but, for individual small op-
position parties, what would surely matter are gains or losses relative to votes won 
by that party at the most recent national election – relative gains. A party that gains 
2 percent of the total vote might not seem to be gaining much and, in absolute terms, 
it is not. But, if that gain doubles its vote-share this would, relatively speaking, be 
hugely newsworthy and seen as a big victory by party supporters. 
In the appendix to this chapter, Table B validates the structural expectations we 
get from the second order model. Small non-government parties do gain support both 
because they are small and also because they are not members of the government. 
The separate effects of being small and being in opposition to the government ap-
ply whichever method is used for measuring gains to small parties. However, being 
in opposition and being small are highly correlated, and if one is interested in the 
joint effects of both reasons for party gains it matters whether those gains are mea-
sured absolutely or relative to the size of the small party. When measured in abso-
lute terms, opposition status does not add signiﬁcantly to small party gains over what 
would be seen were the small party to have been a government member. However, 
if gains are measured relatively then small parties gain both because they are small 
and also because they are in opposition.  
Additional analyses included in Table B show that these gains occur mainly at 
the start of the electoral cycle. Indeed effects for small parties at EP elections held 
shortly after national elections are the strongest effects in the table. Such parties gain 
four times more than the absolute proportion of votes they received at their most re-
cent national election – gains that are statistically highly signiﬁcant. 
This is the ﬁrst time, to the best of our knowledge, that a link has been made bet-
ween the structural model of EP election turnout and the second order implications 
for party gains and losses. Because this is an incidental ﬁnding made in the course 
of a hurried preliminary investigation of new data, it is beyond the remit of this chap-
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ter to validate the ﬁnding by seeing wither it can be replicated using data produced 
by previous EP elections. Until such an investigation is conducted we cannot be sure 
about these ﬁndings and must treat them as suggestive. 
 
conclusion 
 
In this chapter we performed a first effort at providing explanatory factors for the 
outcome of these elections. Our reflection started from the established model that 
sees EP elections as second-order elections, and covered two separate dimensions: 
turnout and party support. 
In terms of turnout, our analysis employed the established structural model that 
sees EP turnout conditioned by several factors which are not related in any way to 
the contingencies of political debate related to the EU. And it is here that we found 
a ﬁrst, striking ﬁnding: while the structural model has in general a remarkable pre-
dictive power for EP election turnout, it clearly cannot account for the turnout increase 
seen in these elections. As a result, it has to be recognized that the 2019 EP elections 
might be marking a turning point in this regard: we might be witnessing – for different 
reasons, whose relative importance cannot be rigorously tested here – a turnout in-
crease which might be related to some real politicization of these elections. 
In terms of party support, our ﬁrst tests do not show equally exceptional results. 
The second-order model still applies, with party gains and losses being partly explained 
by a combination of opposition status and small size, in turn interplaying with the 
timing of the EP election – whether it occurs close to the previous national election 
or not. However, our identiﬁcation of structural dynamics that inﬂuence party sup-
port does not go into the detail of what types of small, opposition parties were rewarded 
in these elections. The open questions remains, whether, in the context of structu-
ral dynamics of party support,  there might still have been some EU-wide trend that 
has rewarded parties with speciﬁc policy positions. Some clues that this might be the 
case have already emerged from the results presented in chapter 1 in this book (An-
gelucci and Carrieri 2019); but – more rigorously – this is the key research question 
assessed in the next chapter (Maggini et al. 2019). 
 
references 
 
Angelucci, D. & Carrieri, L. (2019). Much ado about nothing? The EP elections in 
comparative perspective. In L. De Sio, L. Russo and M. Franklin (Eds.), The Eu-
ropean Parliament Elections of 2019. Luiss University Press. 
Butler, D., & Stokes, D. (1974). Political change in Britain: Basis of electoral choice. 
New York: St Martin Press. 
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S., Hicken, A., & Semetko, 
H. A. (2011). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: A new approach. Per-
spectives on Politics, 9(2), 247-267. 
Ferrara, F., & Weishaupt, J. T. (2004). Get your act together: Party performance in 
European Parliament elections. European Union Politics, 5(3), 283-306. 
65
Franklin, M. N., (2001) How Structural Factors cause Turnout Variations at Euro-
pean Parliament Elections. European Union Politics (2:3) 309-328. 
Franklin, M. N. (2004). Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in esta-
blished democracies since 1945. Cambridge University Press. 
Franklin, M. N., & Hobolt, S. B. (2011). The legacy of lethargy: How elections to the 
European Parliament depress turnout. Electoral Studies, 30(1), 67-76. 
Franklin, M.N., & Hobolt, S. B. (2015). European elections and the European voter. 
In European Union (pp. 399-418). Routledge. 
Franklin, M. N., & Oppenhuis, E. (1996). Choosing Europe?: the European electora-
te and national politics in the face of union (pp. 306-332). van der Eijk & MN Fran-
klin (Eds.). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Hirczy, W. (1995) Explaining near-universal turnout: The case of Malta. European 
Journal of Politial Research, 27(2) , 255-272. 
Hix, S., & Marsh, M. (2007). Punishment or protest? Understanding European par-
liament elections. The journal of politics, 69(2), 495-510. 
Hobolt, S. B. (2014). A vote for the President? The role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 
2014 European Parliament elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10), 
1528-1540. 
Kostelka, P. (2017) Does Democratic Consolidation Lead to a Decline in Voter Tur-
nout? Global Evidence Since 1939. American Political Science Review, 111(4), 653-
667. 
Kousser, T. (2004). Retrospective voting and strategic behavior in European Parliament 
elections. Electoral studies, 23(1), 1-21. 
Lijphart, A. (1999). Australian democracy: modifying majoritarianism? Australian 
Journal of Political Science, 34(3), 313-326. 
Maggini, N., De Sio, L., Garzia, D., & Trechsel, A.H. (2019). Impact of issues on par-
ty performance. In L. De Sio, L. Russo and M.N. Franklin (Eds.), The European 
Parliament Elections of 2019. Luiss University Press. 
Marsh, M. (1998). Testing the second-order election model after four European elec-
tions. British journal of political science, 28(4), 591-607. 
Marsh, M. (2009). Vote switching in European Parliament elections: evidence from 
June 2004. European Integration, 31(5), 627-644. 
Nielsen, J. H., & Franklin, M. N. (2017). The 2014 European Parliament elections: 
still second order?. In The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament Elections (pp. 
1-16). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Plutzer, E. (2002). Becoming a habitual voter: Inertia, resources, and growth in young 
adulthood. American political science review, 96(1), 41-56. 
Reif, K. (1984). National electoral cycles and European elections 1979 and 1984. Elec-
toral studies, 3(3), 244-255. 
Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine second-order national elections–a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of European Election results. European journal of po-
litical research, 8(1), 3-44. 
Schmitt, H. (2005). The European Parliament elections of June 2004: still second-
order?. West European Politics, 28(3), 650-679. 
explaining the outcome
66 the european parliament elections of 2019
Schmitt, H., & Teperoglou, E. (2015). The 2014 European Parliament elections in 
Southern Europe: second-order or critical elections?. South European Society and 
Politics, 20(3), 287-309. 
Van der Eijk, C., Franklin, M. N., & Marsh, M. (1996). What voters teach us about 
Europe-wide elections: what Europe-wide elections teach us about voters. 
Electoral Studies, 15(2), 149-166. 
van der Eijk & MN Franklin (Eds.). Choosing Europe.The European electorate and na-
tional politics in the face of union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Weber, T. (2007). Campaign effects and second-order cycles: A top-down approach 
to European Parliament elections. European Union Politics, 8(4), 509-536. 
 
 
67
appendix to chapter 4  
statistical analyses explaining turout at ep elections 
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Table A - OLS regression findings for the structural model of EP election turnout  
(Franklin 2002)
model 1:  
without new 
democracies
model 2:  
with new  
democracies, 
no  
interactions
model 3:  
with new  
democracies 
and  
interactions
model 4:  
as c but with  
dummy for 2019
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
First election  
“boost” 4.92 (2.90) 2.12 (2.37)ns 5.29 (2.94) 3.46 (2.88)ns
Time to next  
national election  
(0-1 proportion 
 of 5 years)*
-6.79 (3.23) -7.31 (3.00) -6.92 (3.28) -7.40 (3.17)
Compulsory  
voting** 37.12 (2.07) 37.30 (2.11) 37.16 (2.10) 37.20 (2.03)
New democracy -14.81 (2.17) -12.44 (3.59) -11.40 (3.48)
New democracy X 
ﬁrst election -8.07 (4.40) -4.37 (4.37)ns
New democracy X 
time to next  
national election
-2.65 (7.89)ns -6.36 (7.68)ns
2019 year 
dummy 8.96 (2.48)
Electoral sequen-
ce (0-1 proportion 
of 9 elections) -4.95 (3.17)ns -5.02 (3.12)ns -4.10 (3.16)ns -10.98 (3.59)
Intercept 52.56 (2.42) 53.12 (2.35) 52.09 (2.44) 55.15 (2.50)
R-squared 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.79
Observations 132 172 172 172
Notes: All coefficients signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, one-tailed, unless marked "ns". 
 * Originally measured in days. 
 ** Compulsory voting coded 1 if in effect and enforced. If abolished, coded as proportion of years left before all pre-re-
form voters have been replaced, starting with ﬁrst election following abolition. If not enforced, coded as for abolition, 
starting with the second EP election at which the country partici pated (see main text for details).
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In Table A, Model 1 corresponds to the model presented in Franklin (2001), though 
with time to the next national parliamentary election coded as a proportion (so that 
coefficient magnitudes are comparable across variables) rather than in months) and 
with established democracies included at every election up to 2019. Model 2 adds 
new democracies (countries acceding to the EU in 2014 with the exception of Mal-
ta and Cyprus, which were already included in Model 1). Model 3 adds interactions 
between new democracy and each of ﬁrst election and time to next election. These 
show new democracies turning out at an even lower rate 2.9 percent lower than esta-
blished democracies would have done in the absence of a ﬁrst election boost (5.29 
- 8.07 = -2.78), though the difference would not have been statistically signiﬁcant. 
It also shows new democracies being more strongly affected (over a third more stron-
gly) by time to the next election (-6.92 / -2.65 = 0.38), but again this difference would 
not have been statistically signiﬁcant. This is the model used to derive predicted out-
comes for Figures 1 and 2 in the main text. Finally, Model 4 inroduces the 2019 elec-
tion year dummy, mentioned in the main text. The effect of this variable shows tur-
nout in 2019 to have been almost 9 percent greater than would have been expected 
on the basis of the structural model (which would have led us to expect the turnout 
level shown in Figure 2 in the main text. This effect is highly signiﬁcant, statistical-
ly. Indeed, there is less than a 1 in a thousand chance of this effect being the result 
of happenstance. 
Importantly, all of these models except for the ﬁnal one show no signiﬁcant effect 
of electoral sequence – a measure of the location of each election in a nine election 
sequence coded 0 to 1. The effect (leaving aside Model 4) suggests a total drop in 
turnout of 5 percent. This is the fall in turnout not accounted for by contextual chan-
ges, a little more than half of one percent per EP election – rather less than the de-
cline that would have been expected on the basis of work by Franklin and Hobolt 
(2011). It is possible that, far from a reduction in EP election support over the ye-
ars, there has actually been an increase, net of contextual and other factors. 
In Table B we show effects on party gains in vote share between national and EP 
elections, using both types of measure (overall and relative) mentioned in the main 
text. These different measures are presented in pairs of columns for different ana-
lyses. The explanatory power of second order theory is seen there to be very low, espe-
cially when it comes to relative gains, meaning that much of the ﬂuctuation in par-
ty support between national elections and following EP elections is due to other fac-
tors than those that the theory takes into account, or are random in nature. Becau-
se effects are so small we set the bar for statistical signiﬁcance at 0.1 rather than the 
more conventional 0.05. 
The ﬁrst four columns show effects of small party size and opposition status, each 
taken alone. Size has about ten times the apparent effect of opposition status and 
the relative measure shows close to ten times the apparent effect produced by the 
absolute measure. These four coefficients are highly signiﬁcant, statistically. However, 
size and opposition status are also highly correlated, and share explanatory power. 
When we take the two together in Model 3 we ﬁnd that, from both perspectives, op-
position status loses statistical signiﬁcance (and, indeed, acquires the wrong sign when 
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measured from a relative perspective). The two measures also tell different stories 
in the ﬁnal pair of columns, those for Model 4. There we see that the proportion of 
time left to the next election plays an important role in conditioning the strength of 
relative effects, but not of absolute effects. Relative effects of opposition status are 
signiﬁcant in this model even though small party size is also taken into account. In 
explaining the outcome
Table B - Relative and absolute gains from opposition status and small party size,  
OLS regressions
outcome: 
gain in 
vote share
model 1:  
opposition  
status
model 2:  
small party 
size
model 3:  
both together
model 4:  
small party  
size x time
Overall Relative Overall Relative Overall Relative Overall Relative
Opposition  
status
0.03 0.57 -0.34 -0.34
(0.01) (0.20) (0.01)ns (0.22)ns (0.01)ns (0.22)
Small party 
size*
0.27 2.59  0.28  1.99  0.26  0.03
(0.03) (0.76) (0.04) (0.85) (0.06) (1.48)ns
Time left until 
the next  
national 
election  
(proportion)
0.01 0.76
(0.02)ns (0.40)
Small X time  0.04  4.44
(0.12) (2.86)
Intercept -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.10 =0.03 -0.12 -0.02 0.24
(0.00) (0.09)ns (0.00) (0.11)ns (0.00) (0.11)ns (0.01) (0.22)ns
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.06
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267
Notes: All coefficients signiﬁcant at 0.1, one-tailed, unless marked “ns.” Standard errors in parentheses. 
* 1 - size of party at the most recent national election, measured as a proportion of total votes cast.
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this model, effects of small size become signiﬁcant in the expected direction only pro-
vided there is a long time left before the next national election. More importantly 
this effect is the most powerful of any seen in Table 1. At EP elections held close to 
the start of a country's election cycle, the smallest parties gain by a factor that is four 
times their size, though this boost explains little variance because the smallest par-
ties are few in number and rarely have the good fortune to contest an EP election in 
the immediate aftermath of a national election.  
This last model is suggestive of a strong link between the structural theory and 
second order theory, which should not surprise us since the structural theory itself 
incorporates second order theory in a number of ways. However, the ﬁndings are ba-
sed on models with little power and we should bear in mind the relatively high pro-
bability (little less than 1 in 10) that these ﬁndings are spurious. Evidently they need 
to be conﬁrmed in future research.  
 
 
Chapter Five 
Impact of issues on party performance 
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introduction 
 
European Parliament (EP) elections are traditionally analysed and interpreted ac-
cording to the second order model (Reif and Schmitt 1980; van der Eijk and Fran-
klin 1996): EP elections are second order contests characterized by low turnout (Fran-
klin 2001) and driven by domestic factors (de Vreese et al. 2006). Such contexts, fur-
thermore, offer a platform for new parties to emerge, they tend to favour small ra-
ther than big parties and, finally, they are likely to result in electoral losses for go-
verning parties. Since the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, 
the second-order theory has been tested in the aftermath of each single election (van 
der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh 1996; Marsh 1998; Schmitt 2005; Schmitt and Tepe-
roglou 2015), and has repeatedly confirmed its conceptual and empirical validity.  
As regards the main characteristics of a second-order election, lower turnout is 
the one that is most strictly linked to the lower saliency of EP elections. This featu-
re has been explained by  relying on a small number of structural factors (Franklin 
2001), which are not related to the EU dimension. For instance, scholars have shown 
that saliency of EP elections depends also on the time of national electoral cycles in 
which they occur: EP elections are more important when they take place shortly be-
fore a national parliamentary election, at which time they gain an importance as 'ba-
rometers' of national party standings (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). 
Compared to other second-order elections (e.g. local elections), nevertheless, 
EP elections share with ﬁrst-order elections an important feature: they are both held 
at the national level. Party competition at national level has been interpreted by some 
scholars in terms of issue competition (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Green-Peder-
sen 2007). According to the second-order perspective, the impact of issues on EP elec-
tions should be mostly related to domestic factors (de Vreese et al., 2006). Conse-
quently it has traditionally been maintained that these elections had no European 
issue content (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). However, more recently scholars star-
ted to question some of the second order features, especially trying to show the in-
creasing importance of supranational elements in EP elections (Bellucci, Garzia and 
Rubal 2010; Trechsel 2010; Hix and Marsh 2011; Shuck et al. 2011; Hobolt and Spo-
De Sio, L., Franklin, M.N. and Russo L. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 2019, Luiss Uni-
versity Press, Rome, 2019.  
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on 2012).1 In this contribution, we support the argument of a “growing European-
ness of European elections” (Trechsel, De Sio and Garzia 2017) through empirical 
analyses which take into account the role played by shared issues among EU mem-
ber states in explaining party performances. 
By taking as a reference point the previous parliamentary elections, we ﬁrst de-
monstrate the lower relevance and predictive power of the second-order model for 
analysing party performance when issues are not taken into account; then, we show 
that party gains and losses – compared to previous national elections – can be si-
gniﬁcantly explained by party stances on the same issues across the 28 EU countries, 
showing signs of a perhaps new emergence of a common European debate, struc-
tured around a few key issues; nevertheless, relevant differences emerge when the 
main geographical areas of the EU are taken into account. 
 
beyond the second-order election model:  
the impact of issues on party performance 
 
In this chapter, we aim at analysing and explaining party performance in the 2019 
EP elections going beyond the traditional second-order explanations. In light of re-
cent studies that show, with different degrees of success, that the influence of Eu-
rope on voting might have even increased over time due to the continuous stren-
gthening of the EP’s powers (Schmitt 2005) and a greater visibility of European is-
sues during the campaign (Trechsel 2010, Trechsel, De Sio and Garzia 2017), we ex-
pect that parties take positions on similar key issues which inform the political de-
bate in Europe, not only when national elections are held, but also in times of EP elec-
tions . Thus, we first expect that: 
  
in order to predict electoral performance in the 2019 EP elections in terms of gains 
or losses compared to previous parliamentary elections, issue stances of politi-
cal parties significantly contribute in terms of predictive power on top of struc-
tural second-order factors, even when estimating a common model for all EU-
28 countries. 
 
Secondly, we expect that, despite a potentially increasing Europeanization of the po-
litical space, issue stances of parties have a differentiated impact on electoral per-
formance in different geographical areas of the EU, rooted in diverse political tra-
ditions, developments and socio-economic contexts. In this regard, the structure of 
1. It needs to be recognized that the 2014 EP elections (and perhaps also those of 2019) were 
held in the context of a considerable europeanization of national political discourses. If EP 
elections constitute distorted reflections of national political concerns (van der Eijk and Fran-
klin 1996) then it would be expected, even according to Second Order Election (SOE) theo-
ry, that these elections would reflect any European content that national elections might ac-
quire. So such content occurring after 2009 does not contradict SOE theory. The discovery 
of shared trends across EU countries in issue effects also does not contradict SOE theory sin-
ce SOE theory does not consider this possibility.
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political conflict in Central Eastern Europe has been traditionally very different com-
pared to Western Europe, with the former characterised by higher electoral volati-
lity, weaker party allegiances, a less structured political space (Bielasiak 2005) or 
different ideological combinations of economic and cultural issues (Kitschelt 
1992). Furthermore, studies that have analysed citizens’ attitudes through the len-
ses of post-materialism (Inglehart 1990) have shown that individuals have different 
issue priorities depending on their level of material wellbeing, with post-materia-
list attitudes spreading especially among well-educated middle classes. Borrowing 
on these insights and recognising the risks to empirical inference that derive from 
data limitations (given that we do not employ individual-level data), it is plausible 
to expect that: 
 
distinguishing between the different European geographical areas, electoral gains 
are explained by different party positions on issues, with post-materialist, envi-
ronmentalist positions playing a greater role in the richest countries of the Cen-
tre-North. 
 
data 
 
In our analysis, following a long-standing analytical approach (e.g., Schmitt 2005; 
Hix and Marsh 2007; 2011; Schmitt and Toygur 2016), we rely on aggregate-level 
data to investigate why citizens switch votes from national to European elections. 
Consequently, individual parties running at the 2019 EP elections are our unit of ana-
lysis, whereas the dependent variable is for each party the difference between the 
percentage of valid votes polled in the EP elections and that obtained at the previous 
national parliamentary elections held in the country (the same measure as used in 
Chapter 4 of this book). In contrast to the strategy pursued by De Sio, Russo and Fran-
klin in that chapter, we focus only on the relative difference, ignoring the absolute 
one. More precisely, for each party we calculated vote-share gains or losses relati-
ve to votes won by that party at the most recent national election. Relying on rela-
tive vote changes across elections has the notable advantage of permitting a strai-
ghtforward comparison between large parties (more likely to lose votes at EP elec-
tion, according to the second-order model) and small parties, with results that are 
more sensitive compared to simple party performance differences. For instance, a 
party gain of 2-3 percent of the total vote is not a big gain in absolute terms. However, 
if that gain doubles the party’s vote share, this would been conceived as a big vic-
tory by commentators and party supporters. 
The main independent variables that operationalize the second order model are 
as follows: 
- “Size” is the percentage of votes for each party in the last national election. This 
variable also represents the baseline to calculate the vote-share gap between na-
tional and the 2019 EP elections; 
- “Government status” is a dummy variable scoring ‘1’ for all parties included in 
the national government at the time of the 2019 EP elections and ‘0’ for all others; 
impact of issues on party performance
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- “Early” is an index ranging between 0 and 1 that measures the period of the elec-
toral cycle in which the EP election is held (the highest the index, the closest the 
EP election is to previous parliamentary election); 
- The interaction between “size” and “early”, which is intended to measure the in-
ﬂuence of party size mediated by the effect of the electoral cycle. As shown by 
De Sio, Russo and Franklin in this book, electoral gains of small parties occur main-
ly at the start of the electoral cycle. 
 
The coding of parties’ positions on issues comes from the 2019 euandi project (who-
se dataset will be soon publicly released). In order to place parties in the political 
issue space, these operational measures are the result of an iterative approach to par-
ty placement strictly linked to the development of Internet-based Voting Advice Ap-
plications (VAAs). This method consists in comparing expert judgements with par-
ty self-placements (Trechsel and Mair 2011; Garzia, Trechsel and De Sio 2015; Tre-
chsel, De Sio and Garzia 2017) in order to maximize the strengths of both metho-
dologies, while at the same time attempting to counterbalance the respective we-
aknesses. Expert coding and party self-placement occur independently, but the re-
spective results are compared to allow a control mechanism. Through this kind of 
datasets, it is possible to cover immediately in the aftermath of the EP elections a lar-
ge number of policy issues, which are related to actual policy statements rather than 
to a generic classification of political conflict dimensions. 
 
results 
 
In Table 1 we show effects on party performance in the 2019 EP elections. In Mo-
del 1 only the aforementioned second orders factors are included as control varia-
bles. In Model 2 we added as predictors party positions on issues.2 The first evident 
result that emerges is that the explanatory power of second order theory is not very 
large: the variance explained by Model 1 is 13%.3 This means that much of the va-
riation in party support between national elections and following EP elections is due 
to other factors than the structural elements of the second-order theory: indeed, when 
we add party positions in Model 2, R-squared increases significantly, reaching 24%. 
2. Considering the relatively low number of observations and the relatively large number of is-
sues, we pursued a systematic strategy for identifying a parsimonious model. We first ran a 
full model with 21 issues from the VAA of the 2019 euandi project (after having excluded the 
“EU transnational party lists” issue because of too many missing values). We then excluded 
issues with effects characterized by very high p-values (equal or above 0.8). Finally, we loo-
ked at bivariate Pearson correlations between the remaining issues. According to the 
strength of association (Cohen 1988), we excluded some variables (e.g. “anti-immigration”, 
“green taxes”, “EU foreign policy”) in order to avoid items picking up on the same covarian-
ce component. See the Appendix for the complete list of analysed issues, along with question 
wording.  
3. Because effects are small and the number of observations is limited being aggregate data, we 
set the bar for statistical significance at 0.1 rather than the more conventional 0.05.
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Hence, our first empirical expectation is confirmed: the predictive power of the se-
cond-order model when considered only in terms of its structural implications has 
considerably less predictive power for analysing party performance, compared to a 
model which includes party stances on the same issues across the 28 EU countries. 
In particular, looking at Model 2, we notice that some issues have a signiﬁcant 
effect on party performance: banks taxation (negative), assimilation (negative), tou-
gher criminal sanctions (positive) and EU integration (positive). This means that par-
ties which support EU integration and claim that criminals should be more severe-
ly punished are likely to have made electoral gains in the 2019 EP elections, com-
pared to previous parliamentary elections. Conversely, positions in favour of cultu-
ral assimilation of migrants and of a higher taxation on banks and stock market ex-
changes are associated with electoral losses. This suggests the emergence of a com-
mon European debate, centred on different dimensions of the political space: the eco-
nomic left-right dimension (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Knutsen 1995; 1997); the 
cultural dimension based on the libertarian-authoritarian distinction (Kitschelt 1994); 
and a dimension based on the divide between cultural integration and demarcation 
linked to globalization and EU integration processes (Kriesi et. al. 2006).  In this re-
gard, good party performances are explained by a mixture of political positions: right-
wing on economy, authoritarian as regards law and order issues, but culturally open 
as regard EU integration and cultural integration of migrants. 
However, we expect that this Europeanization of political dynamics is partial, with 
signiﬁcant differences among geographical areas of the EU, consistently with the dif-
ferent steps of the EU enlargement and the very different political traditions and re-
cent developments of EU countries, especially if we consider the distinction betwe-
en eastern countries (of the former soviet bloc), countries of the centre-north of Eu-
rope and southern countries.4 We therefore proceeded to test this second empirical 
expectation by interacting all the issue-related variables of Model 2 with dummy va-
riables for the aforementioned areas, through separate models. Here we present the 
results of the signiﬁcant interactions through plots of the marginal effects of issue 
positions on party performance across geographical areas.  
Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of pro renewable energy stances on party per-
formance across groups of countries. This variable in Model 2 of Table 1 was not si-
gniﬁcant. Interestingly, when we take into account the interaction with groups of coun-
tries, it becomes signiﬁcant and positively associated with electoral gains in the Cen-
tre-North.  This result is consistent with the geographically differentiated success of 
green parties in the 2019 EP elections, with the largest gains that occurred in the 
central-northern countries (for instance, the astonishing success of the Green Par-
ty in Germany which has become the second most voted party with 20% of the vo-
impact of issues on party performance
4. France is a country that shares features of both the South and the North: considering both 
socio-economic and political-institutional factors, we decided to include it in the Centre-North. 
To check the robustness of our results, we replicated the analyses including it in the South, 
and findings are substantially confirmed.
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tes). Again, environmental issues seem to play a relevant role in electoral terms only 
in the most economically developed part of Europe, conﬁrming our expectation ba-
sed on the assumptions of post-materialist theory (Inglehart 1990). 
 
Table 1- Testing the full model of party performance in 2019 EP elections, OLS regressions
outcome:  
relative gains/losses in vote share
model 1 
base model: 
only second-order 
controls
model 2  
party stances  
on issues
Second-order controls (government 
status, party size, early in the electoral 
cycle, size*early)
 (included)  (included)
unemployment support -0.19 (0.39)ns
banks taxation -0.46 (0.34)
lower taxes -0.36 (0.35)ns
assimilation -0.74 (0.39)
tougher criminal sanctions  0.93 (0.35)
asylum quota -0.14 (0.28)ns
euthanasia  0.02 (0.27)ns
renewable energy  0.41 (0.36)ns
EU integration  0.45 (0.30)
no veto power  0.00 (0.30)ns
Constant 1.00 (0.60) 1.00 (0.60)
R-squared 0.13 0.24
Observations 126 126
Notes: All coefficients at least signiﬁcant at 0.1, one-tailed, unless marked “ns.” Standard errors in pa-
rentheses.
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Figure 1. Marginal effects of renewable energy on party performance by groups of countries. 
 
As regards economic issues (see Figure 2), positions supporting lower taxes (in 
Model 2 not signiﬁcant) become substantially signiﬁcant and negatively associated 
with party performances only in the Centre-North. Conversely, the negative and si-
gniﬁcant association between positions in favour of banks taxation and party per-
formance holds only in eastern countries, whereas in the Centre-North the sign of 
the effect is the opposite, although not signiﬁcant. These results seem to indicate a 
relevant political distinction between eastern and central-northern countries: in the 
latter, positions attached to the defence of the traditional welfare state (originated 
precisely in these countries) seem to be electorally rewarding, whereas in the East 
right-wing pro market positions appear more promising. 
 
 
Figure 2. Marginal effects of banks taxation and lower taxes on party performance by groups of 
countries. 
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Political differences between geographical areas, especially those between cen-
tral-northern and eastern countries, appear evident also when we consider margi-
nal effects of cultural issues on party performance by groups of countries. Concer-
ning issues related to cultural demarcation-integration (see Figure 3), the afore-
mentioned signiﬁcant and negative association between positions supporting cul-
tural assimilation of migrants and party performance is a phenomenon which oc-
curs mostly in the Centre-North (in the South it is less signiﬁcant, while in the East 
such positions are positively associated with electoral performance, although not si-
gniﬁcantly). Similarly, pro-EU integration positions show substantial signiﬁcant effects 
in the same geographical area (whereas in the South and in the East they are not si-
gniﬁcant, albeit the sign of the association is the same). Therefore, noteworthy po-
litical differences between Centre-North and East emerge not only as far as econo-
mic issues are concerned, but also when cultural issues are on the table. This latter 
point is conﬁrmed by looking at Figure 4: positions in favour of tougher criminal san-
ctions – an issue traditionally linked to the authoritarian-libertarian dimension – are 
highly signiﬁcant and positively associated with electoral gains in the East, where-
as in the South and in the Centre-North are less signiﬁcant, albeit showing the same 
direction. Finally, positions supporting distributions of asylum seekers quota among 
EU member states (a variable not signiﬁcant in Model 2), keep being not statistically 
signiﬁcant in the South and in the Centre-North, while becoming signiﬁcant and as-
sociated with electoral losses in eastern countries. 
 
 
Figure 3. Marginal effects of cultural assimilation and EU integration on party performance by groups 
of countries. 
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Figure 4. Marginal effects of tougher criminal sanctions and asylum quota on party performance 
by groups of countries. 
impact of issues on party performance
To conclude, this analysis has shown that traditional second-order and structural 
factors, certainly relevant, are only partially sufficient to interpret and predict elec-
toral performance of parties at the 2019 EP elections. Including in explanatory mo-
dels party positions on key issues shared among EU countries appears a promising 
strategy. Furthermore, the growing importance of an European issue space should 
be nuanced taking into account relevant political differences between the geogra-
phical areas of the EU. Our results have shown, indeed, a clear divide between cen-
tral-northern and eastern countries, in terms of the type of issue stances that can be 
electorally rewarding. In the Centre-North environmentalism, positions pro-cultu-
ral integration and to a certain extent the defence of the welfare model seem to be 
all issues than can lead to electoral gains. This issue context is particularly fruitful 
to explain the (geographically differentiated) “green wave” of the 2019 EP elections. 
This progressive landscape totally changes when we look at issue opportunities in 
the East: authoritarian stances on the cultural dimension and to a certain extant right-
wing positions on the economy seem to be electorally rewarding, consistently with 
the political development of the last years. This is of course preliminary research with 
signiﬁcant limitations, especially as regards the number of cases analysed (aggre-
gate data from two elections). However, results appear promising and further research 
is needed to explore more in depth these preliminary insights, both enlarging the 
number and type of elections analysed and interplaying aggregate level data with 
citizens’ opinions on issues through public opinion surveys. 
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appendix to chapter 5: 
question wording of issue statements 
WELFARE Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes
UNEMPLOYMENT SUPPORT The state should provide stronger ﬁnancial support to unemployed workers
EU DEFICIT The European Union should rigorously punish Mem-ber States that violate the EU deﬁcit rules
ASYLUM QUOTA Asylum-seekers should be distributed proportionally among European Union Member States
ANTI IMMIGRATION Immigration into Denmark should be made more re-strictive
ASSIMILATION Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values
GAY UNIONS The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing
LEGALISATION DRUGS The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed
EUTHANASIA Euthanasia should be legalized
LOWER TAXES Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes
EU TAXATION The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers
BANKS TAXATION Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily
GREEN TAXES The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)
RENEWABLE ENERGY
Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind ener-
gy) should be supported even if this means higher 
energy costs
INTERNET RESTRICTIONS Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons
TOUGHER CRIMINAL SANCTIONS Criminals should be punished more severely
EU DEFENCE The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy
EU FOREIGN POLICY On foreign policy issues the European Union should speak with one voice
EU integration European integration is a good thing
ANTIEURO The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing
NO VETO POWER Individual member states of the European Union should have less veto power
part ii 
results across the 28 eu countries

Austria: An election overshadowed by Ibiza-gate 
sylvia kritzinger and carolina plescia
introduction  
 
On May 17th 2019, the campaign for the European Parliament election came to an 
abrupt halt in Austria. That evening, the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung 
and the German magazine Der Spiegel released a video that resulted in one of the 
biggest national political scandals in Austrian history, now known as “Ibiza-gate”. 
In the video – secretly recorded shortly before the national election in 2017 – the 
FPÖ-party leader Heinz-Christian Strache and deputy leader Johann Gudenus re-
vealed modes of illegally funding the FPÖ, promising government orders at inﬂa-
ted prices to a purported niece of a Russian oligarch in a villa in Ibiza. The video 
caused the collapse of the coalition government between the right-wing Peoples’ Par-
ty (ÖVP), led by the Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, and the populist-right Freedom Par-
ty (FPÖ), led by the Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache – who has been in po-
sition since December 2017 – and resulted in a snap-election to be held in early Sep-
tember 2019.  
The scandal and the subsequent government crisis redirected the attention of po-
litical commentators, politicians and citizens to the national level, making the Eu-
ropean Parliament election per se, as well as parties’ positions on European integration, 
politically irrelevant. Still, the EP-election served as a ﬁrst nationwide ‘poll’ on how 
the parties are likely to perform in the upcoming national election in September. The 
2019 EP-election taking place on Sunday 26 May was thus not even second-order 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2016), but can be characterised as a pre-test of the upcoming 
national snap-election. 
 
the ep-electoral campaign before ibiza-gate 
 
Seven parties ran in the 2019 EP-election. Beside the two parties in government – 
the ÖVP and FPÖ –, all parties currently represented in the parliament ran for elec-
tion. Namely, the Social Democrats (SPÖ), the liberal New Austria (NEOS) and the 
List Now (Liste Jetzt), which supported the electoral list 1 Europe, whose leading can-
didate was a former MEP for the Greens. Additionally, the Greens and the Commu-
nist party (KPÖ) also decided to run. The Greens are no longer represented in the 
National Council after failing to reach the threshold of 4% in the last national elec-
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tion in 2017 (Bodlos and Plescia, 2018) – but they were still represented in the Eu-
ropean Parliament with 3 MEPs. Overall, in 2019, fewer parties participated in the 
EP-election than in 2014 (Plescia and Kritzinger, 2014).  
Apart from the FPÖ, all parties can be considered pro-European. The Greens cam-
paigned for a European social union and a common tax system; the NEOS even sup-
ported the establishment of a United States of Europe. The SPÖ were less favoura-
ble towards European integration by comparison, and mainly campaigned for a Eu-
rope attentive to the needs of its citizens – not to ﬁnancial interests – and thus lar-
gely overlapping with Green demands. All three parties also campaigned on avoi-
ding a Rechtsruck – that is, containing the electoral success of populist right parties 
– in the upcoming EP-election. The KPÖ can also be classiﬁed as Euro-friendly but, 
overall, did not gain a lot of attention during the campaign.  
While Sebastian Kurz worked hard in presenting himself as well as the ÖVP as 
clearly pro-European (especially after having formed a coalition with the Eurosceptic 
FPÖ in 2017), two weeks before the 2019 EP election he caught media attention both 
nationally and Europe-wide by making a number of Eurosceptic statements. These 
included condemning European overregulation and calling for a substantial reform 
of the European Union and its institutions.  
Overall, however, in 2019 the FPÖ was the only clearly Eurosceptic party in Au-
stria. But even the FPÖ has changed its discourse substantially since 2014: an ÖXIT 
(Austrian exit from the EU) was no longer on the FPÖ agenda and the party rather 
focused on campaigning for more national sovereignty.  
As already mentioned, however, ‘Ibiza-gate’ overshadowed the EP election cam-
paign during the week immediately before the election.    
 
results 
 
Austria has a proportional system, with a threshold of 4% and the possibility for vo-
ters to express a preference vote for a single candidate. However, to obtain a man-
date in the 2019 election, a party needed to obtain around a 5% vote share. Seats 
are distributed within a single national constituency. All citizens aged over 16 can 
vote in EP-elections.  
As in most other countries, electoral participation increased substantially in Au-
stria, from 45.4% to 59.8% – an increase of 14.4 percentage points. Only in 1996, 
Austrians' ﬁrst opportunity to vote in an EP election after Austria became a member 
of the EU, was the turnout higher (67.3%).  
This year, the ÖVP won a landslide victory with 34.6% of the vote, outpolling the 
second-place party, the SPÖ, by 10.7%. This is an increase of 7.6 percentage points 
for the ÖVP compared to 2014, while the SPÖ obtained 23.9% of the votes (-0.2 per-
centage points). Interestingly, the FPÖ was able to contain its losses and ‘only’ lost 
2.5 percent of votes, compared with 2014, resulting in a 17.2% vote share. The NEOS 
obtained almost as many votes as in 2014 (8.4%, +0.3 percentage points). At the 
same time, the Greens did exceptionally well with 14.1% (-0.4 percentage points) 
of the vote, especially when considering that the party only won 3.8% of the popu-
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lar vote in the last national election in 2017. The EP election in 2019 seems to have 
put them back on the political scene. The 1 Europe list and the KPÖ obtained 1% and 
0.8%, respectively – far below their expectations.  
Austria is entitled to eighteen seats – nineteen after Brexit. The ÖVP won seven 
seats (two more than at the previous election), while the SPÖ maintained its ﬁve 
seats in the Parliament. The FPÖ as well as the Greens lost one seat each, and now 
hold three and two seats respectively, while the NEOS, as in 2014, can send one MEP 
to Brussels. After Brexit, the Greens are set to get the additional seats assigned to 
Austria. 
Interestingly, the possibility to cast a preferential vote has been widely used in 
this EP election, with entire party lists (particularly that of the ÖVP) being overthrown. 
Although Mr Strache – who was at the centre of the Ibiza-gate scandal – was sym-
bolically ranked last on the FPÖ-party list, he received more than the necessary 33,500 
preferential votes, which provides him with a seat in the new Parliament.   
 
discussions of the results 
 
While the ﬁrst half of the European election campaign focused on European issues 
and ideas on how to reform the EU, the last week was completely dominated by the 
government crisis.  
The clear winner of this election is the ÖVP, which not only gained 7.6 percen-
tage points more than in 2014, but is also the party with the largest vote share in Au-
stria. The Greens can also be considered election winners After their debacle in the 
national election of 2017 that resulted in the loss of parliamentary representation 
in the National Council, the EP elections 2019 were about political survival. Here 
the Greens not only won back the voters they lost in the national election, but were 
able to obtain a similar electoral result to 2014 – a result that could hardly have been 
envisaged beforehand. The vote loss of the FPÖ was rather moderate in light of spe-
culation about the consequences of Ibiza-gate. It seems that the FPÖ, by presenting 
itself as a victim rather than a perpetrator of Ibiza-gate, was able to mobilise voters 
of its own party who would not normally vote in EP elections to vote all the more for 
the FPÖ. Furthermore. The NEOS won more votes than in 2014, but they had ho-
ped for an additional seat. 
There are two clear election losers. The ﬁrst one is the SPÖ. As the biggest op-
position party, the SPÖ was not only unable to proﬁt from Ibiza-gate, but also lost 
support compared with 2014. With a weak leading candidate as well as a weak par-
ty leader, the party’s (non-)handling of the Ibiza-gate led to the worst ever result in 
a nationwide election. The second election loser is 1 Europe. Though it had a very 
prominent candidate – Johannes Voggenhuber – its electoral campaign, as well as 
earlier intra-party conﬂicts at the national level, resulted in only a 1% vote share. 
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conclusion 
 
Though Austrian parties started the EP campaign largely focused on European is-
sues, national political turmoil dominated the last 10 days of the EP election cam-
paign. Thus, the 2019 European election in Austria was a clear second-order elec-
tion – or rather effectively an early national election poll. The Austrian case shows 
just how quickly national politics can dominate European politics, with European 
issues and problems losing out when national politics gains prominance. There is the-
refore still a long way to go before Europe-wide election politics can be considered 
equally as important as national politics. To a certain extent, this is bad news for po-
licies that need common European understanding and problem-solving, such as cli-
mate change or taxation.  There are thus two takeaway messages: turnout ﬁnally in-
creased in the EP election of 2019, but it also showed that the national arena is still 
the centre of political activity, at least in Austria. 
 
Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Austria
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) EPP   1,305,954 34.6
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) S&D  903,151 23.9
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) ENF  650,114 17.2
The Greens (Grüne) G-EFA  532,194 14.1
NEOS-The New Austria (NEOS) ALDE  319,024 8.4
Jetz - Liste Peter Pilz  39,234 1.0
Others  30,086 0.8
Total 3,779,757 100
Turnout (%) 59.8
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 4%
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
7 7 +7.6 +2 +2
5 5 -0.2 +0
3 3 -2.5 -1 -1
2 3 -0.4 -1
1 1 +0.3 +0
+1.0
18 19 +1

Belgium: Least salient, but very European  
louise hoon
introduction 
 
As happened ﬁve years ago, the 2019 Belgian elections to the European Parliament 
(EP) coincided with regional and federal elections. As voting is compulsory, the ex-
ceptional turnout of 88.5% is a bad indicator of the salience of the election. But from 
the near absence of European campaigns and candidates from public debate and me-
dia, as well as from the marginal differences in the election results between the three 
levels, we may read the EP election as being again overshadowed by national campaigns 
and candidates (Kelbel et al., 2016). Nevertheless, this competition had a European 
dimension, as it was dominated by two transnational issues: the climate and migra-
tion. Radical right, radical left and green parties that ‘own’ these issues were the win-
ners of the election, at the cost of center parties (Van de Wardt et al., 2014). This de-
velopment is not new to most EU member states. But it poses a new challenge to the 
Belgian federal system, as it exacerbates the long-standing divide between Flanders 
and Wallonia. 
 
belgium: a federal state of communities and regions 
 
To interpret the dynamics of this three-level election, some understanding of the Bel-
gian political system is needed. Belgium is a federal state, with three competent levels: 
the federal, provincial and municipal levels. At the highest level, the federal state, the 
communities and the region are on an equal standing. The communities are groups 
of citizens with a shared culture and language: next to the main languages, Dutch and 
French, there is a tiny German-speaking community. The competences of the com-
munities’ governments and parliaments focus on culture and education.1 
The regions are territorially deﬁned and hold mainly socio-economic competences. 
The Northern, Flemish region covers the largest part of the country. Wallonia covers 
the Southern part, and the Brussels Capital region is situated at the heart of the coun-
try, near the language border, but entirely surrounded by Flemish territory. The Fle-
1. The German-speaking community counts about 76.000 citizens.
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mish community and region institutionally overlap, as they are both represented by 
the Flemish Parliament. The Walloon region, the French-speaking community, the 
Brussels Capital region and the German-speaking community (located in the East of 
the Walloon region) have separate parliaments and governments.  
 
electoral system 
 
Members of these six parliaments are selected through proportional elections, with 
a 5% threshold and different constituencies. The complex and asymmetrical politi-
cal system results in a two largely separate party systems: a Flemish and a Walloon 
one.  Debates, campaigns and awareness of candidates remain highly conﬁned to the 
two main regions. In Brussels, voters get to choose between lists of French- or Dutch 
speaking candidates. By consequence, the two party systems co-exist in Brussels. As 
there is only a minority of Dutch-speaking citizens there, debate is dominated by the 
French-speaking parties.  
The federal government is a coalition of parties from Flanders and Wallonia. For 
a long time, the center parties dominating the political landscape, the democrat CD&V 
and CdH, the social-democrat Sp.a and PS and the liberal OpenVld and MR were rea-
dy to compromise across the linguistic divide. 
 
However, Flemish voters have long been more right-leaning, while socialists are stron-
ger in Wallonia. In recent years, this divide has deepened, especially with the rapid 
growth of the conservative right Flemish nationalist N-VA, which has been the lar-
gest party in Flanders since 2010. The most outspoken case for Flemish independence 
is made by the radical right VB. Due to its racist and discriminatory discourse, the 
party has been excluded from government negotiations by the other Belgian parties, 
in a so-called cordon sanitaire.  
 
results 
 
The results of the European election are presented in Table 1. In Flanders the New 
Flemish Alliance (N-VA) remains the largest party at all three levels. However, it lo-
ses a few percentage points at each election. The radical right Flemish Interest (VB) 
came in second, but is the clear winner, with an average increase of 12.5% over the 
three levels. On the Walloon side, this dynamic is mirrored on the left side of the po-
litical spectrum. The social-democrat PS remains the ﬁrst party, but it lost between 
3 and 5% over the three levels. Its radical challenger on the left, the communist La-
bour Party (PTB), increased its vote by about 9%, with results between 14 and 15% 
over the three levels. Scores for the Walloon green party Ecolo increased between 
6 and 8%.  
If we compare results over the three levels, differences are rather small. Comparing 
the regional2 and the EP election results, the most remarkable difference is that gre-
en parties do better in the EP elections than in the regional and federal ones. The 
Flemish green party Groen took 2.3 percentage points more in the EP election, and 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Belgium
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Dutch-speaking constituency
New-Flemish  
Alliance (N-VA) EPP  954,048 22.4 3 -4.2 -1
Flemish Interest 
(VB) ENL  811,169 19.1 3 12.5 +2
OpenVld ALDE  678,051 16.0 2 -4.5
Christian-Democrat 
& Flemish (CD&V) EPP
Christian- 
Democrat &  
Flemish (CD&V)
EPP  617,651 14.5 2 -5.4 -1
Green (Groen) G-EFA 525,908  12.4 1 +1.8
Socialist  Party  
Different (Sp.a) S&D  434,002 10.2 1 -3.0
Labour Party 
(PVDA)
GUE-
NGL   210,391 5.0 +2.6
Total  4,231,220 99.6 12
French-speaking constituency
Socialist Party (PS) S&D  651,157 26.7 2 -2.6 -1
Ecolo G-EFA  485,655 19.9 2 +8.2 +1
Mouvement  
for Reform (MR) ALDE  470,654 19.3 2 -7.8 -1
Belgian Labour  
Party (PTB)
GUE-
NGL  355,883 14.6 1 +9.1
Humanist  
democratic center 
(cdH)
EPP  218,078 8.9 1 -2.4
Déﬁ  144,555 5.9 +2,5
Popular Party (PP)  113,793 4.7 -1.3
Total 2,439,775 100 8
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(continued) Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Belgium
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
German-speaking constituency
Christian-Social Party 
(CSP) EPP  14,247 34.9 1 +4.6
Ecolo  6,675 16.4 -0.3
For German-speaking 
community (ProDG)  5,360 13.1 -0.1
Party for Freedom and 
Progress (PFF-MR)  4,684 11.5 -4.6
Socialist Party (SP)  4,655 11.4 -3.7
Vivant  4,550 11.2 +2.6
Animal Party  
(DierAnimal)  606 1.5
Total  40,777 100 1
Total  13,423,544 21
Turnout (%) 88.5
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) none
the Walloon greens took 5.4%, with about 1.5 percentage points increase in the vote 
share.3 It suggests that the outspokenly transnational and pro-European programs 
these parties presented may have incentivized voters to make a particularly Euro-
pean choice.  
This pattern could also be a consequence of the typical phenomenon of ‘since-
re voting’ in second order elections, where voters opt for a smaller party they sym-
pathize with, when the stakes in the election seem lower to them (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980). However, with radical left and radical right challengers, we see no 
such effects. Results for PTB and VB are equally strong in Wallonia and Flanders, as 
they are in the EP election. Whereas research has shown that voters behave differently 
in European elections, coincidence and compulsory voting seem to mitigate these 
effects in Belgium (for example Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004; Hobolt et al., 2009). 
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issues and candidates: least salient, very ‘european’  
 
Despite the lack of attention to the EP election, the elections had a European dimension 
due to the two topics dominating the agenda: migration and the climate. The lat-
ter was especially debated in Flanders. Migration had been a hot topic over the de-
parting government’s term, as the federal state secretary for asylum and migration, 
Theo Francken (N-VA) had caused several incidents, taking a very tough stand on 
migration, and sharing controversial tweets about refugees and migrants. Eventually, 
the government fell over the issue, when coalition partner N-VA refused to back the 
United Nations Global Compact for Migration.  
The climate had been at the center of public debate since the weekly protests of 
Belgian youngsters in the streets of Brussels. Following the example of the Swedish 
activist Greta Thunberg, the youngsters held weekly ‘strikes’, taking to the streets in-
stead of going to school. Shortly after the demonstration, the Flemish Christian-de-
mocrat minister for the environment, resigned after falsely claimeing that the secret 
services informed her about radical forces orchestrating the protests.  
The issue of European integration itself remained largely depoliticized. Despi-
te a tough anti-migration agenda, both N-VA and VB refrain from placing hard Eu-
roscepticism at the center of their programs. A possible explanation for this, is that 
they may see the EU as a vehicle, rather than an obstacle in that struggle. Contrary 
to what the strong position of the two Flemish nationalist parties may imply, the to-
pic of state reform, or of a further redistribution of competences within Belgium, was 
barely discussed in the run-up to the election.  
While national politicians took turns showing up in daily political shows on the 
Belgian national channels, there was little attention given to the EP candidates. On 
Flemish television, there was a rather low-proﬁle debate between candidates, and 
there were two or three slightly more ambitious debates in Walloon media. There 
was no Belgian candidacy for the Spitzenkandidaten procedure. In 2014, the can-
didacy of Guy Verhofstadt for the Presidency of the Commission had attracted at le-
ast some attention to the European election (Kelbel et al., 2016). 
 
conclusion 
 
Altogether, the EP election went by without much notice. For many Belgians, the Eu-
ropean vote was just another box to be ﬁlled on an already complex ballot paper. Ne-
vertheless, the salience of migration and climate, and the gains of parties that ‘own’ 
these issues, gave the election a European dimension. It seems that Belgium is cat-
ching up with a development that has been redrawing party systems elsewhere in 
Europe for quite some time now. But in the particular Belgian context, it results in 
a growing fracture between the two parts of the country. Without touching upon the 
issue, the Flemish nationalists may have succeeded in getting the issue of state re-
form on the table by means of the essentially European issue of migration. 
 
 
belgium: least salient, but very european 
96 the european parliament elections of 2019
references  
 
Ferrara, F. and Weishaupt, J. T. (2004). Get your act together: Party performance 
in European Parliament elections. European Union Politics, 5(3), 283-306.  
Hobolt, S. B., Spoon, J. J. and Tilley, J. (2009). A vote against Europe? Explaining 
defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections. British Journal 
of Political Science, 39(1), 93-115. 
Kelbel, C., Van Ingelgom, V., and Verhaegen, S. (2016). Looking for the European vo-
ter: Split-ticket voting in the Belgian Regional and European Elections of 2009 
and 2014. Politics and Governance, 4(1), 116-129. 
Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine second-order national elections–a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of European Election results. European Journal of Po-
litical Research, 8(1), 3-44. 
Van de Wardt, M., De Vries, C. E., and Hobolt, S. B. (2014). Exploiting the cracks: 
Wedge issues in multiparty competition. The Journal of Politics, 76(4), 986-999. 
 
 
 
Bulgaria: neither a protest, nor a European vote 
nikoleta yordanova
In May 2019, over six million voters were eligible to select seventeen members of the 
European Parliament (EP) in Bulgaria under a proportional representation system 
with preferential voting in a single nation-wide constituency.1 Three hundred and 
eighteen candidates were nominated by thirteen political parties, eight coalitions and 
six initiative committees.2 Voting in the EP elections is mandatory in Bulgaria, but 
there is no penalty for not turning out to vote. Furthermore, voting can take place 
only in person at polling stations and there is no postal voting. These voting arran-
gements, combined with the lack of any new political formations to mobilise habi-
tual non-voters and the fact that the election fell on the third day of a long weekend, 
prompted low electoral turnout.3 
 
the electoral campaign 
 
Until election day, the winner of the European elections in Bulgaria was unpredic-
table. A week before the elections, one fourth of the voters were undecided.4 The main 
governing political party, Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), 
in coalition with the United Democratic Forces (SDS), was predicted by opinion polls 
to receive 30%. So was the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the biggest opposition 
party and a successor of the ex-communist party. A distant third, but sure to obtain 
EP representation (polling at about 11%), was the long-standing Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms (DPS), representing the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria. A num-
ber of smaller parties and independent candidates fought for single seats. Most likely 
to pass the 5.88% effective threshold needed to obtain a seat were the “Democratic 
1. A candidate needs 5% of the party vote for the party list to be reordered. 
2. Central Electoral Commission (CIK). https://www.cik.bg/bg/ep2019/registers/candidates 
(Retrieved May 15, 2019). 
3. Interview by the newspaper Duma with the political commentator Dimityr Ganer, Research 
Center Trend on May 21, 2019. https://duma.bg/dimitar-ganev-ochakvam-niska-izbiratel-
na-aktivnost-n192192 (Retrieved on May 21, 2019). 
4. National survey by research center Spectyr conducted in the period 16-21 May 2019 
https://fakti.bg/bulgaria/382876-spektar-borba-za-chetvartoto-masto-za-evropeiskite-
izbori.
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Bulgaria” coalition and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation 
(IMRO), a political party.5 
Corruption scandals involving the government dominated the public debates in 
April and early May, leading to a drop in support for the governing GERB and a lead 
of two percentage points for BSP.6 The so-called “apartment-gate” scandal exploded 
when the media revealed high-ranking government officials had obtained luxurious 
apartments in the centre of Soﬁa at unrealistically low prices. Public protests threa-
tened the government’s survival, and the main opposition party BSP demanded ear-
ly national elections should it win the European elections.  
Another outcome of the scandal was increased apathy among the electorate. The 
public grew tired of the electoral political propaganda. While 51% of the voters vie-
wed the European elections as important in April, only 38% did so a month later.7 
The expected turnout was revised from 42% in early May to 35% as the elections ap-
proached.8 
Concerns about the protection of Bulgaria’s national interests in the EU also sur-
faced in the electoral campaigns. The top candidate of the governing party GERB and 
current Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society Mariya Gabriel, pledged her 
party would pursue ending the Cooperation and Veriﬁcation Mechanism, a post EU-
accession monitoring program of the progress of Bulgaria in ﬁghting corruption and 
assuring the rule of law via an independent judiciary. GERB positioned itself stron-
gly against double food standards in Eastern Europe compared to the rest of the EU.9 
The main opposition party, BSP, focused on attacking the government in the wake 
of the corruption scandals. It also criticised the government’s failure to secure the 
end of the Cooperation and Veriﬁcation Mechanism. Furthermore, BSP emphasised 
problems of low income in Bulgaria and supported the introduction of some form 
of minimum wage across the EU.10 The party strongly advocated ending the EU’s eco-
nomic sanctions against Russia. Notably, BSP assumed conservative views by fervently 
opposing the Istanbul Convention on combating violence against women on the 
grounds that it also entailed the protection of transsexual people. 
As usual, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) was expected to mobi-
lise their supporters and gain a double-digit result in the election. It led a pro-EU cam-
paign with emphasis on economic development to entice Bulgarian emigrants to come 
back to the country. 
5. https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2019/04/25/3424680_za_17_evrodeputatski_mesta_se_ 
boriat_318_bulgari/ Retrieved on April 25, 2019. 
6. Mediana Agency. “Two weeks before the European Elections: Public and Political Attitudes.”  
www.mediana.bg/download-analysis/MAY_2019_press.doc. Retrieved May 10, 2019.  
7. Ibid. 
8. Capital citing survey by Specter Research Center https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomik-
a/bulgaria/2019/05/26/3911079_live_evroizbori_2019/. Retrieved May 26, 2019.  
9. Svobodna Evropa, interview with GERB’s party list leader Mariya Gavriel on 21.05.2019 
https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/29952541.html. 
10. Svobodna Evropa, interview with BSP’s party list leader Elena Yoncheva on 22.05.2019. 
https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/29954975.htm. 
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Next in line for possible EP representation were the nationalist-patriotic parties. 
The front-runner was IMRO, which promoted less EU bureaucracy and federalism, 
but not less European integration per se. It also advocated the end of the discrimi-
natory EU monitoring of Bulgaria’s internal affairs and judiciary as well as scrapping 
the EU’s Mobility Package.11 IMRO further campaigned against illegal immigration 
and double standards in the EU and promoted protectionist policies for Bulgarian 
industries.12 The party’s rhetoric included strong sentiments against any political in-
ﬂuence of Turkey over Bulgaria. 
Other nationalist-patriotic parties with somewhat slimmer chances included Vo-
lya-The Bulgarian Patriots, Patriots for Valeri Simeonov and Ataka. These parties em-
phasized to various degrees populist anti-establishment policies and strict immigration 
controls. 
A ﬁnal likely candidate to gain a seat was the coalition Democratic Bulgaria (DB), 
uniting the centre-right and green parties. Its leader, Radan Kanev, advocated con-
tinued EU monitoring of law and justice in Bulgaria and continued sanctions on Rus-
sia. The party stood for deeper political union and integration in the spheres of de-
fence and security, justice and energy.13 It viewed the EP elections as an opportunity 
for a vote of no conﬁdence against the government.  
 
results 
 
The governing GERB was the winner of the elections. Together with its coalition par-
tner SDS, it sends six deputies to Brussels. GERB’s recovery from the corruption scan-
dals is attributable to the personal engagement of its popular party leader Boyko Bo-
risov in the ﬁnal days of the party campaign.   
BSP ended up in second place with ﬁve EP seats, damaging its hopes for early 
parliamentary elections. Its former leader and current President of the Party of the 
European Socialists, Sergey Stanishev, ascribes the party loss to intra-party conﬂicts, 
lack of a united campaign with real EU content and the party’s exit from the natio-
nal parliament earlier this year to boycott an electoral rule change.14 BSP did not suc-
11. The Mobility Package has been criticized in Bulgaria for undermining the competitive advantage 
of Eastern European hauliers in prices and services by introducing new regulation of truck 
drivers’ postings, driving and rest times among others. 
12. Svobodna Evropa, interview with IMRO’s party list leader Angel Dzhambazki on 21.05.2019 
2019 https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/29952690.html.  
13. Svobodna Evropa, interview with the list leader of “Democratic Bulgaria” Radan Kanev on 
22.05.2019. https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/29952857.html. 
14. Interview by BNT with Sergey Stanishev on 26.05.2019. https://izbori.bnt.bg/analizi-sin-
gle/sergej-stanishev-tova-ne-e-poslednata-bitka-koyato-vodim/ In an effort to distract attention 
from the prime ministers’ successes in the international arena, BSP tried to redirect attention 
to national politics and left the parliament in protest against a proposal to amend the elec-
toral law, which would have scrapped preferential voting.
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Bulgaria
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Citizens for European  
Development of  
Bulgaria (GERB)
EPP  607,194 31.1 6 +0.3
Bulgarian Socialist  
Party for Bulgaria 
(BSP)
S&D  474,160 24.3 5 +5.4 +1
Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms (DPS) ALDE  323,510 16.6 3 -0.7 -1
Internal Macedonian  
Revolutionary  
Organization (IMRO) -  
Bulgarian National  
Movement
ECR  143,830 7.4 2 +1
Democratic Bulgaria 
(DB) EPP  118,484 6.1 1
Volya-The Bulgarian 
Patriots ENF  70,830 3.6
Initiative committee 
for Desislava Petrova  
Ivancheva
 30,310 1.6
Initiative committee 
for Mincho Hristov  
Kuminev
 22,992 1.2
Patriots for Valeri  
Simeonov (NFSB  
and Middle European 
Class)
EFD  22,421 1.1
The Way to the Young  21,315 1.1
Ataka NI  20,906 1.1 -1.9
Vazrazdane  20,319 1.0
Reload Bulgaria  
(formerly Bulgaria  
without Censorship)
ECR  3,907 0.2 -1
Others  74,113 3.8
Totala 1,954,291 100 17
Turnout (%) 33.3
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) none
Note: PR system with preferential vote. 
a The total does not include the 61,029 votes for “I don’t support anyone”. 
Sources: Central Electoral Commissio. https://www.cik.bg/bg/decisions/447/2019-05-29 and https://re-
sults.cik.bg/ep2019/rezultati/index.html (Retrieved on 29.05.2019
101bulgaria: neither a protest, nor a european vote
ceed in mobilising centrist voters to oppose the government, leading to the resignation 
of its leader Kornelia Ninova.15 
DPS obtained three EP seats, one fewer than in the previous EP elections. A big-
ger surprise was the success of the newly formed coalition Democratic Bulgaria, which 
garnered a plurality of the vote from expatriot Bulgarians (i.e. 28.8%) and won one 
seat in the EP. IMRO also did remarkably well by consolidating the nationalist vote 
and securing two EP seats. None of the other nationalist parties mustered enough 
votes to obtain representation. Euroscepticism did not deﬁne the European elections 
in Bulgaria.  
 
conclusion 
 
The outcome of the EP elections in Bulgaria does not sit well with any of the esta-
blished theoretical models of European elections. It conforms to the second order 
electoral model only in so far as the turnout was notably low at 33.3% (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980; Hix and Marsh, 2007).16 This is signiﬁcantly lower than the avera-
ge turnout across the member states of 51.0%17 and it is 2.6 percentage points lo-
wer than in the 2014 EP election in Bulgaria.18 The low electoral activity can be vie-
wed as a protest against the political elites in Bulgaria. In line with this interpreta-
tion, of those who did turn out, 3% chose the vote option “I do not support anyone”.19 
However, contrary to the other two predictions of the second order model, the go-
vernment and larger parties more generally were not the clear losers in the elections. 
On the contrary, opposition parties did not succeed in framing the European elec-
tions as a vote of (no) conﬁdence in the government. Moreover, smaller parties only 
slightly increased their vote share in the EP elections compared to the national par-
liamentary elections (by 11 percentage points altogether). Overall, the results can-
not be summarised as a protest vote, even though the EP elections fell in the mid-
dle of the national electoral cycle when the government’s honeymoon period is over 
and it is more vulnerable to electoral punishment (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996).  
The alternative “Europe matters” model of European Parliament elections pre-
dicting sincere voting based on EU issues cannot account for the results either (e.g. 
De Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Hobolt, 2015). Although Eu-
ropean issues emerged during the electoral campaign, none of the winning parties 
15. That is despite the timing of the elections during a long weekend holiday that favoured BSP. 
While GERB’s more well-off sympathizers were expected to go on holidays, higher turnout was 
anticipated by BSP’s core supporters, i.e. pensioner for whom the elections offered rare me-
ans of social participation.  
16. CIK. https://www.cik.bg/b (Retrieved May 29, 2019). 
17. https://www.election-results.eu/ (Retrieved May 31, 2019). 
18. For comparison, the voter turnout in the 2017 national parliamentary elections was 54.1% 
(CIK. http://results.cik.bg/pi2017/aktivnost/index.html. (Retrieved May 31, 2019). 
19. CIK https://www.cik.bg/b (Retrieved May 29, 2019). Curiously, 36% also took advantage of 
preferential voting rather than relying on the pre-ordered lists devised by party leaders.
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offered a clear EU programme for the coming years. Crucially, the hard Euroscep-
tics enjoyed remarkably weak electoral support.  
Thus, a new theoretical model is needed to explain the results of the EP elections 
in Bulgaria, and perhaps more broadly in Eastern Europe.  
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Croatia: Towards further fragmentation of the party system 
andrija henjak
introduction 
 
The 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections in Croatia were held in a very diffe-
rent political environment than previous EP elections. Economic conditions have im-
proved as GDP growth resumed in 2015, unemployment has declined by more than 
half, and the government’s ﬁscal position has improved as well. However, the entry 
into the EU and expiration of the restrictions on the free movement of labour pro-
duced mass emigration of mostly younger Croatians towards countries of Western 
Europe. Thus, despite the migrant crisis that affected Croatia in 2015 and 2016, and 
the constant pressure of migration on the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, it 
was emigration – rather than immigration – that  was at the core of public debates 
in the two years preceding the 2019 EP elections. Emigration particularly affected 
the eastern part of the country, which suffered huge population losses and turned 
a fertile and potentially prosperous region into a symbol of the country’s failure to 
manage its own development and to take advantage of its EU membership. The Croa-
tian economy was largely unable to tap new markets in the EU, it is heavily depen-
dent on tourism and it suffers from a weak export sector and lack of innovation ca-
pacity and competitiveness. This resulted in Croatia becoming one of the countries 
with the lowest GDP per capita in the EU.  
 
the context 
 
In two years prior to the European Parliamentary elections, the government, led by 
the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), was faced with many challenges: the collapse 
of the largest company in the country, the bankruptcy of more than half of the ship-
building industry (one of the few remaining signiﬁcant industries in Croatia), internal 
political inﬁghting between various wings of the HDZ itself, pressures from trade 
unions (which mobilised huge support in opposition to a proposed pension reform), 
and pressures from conservative and nationalist groups (by challenging party lea-
dership when HDZ had moved to a more centrist position after 2016 under the lea-
dership of Andrej Plenkovic´). For two years, the ﬁght between the prime minister 
and his more nationalist and conservative opponents on the right was played out very 
publicly, affecting the undisputed perception of HDZ as the sole credible represen-
tative of voters on the right.  
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At the same time, the period preceding the EP elections was characterised by in-
ﬁghting within the main opposition Social Democrat Party (SDP), which saw numerous 
but ineffective challenges to its even more ineffective leader Davor Bernardic´. The-
se challenges resulted in expulsions, suspensions and defections from the party, re-
ducing party strength in the parliament and its credibility with voters. As a conse-
quence, the party lost almost half of its support in the polls.  At the same time, the 
party Most failed to effectively position itself in the Croatian party system. This par-
ty emerged as the anti-establishment reform party in 2015, seeking to break the two-
party duopoly. Most won signiﬁcant support in parliamentary elections in 2015 and 
2016, brieﬂy participated in two governments, and brought both of them down in 
short order.  Yet, it was overall unable to clearly deﬁne its identity and suffered from 
splits and defections, losing support along the way. On the populist end of the par-
ty spectrum, Živi Zid (Human Blockade), which also emerged in 2015, had fewer pro-
blems deﬁning its message, which consisted in opposing Croatian membership in the 
Eurozone and NATO, calling for political control over the central bank, and sugge-
sting leaving the EU. The party almost rose to second place in the polls, but it declined 
immediately thereafter, as new political actors with similar appeals entered the sta-
ge at the beginning of 2019.  
Overall, between the 2014 and 2019 European Parliament elections, the party 
system in Croatia underwent further fragmentation, primarily as a result of popu-
lar demand for new political actors. However, none of these parties were able to ef-
fectively establish a functional organization and presence on the ground. These par-
ties were often reduced to, and therefore completely dependent on, a few prominent 
personalities acting as the public face of the party. These parties also struggled to 
form candidate lists that had visibility for the EP elections, and struggled to sustain 
political activity. Sheer numerical fragmentation did not help. To compensate for this 
and prevent the wasting of votes, parties formed coalitions which often included four, 
ﬁve or even more members.  
As a consequence, on the eve of the 2019 European elections the combined sup-
port in the polls for the two largest parties (HDZ and SDP) had dropped from over 
60% before the 2015 parliamentary elections to around 40%. The combined vote 
share of the four largest parties was approximately 60%, having fallen from over 80% 
compared to the 2015 parliamentary elections, and there were about ten parties pol-
ling below 3%.  
 
the campaign 
 
The campaign for the 2019 EP elections was more visible than at the previous EP elec-
tions. After six years of membership, it appears that in this campaign the electora-
te was more familiar with the role of the European Parliament and somewhat more 
engaged with the issues facing the EU. Furthermore, parties or individual candidates, 
mostly MEPs, were even making statements about how they see the future of the EU, 
which was not really the case in previous elections. 
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Having incumbent MEPs produced signiﬁcant advantage in the campaign, espe-
cially if those MEPs had managed to remain visible to the Croatian public throughout 
their term. Here SDP enjoyed a particular advantage as both of their MEPs were qui-
te well-known and popular among the general public. A similar advantage was en-
joyed by the group of nationalists and conservative parties forming the coalition of 
Croatian Sovereigntists headed by the well-known and popular MEP Ruža Tomašic´, 
the only Croatian MEP member of the ECR group.  
Perhaps the biggest risk was taken by HDZ, which advanced a list of relatively 
new and unknown candidates and failed to include any prominent members from 
the right wing of the party. Additionally, the list did not include two prominent MEPs 
representing former HDZ coalition partners, both of whom likely enjoyed signiﬁcant 
support among the party adherents, despite not being party members. Thus, despite 
having perhaps the most organized and resourced electoral campaign, HDZ strug-
gled to raise the proﬁle of their candidates. Also, the HDZ campaign, in comparison 
with previous EP elections, did not rely as heavily on symbolic politics based on hi-
story and values. Instead, inﬂuenced by the prime minister and his centrist strate-
gy, it emphasized dangers of populism and extremism for the EU. This message was 
directed both at the populist parties like Živi Zid, and HDZ’s competitors on the right 
such as Independents for Croatia and Croatian Sovereigntists. The party leadership 
was using this election campaign to place the party ﬁrmly in the centre of the par-
ty system and the European mainstream; and attendance at the party’s ﬁnal rally of 
Manfred Weber and Angela Merkel served to emphasize this appeal.  
The SDP campaign was led by their EP candidates as the party leader entered 
this race with a weakened position – the party had been suffering in the polls for qui-
te some time and dissatisfaction in the party was palpable. Most, which entered the 
campaign as the fourth party in the polls, focused their message on the criticism of 
HDZl. However, as the list was topped by the party leader and a majority of the MPs 
from the national parliament, it failed to present a clear candidate or message for 
the EP election, and offered only a weak and somewhat directionless Eurosceptic ap-
peal. Similarly, the nationalist Independent for Croatia were focusing on their do-
mestic message and criticism of the current HDZ leadership, but otherwise did not 
have a clear position or a candidate for this election, as their most prominent can-
didates indicated that they will remain in the national parliament. Živi Zid was the 
only party promoting a clear Eurosceptic message, but their campaign also lacked 
a prominent candidate for the EP and there was a relatively weak presence of the 
party in the media. Other parties and lists varied greatly in their focus and the tone 
of their campaign, as some emphasised their candidates and others focused on do-
mestic issues.  
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Croatia
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 (%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ) EPP 244,176 22.9 4 -18.5
Social Democrat Party 
(SDP) S&D 200,976 18.9 4 -11.0 +2
Croatian Souverenists 
(HRAST-HKS-HSP AS-
UHD)
ECR 91,546 8.6 1 +8.6
Independent list Mislav  
Kolakušic´ NI  84,746 8.0 1 +8.0 +1
Human Blockade  
(Živi Zid) EFD  60,847 5.7 1 +5.7 +1
Amsterdam coalition 
(HSS-GLAS-IDS-HSU-
PGS-D-HL-SR)
ALDE  55,806 5.2 1 +5.2
Bridge od independent 
lists (Most) NI  50,527 4.7 +4.7
Independent list Marijana 
Petir NI  47,385 4.5 +4.5 -1
Independents for Croatia 
(NZH - HSP) NI  46,970 4.4 +4.4
Independent Democrat 
Serb Party (SDSS) NI  28,597 2.7 +2.7
Croatians People Party- 
Liberal Democrats (HNS) ALDE  27,958 2.6 +2.6 -1
Party of anticorruption,  
development and  
transparency (START)
NI  21,744 2.0 +2.0
Party of Labour and  
Solidarity (BM 365) NI  21,175 2.0 +2.0
We Can - Political  
platform (Možemo - Nova 
Ljevica - ORaH)
G-EFA  19,313 1.8 +1.8 -1
Smart (Pametno) ALDE  15,074 1.4 +1.4
Others  47,521 4.5
Total 1,064,361 100 12 +1
Turnout (%) 29.86
Legal threshold  
for obtaining MEPs (%) 29.9
Note: Single national district with 11 (12 after Brexit) seats allocated according to d’Hondt formula. Vo-
ters cast a single vote either for a party list or as a preference. Preference votes can change the ordering 
of candidates on the list when 10% of the total votes cast for the party list indicate a preference vote for 
a candidate.vote for an individual candidate. Source: https://www.izbori.hr/rezultati/index.html
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results 
 
European parliament elections in Croatia are conducted under a PR system where 
eleven seats (twelve after the UK exits the EU) are allocated in a single national di-
strict using the D’Hondt method. Voters can also indicate a preference for a single 
candidate, but this can change the order of candidates on the party list only if 10% 
of voters cast a preference vote for a speciﬁc candidate.  
Turnout in 2019 elections was just over 1.1 million voters, or 29.9%, which is a 
noticeable increase from 2014 EP elections when just over 950,000 voters partici-
pated in the elections (25.24%) or than special elections held in 2013, where just 
above 780,000 voters participated (20.84%). Seats were won by six lists of indivi-
dual parties, coalitions or political platforms. However, the result still left more than 
31% of the voters unrepresented in the EP, which was likely a consequence of high 
party system fragmentation.  
Apart from the large share of “wasted votes”, the election saw a signiﬁcant drop 
in the share of the two largest parties to just above 41%. Though two parties had fought 
several previous EP and national elections in wider coalitions, this level of support 
is their lowest recorded since the ﬁrst multiparty elections in 1990. For the SDP, which 
has suffered a precipitous drop in support since the 2016 parliamentary elections, 
18.9% of the vote and four seats was actually an increase compared to indications 
in pre-electoral polls. For HDZ the result of 22.9% was lower than polls had predicted. 
Winning four seats was less than the party expected, and as a share of votes it is the 
worst result in the party’s history in nationwide elections. Apparently, the risky stra-
tegy of the party leader and prime minister Andrej Plenkovic´ – aimed at promoting 
new names from the centrist wing of the party – did not appeal to the core of the par-
ty base. This was an ominous sign given the strong party organization which even 
at the height of HDZ unpopularity managed to turn out more voters. SDP’s result might 
just be a consequence of the fact that the party has the oldest electorate of all par-
ties, which translated into a turnout advantage.  
The alliance of conservative and nationalist parties called Croatian Sovereigntists 
won 8.6% of the votes, and this success is in large part likely due to MEP Ruža Tomašic´, 
who won around 76% of the preference votes cast for the list, and the largest num-
ber of preference votes of all candidates. The biggest winner, perhaps, is the independent 
candidate Mislav Kolakušic´, a former judge of the commercial court running on a fair-
ly populist message, who managed to gain 8.0% of the votes despite being the only 
publicly known ﬁgure on the list. Somewhat less successful were Živi Zid, a Croatian 
version of the Italian Five Star Movement, and a group of seven centrist, left and li-
beral parties called the Amsterdam coalition, winning one seat each, but failing to ga-
ther as many votes as expected and underperforming in comparison to predictions 
in the pre-electoral polls. Around nine lists won more than 1% of the votes, including 
another three nationalist or conservative groups with a combined vote share of around 
13%, and six parties or lists broadly on the left with around 12% of the votes. The elec-
tions saw a surge in support for more radical conservative and nationalist parties which 
gained around 14% of the votes. The elections also demonstrated the strength of in-
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cumbency, with all MEPs who managed to maintain some visibility during their term 
in office securing sizable support, even if not all of them won seats.  
 
conclusion 
 
The elections demonstrated increasing fragmentation of the Croatian party system, 
where splits in established parties and inability of new actors to join forces or form 
a viable political organisations created parties with few members, almost no orga-
nisation, and scarcely any ﬁgures or policies capable of attracting public attention. 
These parties could not pass the electoral threshold and were either forced to join 
a coalition with similarly small and weak parties or end up collecting “wasted” vo-
tes. If this process continues, electoral volatility and turnover of parties is likely to 
increase, as most new actors have insufficient appeal, organisation or leadership to 
stabilise their support. Furthermore, the elections may indicate that after almost three 
decades of successfully incorporating nationalist and conservative groups within HDZ, 
new parties representing these groups are emerging to the right of HDZ, signiﬁcantly 
reducing the electorate available to the party. The fragmentation of the party systems 
is also likely to make the formation of governing coalitions at the national level more 
difficult in the future. It may be that this process could lead to the formation of new 
parties from the fragments of the current party system under pressure of election 
results. However, the near future is likely to be characterised by higher volatility and 
party turnover.  
Cyprus: An election of ‘soft’ phenomena:  
apathy, incumbent punishment and far right consolidation 
giorgos charalambous
introduction 
 
The 2019 European election in the Republic of Cyprus came three years after the last 
legislative elections of 2016, and one year after the presidential elections of 2018 
that saw the right-wing governing party, DISY, and President Nicos Anastasiades re-
newing their mandate for another ﬁve years. In the surfeit of campaign news and 
electoral results that lie before us, one can observe a number of realignments in the 
patterns of political competition. Although each of them carries signiﬁcance, their 
overall relevance in the island’s political evolution is certainly not analogous to a ma-
jor transformation of domestic politics. Rather, a series of phenomena that can be 
called ‘soft’ have been witnessed, whereby apathy and far-right consolidation have 
become the new normal and a swing against the government has emerged, which, 
however, has not altered the political dynamics very signiﬁcantly. 
 
campaign issues: a lasting cleavage structure 
 
Campaigning in the European elections is usually centred around national-level is-
sues rather than EU-wide or even EU-relevant ones. Cyprus constitutes a clear exam-
ple of this ethnocentric approach to the Union’s electoral process whereby political 
competition revolves chieﬂy around the Cyprus problem and the economy. This is 
a pattern evident since the ﬁrst European elections of 2004 (Teperoglou, 2012) which 
continues to this day, in a way very similar to the rest of the continent.  
The Cyprus problem both trampled the EU as an issue of public political deba-
te and was incorporated into questions relevant to the EU. For example, the Turkish 
Cypriot academic Niazi Kizilyurek’s candidacy, on the left-wing AKEL’s ballot, was 
challenged by journalists and politicians who questioned his intentions about voting 
inside the European Parliament (EP) on ‘crucial issues’ of government and state po-
licy such as direct trade between the EU and the internationally unrecognised TRNC 
(‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’), in the island’s northern part. 
Most polls showed that the Cyprus problem, the economy and to a lesser extent 
corruption were the main criteria declared by the public as driving the vote. These 
were also the most salient issues within public opinion, to which the media both re-
sponded and contributed with their own ethnocentric framing (Trimithiotis, 2019). 
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The crisis unfolded in various directions, such as discussions about the government’s 
selling of the previously state-owned Cooperative Bank to one of the main private 
banks, and the handling of the transfer by the Finance Minister. Visible sleaze, com-
pounded by the Left’s allegations that Anastasiades and DISY were elitist, authori-
tarian and corrupt, also eroded the incumbent’s proﬁle. Issues of ‘new politics’ that 
go beyond the traditional cleavages in the country – such as women’s rights within 
the EU or outside of it, LGBT rights issues, environmental protection, climate chan-
ge, or urban planning – were marginal. Some additional issues were also already being 
addressed within the domain of the ethnic cleavage, through the everydayness of 
Cyprus problem politics.  
The internal dynamics of parties determined their electoral strategy and, con-
sequently, their ballot composition. The Left, inside which a clear pro-solution [to 
the Cyprus divided state] stance has been projected since about 2014, included for 
the ﬁrst time a Turkish Cypriot on its ballot for a public political post in (or, on be-
half of) the Republic of Cyprus. His nomination was both symbolic of the reuniﬁcation 
struggles and practical, as it was the ﬁrst time that AKEL ran an organised and ex-
tensive pre-electoral campaign in the northern part of the island, which on voting 
day evolved into help with the transportation and attendance of Turkish Cypriot vo-
ters at the electoral polls.  
AKEL’s move was at the same time electorally rational, as Kizilyurek’s candida-
cy was intended to limit or reverse the party’s 2 percentage points ‘losses’ to the pro-
reuniﬁcation bi-communal lists of 2014, Jasmin and Drasy-Eylem. In the European 
elections of 2019, the Turkish Cypriot vote was expected to account for approximately 
between 2% and 4% of AKEL’s overall vote share, depending on abstention. The hi-
gher the abstention among Greek Cypriots, the more determinative of the result the 
Turkish Cypriot vote, hence the more responsive to the Turkish Cypriot vote AKEL 
(and others) would likely be. 
For right-wing DISY, the presence of the extreme right ELAM required candidates 
addressing ultranationalist, conservative and neo-fascist elements, but these had to 
be balanced with those reﬂecting liberal, open and bi-communal views. Its ballot thus 
reached a compromise between the popular, lower and middle-class tendencies of 
the Right, both religious and nationalist, and the cosmopolitan, capitalist strata and 
professional classes which are liberal and pro-European. Although DISY’s strategy 
may have prevented worse damage, it was not enough to avert outﬂows towards ei-
ther AKEL’s bi-communal ballot or ELAM’s outright hostility to reuniﬁcation.  
 
results and interpretations: “soft” phenomena 
 
Six men were elected, two from the two main parties, AKEL and DISY, and one by the 
so-called in-between space, DIKO and EDEK. The four pillars of the pre-crisis party 
system in Cyprus entered the EP, but electoral shifts and evolving dynamics were evi-
dent (Table 1). In the immediate aftermath of the election, media coverage again re-
volved around the slogan ‘Abstention was the winner’. In absolute votes abstention 
rose to 352,968 from 340,025 in 2014. A dramatic fall in the turnout rate happened 
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already in 2009, and then again in 2014, on the occasion of the second and third Eu-
ropean elections in Cyprus. By today, apathy has been at stable levels, hence it is now 
all the more difficult to reverse – neither party-instigated polarisation, nor the growth 
of the far right have persuaded most  voters to cast a ballot. Turkish Cypriot turnout 
was 6.93% (5,604 voters), approximately double that of 2014, largely because of Kir-
zilyurek’s nomination, but still very low. Increasing abstention rates and broader apa-
thy are traits that have existed since before the early 2010s, and the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis, thus cannot be exclusively linked to economic difficulties and their po-
liticisation (see Charalambous, 2014).  
cyprus: an election of ‘soft’ phenomena
Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Cyprus
party ep group
votes 
(n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 (%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Democratic Rally (DISY) EPP  81,539 29.2 2 -8.6
Progressive Party of the 
Working People (AKEL)
GUE/ 
NGL  77,241 27.5 2 +0.5
Democratic Party (DIKO) S&D  38,756 13.8 1 +3.0
Social Democratic  
Movement - EDEK (EDEK) S&D  29,715 10.6 1 N/A*
National, Popular Front 
(ELAM) NI  23,167 8.3 +5.6
Democratic Line-up (DIPA) NI  10,673 3.8
Ecologists/Citizens’  
Movement
G-EFA/ 
ALDE  9,232 3.3 N/A*
Jasmin (Yasemi) NI  4,786 1.7 N/A*
Others 6 2.1
Total  280,935 100 6
Turnout (%) 45.0
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) 1.8*
*N/A because EDEK run on a joint ballot with the Ecologists in 2014; Citizens' Movement run alone; 
DIPA did not exist at the time; Yasemi’s leader ran as an independent. 
*The threshold by law is 1.8% but in practice for six seats (with Cyprus counting as a single constituen-
cy) it is 16.6%. 
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Nevertheless, some change has already happened. In clear contrast to the Eu-
ropean elections of 2014, where the then newly elected President’s honeymoon pe-
riod (Anastasiades was elected in 2013) allowed the Right to avoid signiﬁcant los-
ses and present itself as a winner (Charalambous, Papageorgiou and Pegasiou, 2015), 
by 2019 dissatisfaction with the government had increased signiﬁcantly. A considerable 
share of citizens with negative opinions about DISY shifted into abstention, so the 
party lost almost 9 percentage points (a total of around 16,000 votes). This may si-
gnal the beginning of the end of DISY’s hegemony. However, considering the high 
electoral ﬂuidity, this trend might be reversed or contained at the legislative elec-
tions in 2021. Compared to the vote shares of the parties participating in the EPP (Eu-
ropean People’s Party), DISY’s losses still allow it a place approximately seven per-
centage points above its ‘sister parties’ EU average. Its result is thus not disastrous 
(at least in comparative terms), but its wave has receded, and its electoral future ap-
pears challenged. 
The far right achieved a result estabishing it as one of the ﬁve biggest parties in 
the Republic of Cyprus. Speciﬁcally, ELAM gathered 23,167 votes (8.3%), slightly 
higher than it polled at the Presidential elections of 2018, but more than three ti-
mes (in real numbers) its 2014 European elections result. Although the Greek Cy-
priot far right did not manage to enter the EP, its real electoral strength now seems 
to lie between 6% and 8% of the vote. The days of discussing how to deter the rise 
of the extremists are now over; this is the period of their consolidation and main-
streaming. 
The ﬂuidity of political competition has also been clear for some time but the re-
sults, again, are not transformative. From Table 2, one can see that vote switching 
occurred between most political parties, but for the most part only between ideo-
logically proximate parties or platforms; voters moved from one to another choice, 
largely based on at least one or more ideological or political convictions with a hi-
storical reﬂection in terms of either or both of traditional socio-economic issues and 
the Turkish/Greek ethnic cleavage.  
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AKEL’s candidate list, which included a Turkish Cypriot liberal academic (who 
was elected with more than 25,000 votes), attracted voters on the pro-reuniﬁcation 
side within DISY or the broader centre-right space. The left also attracted a consi-
derable number of Turkish Cypriots, as intended - around two thirds of those who 
voted. These two forces have increased AKEL’s vote for the EP that, along with a re-
turn to the party of voters who had abstained in 2014, added to the Left around 8,000 
voters compared with ﬁve years ago. Still, and although AKEL’s vote consolidation 
has increased and is high, a number of voters choosing the party until 2009, befo-
re the effects of its experience in executive office (2008-2013), seem to have been 
lost forever – mostly, although not exclusively, to abstention.  
DISY lost some of its former votes to its right competitor, the extremist ELAM, 
especially in the district of Famagusta, where material interests in tourism and con-
struction that could be damaged by reuniﬁcation tend to favour an explicitly hard-
line policy on the Cyprus problem – and ultra-nationalism. The ‘centrist’, nationa-
list space emerged equally divided as before. Citizens’ Alliance is exiting as a rele-
vant actor, and DIKO’s splinter, DIPA, is becoming a serious competitor. DIKO increased 
its share by 3%, partly due to the inclusion of Solidarity on its ballot. The social de-
mocratic EDEK attracted voters who were adamant on keeping ELAM out of the EP, 
many of whom came from the Ecologists/Citizens’ Movement and, guided by polls, 
opted for EDEK to avoid casting a ‘lost vote’. 
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Table 2 - Vote consolidation and vote switching at the 2019 Cyprus European elections 
(compared to the 2016 legislative elections)*
party
vote  
consolidation 
(≈ %)
main inflows from main outflows to
AKEL 89 Turkish Cypriots, centre-right liberals
EDEK  
and abstention
DISY 79 ELAM ELAM, abstention
DIKO 72 Solidarity** EDEK, DIPA
EDEK 80 DIKO, Ecologists/Citi-zens’ Movement, AKEL Very limited
DIPA 90 DISY, DIKO, AKEL, new voters, abstention N/A
Ecologists/ 
Citizens’ Alliance 35/35 N/A EDEK, Abstention
ELAM 80 Solidarity**, new voters, abstention, DISY DISY
* Approximate ﬁgures, based on multiple exit polls. 
** Solidarity is a centre-right, nationalist party, which ran on DIKO’s ballot in 2019. Its leader, Eleni 
Theocharous came second and was not re-elected.
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The crisis years are not yet over in Cyprus, especially on the path towards the 
negotiated and official partition of the island (see Ioannou, 2019), but also concerning 
the public’s response to the European elections. Various signs of economically dri-
ven political disaffection are there: increase in the left’s vote consolidation, swit-
ches from the Right to the Far Right by ultra-nationalist lower- and middle-class sup-
porters who have been negatively affected by state favours or policy, and the cen-
trality of economic institutions in the campaign, such as co-ops and banks. 
In most respects, the election signalled the continuation of developments that 
had appeared with the European elections of 2009 and 2014 or the legislative elec-
tions of 2016; this year’s electoral contest consolidated pre-existing tendencies in-
side Cypriot society rather than generating phenomena that are entirely new in their 
own right. 
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Czech Republic: No country for old parties 
vlastimil havlík
introduction 
 
Three contextual factors are important for understanding the results of the election 
in the Czech Republic. The party system has changed dramatically in the last deca-
de, revealing the unprecedented decline of the old political parties and the emergence 
of different anti-establishment challengers after a series of corruption scandals, go-
vernment instability coupled with the Great Recession (Balík and Hloušek, 2016). 
The EP election took place in times of exceptional economic prosperity. The Czech 
Republic has experienced a record increase in salaries and has been enjoying the lo-
west level of unemployment among the EU member states. Last but not least, the pu-
blic has been characterised by a very low level of trust in the European Union, ma-
king Czechs one of the most Eurosceptic nations in the EU. The most important mes-
sage of the election is conﬁrmation of the dominance of the new political parties and 
the continued decline of the established political parties.  
 
 
election campaign 
 
According to the polls, up to nine different political parties and electoral coalitions 
seemed to have a good chance of crossing the threshold, reﬂecting the increased le-
vel of party system fragmentation. 
Various anti-establishment political parties (none of which had parliamentary 
representation before the 2013 national election) were predicted to be successful in 
the election: the technocratic populist ANO led by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, the 
Czech Pirate Party, and the populist radical right Freedom and Direct Democracy. 
Not surprisingly, the support of the once stable established parties including the Czech 
Social Democratic Party (C¨SSD), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – 
KSC˘M (running under the label of the electoral coalition the United Czech Left), right-
wing conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the centrist Christian Demo-
cratic Union – Czechoslovak People`s Party (KDU –C¨SL) remained far below their 
electoral performance of the past. Also, the polls indicated possible success of the 
centrist liberal electoral coalition Allie for Europe formed by TOP 09 and Mayors and 
Independents (STAN). 
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Generally speaking, several intertwined issues dominated the electoral campaign 
which was far less visible than usual due to the limited effort (and limited ﬁnancial 
investments) of political parties. Although the intensity of the refugee crisis did not 
reach the level of previous years (and the number of asylum-seekers and/or immi-
grant from non-European countries is very low in the Czech Republic), the issue stron-
gly resonated in the campaign.  
Rejection of immigration framed mostly as a potentially serious security and cul-
tural threat for the Czech Republic was the dominant issue for the radical right SPD. 
The party also presented itself as part of the radical right Eurosceptic group Euro-
pe of Freedom and Democracy. The anti-immigration attitude of ANO was less na-
tivist but more nationalist and protectionist claiming the party to have succeeded in 
protection of the Czech Republic from immigration (e.g. by voting against the quo-
tas that became a symbol of the discussion on immigration in the context of the EU). 
Not surprisingly, the EU and the European elites (alongside the “liberal”, “multi-
culturalist”, “Prague café” and NGOs in the Czech Republic) were blamed for the im-
migration crisis.  
The strong criticism of the EU, usually depicted as an external actor for the Czech 
Republic (and to a lesser extent the appraisal of the European integration), prevented 
the EP election from being labelled as a pure example of “second order national elec-
tions”. While the SPD called for Czexit, ANO and ODS stressed the need to defend 
Czech national interests by reinforcing the position of the member states in the in-
stitutional structure of the EU. The position of ANO towards the EU was symbolised 
by a red baseball cap with the slogan “strong Czechia” worn by Babiš and apparen-
tly copied from Donald Trump.  
ODS abided by its long-term Euroscepticism, rejecting federalism on the EU le-
vel and proposing a multi-speed model of European integration. The notion of the 
national interest was also common for moderately pro-European political parties such 
as the Christian Democrats or C¨SSD. One of the European issues that resonated in 
this context was the need to guarantee the same quality of products sold in the old 
and new members. Milka chocolate, Coca-Cola or detergents became symbols of the 
discussion. Clearly pro-European parties such as the Allies for Europe or the Pira-
tes were the exception, stressing the inevitability of the Czech membership in the 
EU and the strategic and economic advantages of it.  
Last but not least, national politics became an important part of the campaign 
reﬂecting the change in party politics related to the success of the populist parties 
in general and the formation of the government led by Babiš’s ANO in particular. To 
put it into the context, Babiš – sometimes called the Czech Berlusconi or Czech Trump 
– is one of the richest businessmen in the Czech Republic. Babiš’s agro-chemical bu-
siness beneﬁts a lot from both European and national subsidies, which places Babiš 
in a permanent conﬂict of interests (Šte˘tka 2013). In addition, the leader of ANO owns 
important media outlets. On top of that, he is listed as a collaborator with the Se-
cret Police during the communist regime, and at the time of the EP election, he was 
accused of EU-subsidy embezzlement.   
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Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the opposition parties (most visibly ODS 
and C¨PS) presented the election as a tool to stand against Babiš’s – as it was described 
elsewhere – “highly centralised, strongly majoritarian version of a democratic po-
lity with little desire for either horizontal or vertical separations of power” (Havlík, 
2019). On the other hand, ANO framed the EP election as another opportunity to 
reject the “corrupt”, “so-called democratic”, “incompetent” established political par-
ties, also pointing to the extraordinary rise of the Czech economy under Babiš’s pre-
miership (he served as the Minister of Finance between 2013-2017). 
 
results 
 
The level of electoral turnout was one of the biggest questions of the elections and 
the crucial determinant of the electoral results with varying level of voters’ identi-
ﬁcation with different political parties in the context of one of the lowest levels of 
public trust in EU and interest in EU-related affairs. The already-low turnout in 2004 
and 2009 (in both cases 28%) reached another low in 2014: barely 18% of voters 
turned out (the second lowest turnout after Slovakia). Although the turnout of 28.7% 
in 2019 is the new record high, it can be in no way considered as good news for the 
legitimacy of the EU in general or for Czech MEPs in particular.  
 
ANO got the best result, but 21% is far below its result in the last national election. 
This might be a consequence of the ongoing investigation of Babiš and of the lower 
level of party identification among ANO supporters. The greatest rise of support was 
recorded by the Pirates and SPD, while the result of ODS indicates that the party has 
undergone partial recovery after its catastrophic recent fall in electoral support. For 
the first time since 2004, C˘SSD lost its representation in the EP. having suffered from 
the withdrawal of traditionally “warm” supporters, from government participation 
alongside ANO and from long-term internal ideological disputes between the tra-
ditionalists and the modernizers. The results obtained by traditional centre-right pro-
European parties indicates the decline of their support, but also showed a way for 
possible future collaboration (such as the coalition of TOP 09 and STAN).  
All in all, the election results seem to conﬁrm the transformation of the Czech par-
ty system in the second decade of the 21st century. The established old political par-
ties received only one-third of votes, the rest being cast for various political parties using 
populist or anti-establishment appeals and offering alternatives to the way in which 
politics was conducted by the old political parties. It is also clear that the vast majo-
rity of voters chose to support a political party representing some type of critical eva-
luation of the European integration process. On the other hand, it seems that there 
is little support for Czexit and voting for soft Eurosceptic parties is far more common.   
 
conclusion 
 
It is difficult to determine the biggest winner of the election. However, it is clear that 
the established political parties that were the backbone of the party system since ear-
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Czechia
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
ANO 2011 ALDE  502,343 21.2 6 +5.1 +2
Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS) ECR  344,885 14.5 4 +6.9 +2
Czech Pirate Party  
(Piráti) G-EFA  330,884 14 3 +9.2 +3
Allies for Europe 
(TOP 09 + STAN) EPP  276,220 11.7 3 -4.3 -1
Freedom and Direct  
Democracy (SPD) EFD  216,718 9.1 2 +6.0 +2
Christian and Democratic 
Union - Czechoslovak 
People’s Party (KDU-
C˘SL)
EPP  171,723 7.2 2 -2.7 -1
Communist Party  
of Bohemia and Moravia 
(KSC˘M)
GUE-
NGL  164,624 6.9 1 -4.0 -2
Czech Social Democratic 
Party (C˘SSD) S&D  93,664 4 -10.2 -4
Czech Social Democratic 
Party (C˘SSD) S&D  93,664 4 -10.2 -4
Voice (HLAS) ALDE  56,449 2.4
ANO, we will troll  
the Europarliament
Not affi-
liated  37,046 1.6
Free (Svobodní) EFD  15,492 0.7 -4.6 -1
Total 2,370,765 100 21
Turnout (%) 28.7
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) 5%
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ly 1990s have been losing ground. All the same, various anti-establishment actors 
seem to have become the most attractive option for an electorate disappointed by 
the performance of the old political establishment. Another possible reading of the 
electoral results shows that most of the votes were cast for political parties with cri-
tical attitudes towards the EU, either stressing the need to protect Czech national in-
terests or calling for termination of the membership of the Czech Republic in the Eu-
ropean Union. Finally, despite its increase, electoral turnout is still one the lowest 
among all the member states of the EU, and there is little sign of any signiﬁcant re-
newal of democratic processes.   
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Denmark:  
The surprising success of pro-European mainstream parties  
julie hassing nielsen 
introduction  
 
A National Parliament election was called in Denmark in early May 2019. Hence, much 
of the focus that would otherwise have been devoted to the European Parliament (EP) 
election went to the national election campaign. Nevertheless, the two elections the-
matically overlapped. The overall focus was on the climate crisis and, secondly, im-
migration. This focus secured a successful EP election for green-leaning parties – the 
Socialist People’s Party (SF) and the Danish Social-Liberal Party (RL). But the main-
stream parties, particularly the Liberals, also enjoyed increases in their Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs), which was mainly at the expense of the right-wing 
Eurosceptical Danish People’s Party (DF).  
 
the campaign summarized: climate, climate, and immigration 
 
When the Danish PM Lars Løkke Rasmussen (the Liberals) called a national election 
to be held on 5 June 2019, the EP election campaign was deemed to yet again be-
come second order. Placing core national events, including national elections, on top 
of EP elections always challenges the opportunity to put European politics on the agen-
da (e.g. Hix and Marsh, 2011). Competition for scarce electorate attention is fierce 
– and, most often, attention to the national election context wins. After all, the EP 
election remains second order – even in a country famous for its high voter turnout 
also in the EP election (e.g. Nielsen and Franklin, 2017).  
Consequently, the focus on the EP election in national news came very late. As 
usual, national and European topics were overlapping. On top of this, the climate 
crisis gained critical attention from the voters, continuously ranking highest when 
Danes were asked about their top priorities in European and Danish polls (e.g. Eu-
robarometer 90.3). Amongst other topics that received attention were immigration, 
both from other European countries and from third countries outside the EU, ﬁghting 
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international tax evasion, and avoiding social dumping. Since Denmark reinstalled 
border control at the Danish-German border in January 2016, as a response to the 
immigration crisis, this move has been heavily disputed. The border patrol and, thus, 
Denmark’s suspension of the Schengen agreement continues to be a salient issue in 
Danish politics. Meanwhile, the economic aspects of the EU, including the future of 
the Eurozone, are low of low salience in Denmark, which has an opt-out from the 
third phase of the Euro (e.g. Nielsen, 2015).  
Despite their reputation as being Eurosceptical, Danes remain fond of their EU 
membership. In academic terms, they are soft Eurosceptics (i.e. reluctant to integrate 
some political aspects of EU integration) or EU pragmatics (e.g. Raunio, 2007; Niel-
sen, 2017; Nielsen and Franklin, 2017). Danes have, however, never been hard Eu-
rosceptics (i.e. never wished to leave the EU altogether) (Nielsen, 2017). Nevertheless, 
Danes have obtained this reputation because of strong referendum traditions on cri-
tical EU questions where a small minority has occasionally turned down, for exam-
ple, full participation in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) or the Euro (2000). Figures 
published just weeks before EP election day, 26 May 2019, showed that 77% of Da-
nes would vote to stay within the EU if presented with a referendum similar to the 
2016 Brexit referendum. The European average was 68%. In general, whether Den-
mark should join the UK in a so-called “Dexit” has been an idea loosely circulated 
both amongst left- and right-wing Danish parties. Yet, as the Brexit negotiation in-
creasingly shed light on the complexity of leaving the Union, the Danish EP election 
debate was not dominated by Dexit discussions.  
Because Denmark only has thirteen MEPs – a number which increases to four-
teen MEPs after the expected Brexit – the Danish MEPs rely strongly on European 
allies and alliances to make their voice heard. In the 2019 EP election campaign, two 
strands of pan-European cooperation were closely followed by the media. The do-
minating focus went to the Italian depute PM Matteo Salvini’s (Lega) new alliance 
consisting of right-wing anti-European parties, which included, amongst others, par-
ties from Finland (The True Finns), Germany (Alternative für Deutschland), and Au-
stria (The Freedom Party). From Denmark, the Danish People’s Party, which belongs 
to the ECR group in the EP, was an early adherent of Salvini’s alliance. One of DF’s 
top candidates – Anders Vistisen – was portrayed side by side with Salvini at the mee-
ting announcing the alliance in Milan in early April 2019. Secondly, on the left, the 
Danish anti-establishment party the Alternative (Alternativet) joined the ﬁrst pan-
European party list European Spring on an agenda predominantly focused on the 
climate crisis. This list, however, did not attract as much attention as Salvini’s alliance.  
 
election results:  
the surprising success of pro-european mainstream parties  
 
The Danish EP election witnessed four broad trends. Firstly, contrasting with the ten-
dency in most European countries, mainstream Danish parties witnessed strong sup-
port (see Table 1). The mainstream liberal party (the Liberals), which also heads the 
current minority coalition government with Lars Løkke Rasmussen as PM, enjoyed 
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an increase in vote share from 17% (2014) to 24% (2019), thereby doubling their 
MEPs from 2 (2014) to 4 (2019). One of these liberal MEPs is the so-called “four-
teenth mandate”, which Denmark will obtain when the seats from the British MEPs 
are divided amongst the remaining EU27 Member States after Brexit. Since Brexit 
has been postponed to October 31st , the fourteenth  Danish Member will only be-
come a full MEP at that time. The mainstream opposition party the Social Democratic 
Party also had a better election than predicted. They went from 19% (2014) to 22% 
(2019), maintaining their three MEPs. Finally, the mainstream center-party The Da-
nish Social-Liberal Party (RL) secured a stronger representation in BXL and doubled 
their mandate from one (2014) to two MEPs (2019).   
The second trend is the success of left-wing green parties. While the Alternati-
ve did not manage to obtain a seat for its lead candidate, the Socialist People’s Par-
ty (SF) aquired an extra mandate, going from one (2014) to two MEPs (2019). In 
addition, the left-wing Red-Green Alliance managed to secure one MEP. However, 
while the SF indeed secured a successful election outcome, a scandal broke out only 
days after the election when it became clear that one of its prominent candidates had 
decided to turn down the MEP spot in favour of a potential seat in the national par-
liament. This event highlights the ongoing controversies associated with an election 
system that enables candidates to run for office both at the EU and the national le-
vel simultaneously.  
Thirdly, Danish voters went against an otherwise ﬁrm European trend of increasing 
support for right-wing populist parties. The main loser of the election was the Da-
nish People’s Party (DF), which went from four MEP’s (2014) to one (2019). Ano-
ther right-wing anti-immigration party Nye Borgerlige attracted attention in the last 
days of the EP campaign when its leader announced she would not vote in the EP 
election.  
Lastly, the EP 2019 election results in Denmark witnessed a decrease in support 
for the traditional left Eurosceptic parties. While the soft Eurosceptic left-wing par-
ty – The Red-Green Alliance - for the ﬁrst time secured one MEP, the Movement against 
the EU, which has for decades been a critical Eurosceptical Danish voice in the EP, 
did not get re-elected.  
As in a majority of other EU countries, Denmark also witnessed a dramatic in-
crease in voter turnout. While Denmark has always enjoyed high levels of voter tur-
nout, which has constantly been higher than the European average, 2019 witnes-
sed an increase of 10 percentage points in voter turnout from 56% (2014) to 66 % 
(2019). This increase has been attributed in particular to the enhanced focus on the 
climate crisis. The Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg headed a widely popu-
lar climate march in Copenhagen on May 25th 2019 – one day prior to the election 
– which manifested many Danes’ commitment to this agenda.    
 
results  
 
The Danish EP 2019 results beg two questions: why did the Eurosceptical right-wing 
parties not obtain the support that such parties gained in other EU countries? And 
denmark
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why did the mainstream parties enjoy such unusually high support when governing 
parties tend to be specially punished in EP elections?  
The answers to these questions may be many, but one obvious answer to the ﬁrst 
question is the fact that, unlike previous EP elections, the climate crisis was on top 
of the Danish agenda. Climate is traditionally a left-wing concern, and the right-wing 
Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Denmark
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
The Liberals ALDE 648,203 23.5
The Social Democratic Party S&D 592,645 21.5
The Socialist People’s Party EFA 364,895 13.2
Danish People’s Party ECR 296,978 10.8
The Danish Social-Liberal Party ALDE 277,929 10.1
The Conservative People’s Party EPP 170,544 6.2
The Red-Green Alliance  151,903 5.5
The People’s Movement against the EU GUE-NGL 102,101 3.7
The Alternative 92,964 3.4
The Liberal Alliance 60,693 2.2
Total 2,758,855 100
Turnout (%) 66.1
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Source: www.euoplysningen.dk *the 14th Danish MEP will join as full MEP  
when Britain leaves the EU. 
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parties did not prioritise this concern in their campaign. Furthermore, responding 
to the manifest complexity of Brexit negotiations, the Danish fondness for EU mem-
bership has increased. While it is too early to say whether Brexit should be credited 
with this evolution, EP 2019 in Denmark nevertheless signalled strong support for 
a cosmopolitan Europe championed by the mainstream parties.  
denmark
seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
4(3)* +2.0
3.0
2.0 +1.0
1.0 -3.0
2.0 +1.0
1.0
1.0 +1.0
-1 +1
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Estonia: A scene set by the preceding national election 
piret ehin and liisa talving1
context 
 
The 2019 EP elections in Estonia took place in a heated political atmosphere that pre-
vailed in the aftermath of the general election held less than three months earlier. 
In a “remarkable failure of mainstream politics” (Walker, 2019), two liberal parties, 
Reform and Centre (both members of the ALDE group in the EP), failed to coope-
rate in the process of government formation. Having rejected an invitation by the 
victorious Reform Party to start coalition talks, the incumbent Centre Party formed 
a coalition with two right-wing parties, including a moderate Pro Patria and an il-
liberal, xenophobic, and Eurosceptic Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE). 
The inclusion of a far-right populist party in the government caused an alarmed re-
action both at home and abroad. It was seen as a threat to liberal values, Estonia’s 
progressive international reputation, and to alliance ties on which the small coun-
try’s security so heavily depends. By the time of the EP election, the new government 
had been in office for less than a month. It had been off to an extraordinarily bum-
py start, marked by a variety of scandals associated with EKRE, the coalition’s en-
fant terrible. Against this backdrop, voting choice in EP elections was strongly in-
fluenced by one’s evaluation of domestic political developments since the  March 3rd 
national election. 
Estonia has six seats in the EP. The exit of the United Kingdom will increase the 
number of MEPs elected from Estonia to seven. The entire country is a single con-
stituency. This, combined with an open-list electoral system that entails voting for 
a speciﬁc candidate as opposed to a party list as a whole, makes EP elections in Esto-
nia highly candidate-centred.   
 
contenders and campaigns 
 
Altogether, nine political parties competed in the 2019 EP election, including five 
that are represented in the national parliament. The largest is the Reform Party, a 
1. The research that informs this chapter has benefited from project IUT20-39 financed by the 
Estonian Ministry of Education and Research
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liberal pro-market party with a strong commitment to the EU and to NATO mem-
bership. Despite emerging as a winner in the national election of March 2019, this 
party remained in opposition after the Centre Party’s unexpected alliance with Pro 
Patria and EKRE. At the top of Reform’s candidate list for the European election was 
Andrus Ansip, Prime Minister of Estonia in 2005-2014 and Vice President of the Eu-
ropean Commission. Reform’s list included other candidates of clout such as former 
Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas and former minister and MEP Urmas Paet. The second 
largest contender, the Centre Party, had been the prime ministerial party since late 
2016. While pursuing a catch-all strategy, the Centre has been the party of choice 
for the vast majority of Russian-speakers in Estonia. The Centre’s leading candida-
te at the EP election was Yana Toom, MEP and spokesperson for the Russian mino-
rity, who has caused controversy with her criticism of Western sanctions against Rus-
sia, US attacks on Syria and her dismissive statements about the Estonian langua-
ge and culture.  
The Social Democrats (SDE) entered the race from their position as a smallish 
opposition party. However, their list was headed by another eminent politician, Ma-
rina Kaljurand, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, diplomat and contestant in the 
Estonian presidential election in 2016. Kaljurand demonstrated a signiﬁcant lead com-
pared to all other candidates in opinion polls prior to the EP election. Finally, two 
conservative coalition parties, Pro Patria and EKRE, scored lower in pre-election polls. 
EKRE in particular appeared to make little effort to nominate candidates with a ge-
nuine interest and a realistic prospect of taking up a seat in the EP, instead putting 
their bets on the party’s popularity more generally. EKRE is also the only political 
party in Estonia that has embraced hard Euroscepticism. However, in the context of 
very high levels of public support for the EU in Estonia (European Commission, 2019), 
the party refrained from condemning EU membership, and limited its rhetoric to cri-
ticizing European federalisation and decrying member states’ decreased sovereignty. 
Overall, the election campaigns were characterised by low intensity and a lack of fun-
ding following the highly contested national election just a few months prior. Mo-
reover, opposition parties explicitly framed EP elections as an opportunity to voice 
protest against the inclusion of far-right populists in the government. As such, the 
election was set out to be classically second-order, used by voters to punish the po-
litical incumbents (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).   
 
results 
 
Turnout was 37.6% – virtually the same as in the 2014 EP election (36.5%). Elec-
toral participation was highest in two largest cities and the area surrounding the ca-
pital, while reaching only 24.3% in the North-Eastern Ida-Viru county where Rus-
sian-speakers constitute a majority. The low turnout among Russian-speakers was 
widely attributed to their growing alienation from the Centre Party which had, for 
nearly two decades, served as the party of choice for Estonia’s ethnic minorities. This 
alienation has to do with Russian-speakers’ disapproval of the Centre Party’s deci-
sion to enter a coalition with the far-right EKRE, as well as recent scandals involving 
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the local party branch in the Ida-Viru county. Almost half (47.2%) of all votes in the-
se elections were cast electronically, signalling strong trust in Estonia’s remote in-
ternet voting system which has been used in local, national and EP elections since 
2005 (see also Vassil et al., 2016). 
The two parliamentary opposition parties –Reform Party and the Social Demo-
crats– were the main winners of these elections. The Reform Party took 26.2% of the 
vote, securing two mandates. The SDE got 23.3% of the vote, also ﬁlling two seats. 
SDE’s Marina Kaljurand appeared as the brightest star of this election, receiving 65,549 
personal votes out of 332,104 votes cast in total. Her extraordinary result provided 
the much-needed boost to the second-placed SDE candidate, former foreign and de-
fence minister Sven Mikser (2,886 votes), securing him a seat. Andrus Ansip, top can-
didate on the Reform Party’s list, was the second-biggest vote magnet in these elec-
tions (41,017 votes). As a prominent critic of the Centre-EKRE-Pro Patria coalition, 
he capitalized on protest against the new government, while his credentials as Esto-
nia’s longest serving PM and a European Commissioner guaranteed strong backing. 
Another well-known Reform politician, Urmas Paet, attracted 30,014 votes. 
The incumbent Centre Party was the biggest loser of the election. Its 14.4% of 
the vote (corresponding to one mandate) stood in stark contrast to its vote share 
(23.1%) in general elections less than three months prior. Over a half of all votes cast 
for the Centre Party went to Yana Toom, a spokesperson for the Russian-speaking 
minority and a leading representative of the “internal opposition” of the Centre Par-
ty who had spoken out against her party’s alliance with EKRE. The Centre’s defeat 
after a mere month of leading a new government sent a clear signal that the party’s 
voters considered a coalition with EKRE to be a major mistake. This interpretation 
is conﬁrmed by 20,640 votes (6.2%) collected by independent candidate Raimond 
Kaljulaid, a former highly popular Centre Party politician and Tallinn municipal offi-
cial, who quit the party prior to EP elections over the coalition with EKRE. All in all, 
the Centre’s poor performance conﬁrms the perception that by clinging on to power 
at the cost of accommodating the far-right, PM Jüri Ratas has alienated the party’s 
traditional vote base and caused long-term damage to the party’s electoral prospects.  
The two junior government parties performed better than the PM’s party. With 
12.7% of the vote and one mandate, EKRE was the fourth most popular party. This 
result is a relapse compared to the March 2019 general election where EKRE won 
17.8% of the vote. EKRE’s sole mandate went to Jaak Madison (22,819 votes) who 
has been proactive in liaising with other far-right forces in Europe. Pro Patria pla-
ced ﬁfth with 10.3% of the vote, which will give the party a mandate if Brexit ma-
terializes. Riho Terras (21,477 votes) will then be the only Estonian MEP in the EPP 
group. Several commentators have pointed out that being represented in the EP’s 
largest political group is desirable for a small country.  
About 13% of the vote went to small extra-parliamentary parties and indepen-
dent candidates, none of which won a seat in the EP. Eesti 200, a liberal newcomer, 
received 3.2% of the vote. In contrast to their peers in several other countries, the Esto-
nian Greens have failed to mobilize voters – the party gained just 1.8% of the vote. 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Estonia
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
The Estonian Reform Party ALDE&R 87,160 26.2
The Social Democratic Party (SDE) S&D 77,375 23.3
The Center Party ALDE&R 47,799 14.4
The Conservative People's Party of Estonia 
(EKRE) MENL 42,265 12.7
Pro Patria EPP 34,188 10.3
Raimond Kaljulaid (independent candidate) 20,640 6.2
Estonia 200 10,700 3.2
Estonian Greens Greens/EFA 5,824 1.8
Others 6,153 1.9
Total 3,321,04 100
Turnout (%) 37.6
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
2 2 +1.9
2 2 +9.7 +1.0 +1
1 1 -8.0
1 1 +8.7 +1.0 +1
1 -3.6 -1.0
+6.2
+3.2
+1.5
N/A
7
132 the european parliament elections of 2019
conclusion 
 
All in all, the Estonian results speak of continued domination of mainstream liberal 
political forces: three of Estonia’s six (or in the case of Brexit, seven) seats went to ALDE, 
two to the Socialists and Democrats group, one to the European People’s Party (con-
ditional on Brexit), and one will boost the ranks of a future Eurosceptic group in the 
EP. While reactions to the inclusion of a populist far-right party in the national go-
vernment was the key determinant of vote choice in the 2019 EP elections, it would 
be wrong to conclude that the European dimension was entirely absent. In fact, the 
domestic and the European/international seem intractably interwoven, as the rise of 
EKRE was seen by many as undermining the firm westward orientation that had been 
a mainstay of Estonian politics since the restoration of independence.  
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Finland:  
European Elections in the aftermath of national elections 
henrik serup christensen and marco svensson la rosa
introduction 
 
The elections for the European Parliament in Finland took place in the aftermath of 
the national parliamentary elections that were held on 14 April 2019. In this elec-
tion, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with 17.7% of the votes, narrowly out-
performed the right-wing populist Finns party (PS, 17.5%) and the conservative Na-
tional Coalition Party (KOK, 17%). 
Because of the proximity of these two elections, the election campaign for the 
European Parliament elections was rather short. The Eurosceptic PS party was in the 
spotlight, since it was expected to ride on the wave of Eurosceptic parties in Euro-
pean elections (De Vries, 2018).  
The closeness of national and European elections was expected to decrease tur-
nout in the latter, which in 2014 was 41.0% (Mattila, 2003). Finland had one of the 
lowest turnouts (10%) of young voters (18-24) in 2014, second only to Slovakia (6%), 
although there were signs that turnout in this group would increase this time around. 
Due to the limited number of candidates, even major changes in vote shares were 
unlikely to lead to parties winning or losing more than a single seat. However, in Fin-
land’s open-list proportional system, where voters rather than party elites decide what 
candidates gain a seat (von Schoultz 2018), for most parties it was unclear which 
individual candidates would gain those seats. 
 
parties and issues 
 
Figure 1 shows the slogan used by the SDP in the European elections campaign (We 
don’t Brexit. We Fixit). This slogan clearly refers to the good result obtained by the 
SDP at the national parliamentary elections one month earlier, and at the same time 
attempts to position the party as the dominant voice in the Finnish EU Presidency 
which starts in July 2019.  
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However, most polls suggested that the SDP would end third or even fourth in 
the European elections, only getting two seats in the new European Parliament. With 
rare exceptions, such as the former party leader Eero Heinäluoma, it had few pro-
minent candidates. 
In addition to the SDP, KOK and the Centre party (KESK) are traditionally the 
three main parties in Finnish politics. Both KOK and KESK were expected to lose vo-
tes, although it was uncertain whether this would translate into a loss of seats. KOK 
was expected to lose votes but to remain the largest party. Three current MEPs for 
this party ran for re-election, but former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who was 
a popular candidate in the 2014 elections, did not run this time. The rural-liberal 
KESK risked losingl one of three seats it had won in 2014, echoing the loss they had 
suffered in the national elections. Two of the current MEPs were running but were 
challenged by prominent party cadres. 
Two parties challenged the dominance of the three main parties: the right-wing 
populist Finns Party (PS) and the Green League. Some polls indicated that the PS 
would become the second-largest party in terms of votes, thereby gaining a third seat 
in the EP. PS’s list  included several prominent candidates, including six newly elec-
ted national MPs. The Green League (VIHR) was also expected to win votes, and some 
polls suggested it could become the second largest party in terms of votes and win 
three seats in the process. The candidates included veteran MEP Heidi Hautala and 
former party leader Ville Niinistö. 
The leftist Left Alliance (VAS) was expected to keep their only seat. They had Mer-
ja Kyllönen running for re-election, but she had publicly stated that if elected, she 
would not take up the position since she preferred to work in the national parliament, 
where she had recently won a seat. 
RKP is a minority party that mainly represents the linguistic minority of Swedish-
speaking Finns. Polls suggested they were unlikely to win a seat, and even if the par-
ty’s results are consistently underestimated in pre-electoral polls, RKP needed to ral-
ly most Swedish speakers to vote for them if they were to successfully defend their 
seat in the EP. Current MEP Nils Torvalds spearheaded a list that, for the rest, included 
mostly young candidates. 
Figure 1
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While integration was certainly an issue in the debates, much of the campaign 
focused on genuine European topics rather than national issues, as is otherwise of-
ten the case (Schmitt and Toygür, 2016). Three European topics were particularly 
salient: economic growth, climate change and immigration policies. Table 1 shows 
the position of the parties.  
 
finland
Table 1. Party positions on main issues
party main issues 
Social Democrats (SDP)
- Economic integration to ensure sustainable economic 
growth. 
- EU minimum level corporate tax.
The Finns (PS) - Roll back European integration. - No binding EU measures to combat climate change.
National Coalition Party 
(KOK)
- Fiscal responsibility among all member states. 
- Sustainable economy and deeper economic integration.
Centre Party (KESK) - Common measures at EU level to combat climate change. - Support Common Agricultural Policies (CAP). 
Centre Party (KESK)
- Common measures at EU level to combat climate change. 
- Cooperation to ensure respect for human rights outside 
of EU.
Left Alliance (VAS) - Common measures at EU level to combat climate change. - Avoid harmful tax competition. 
Swedish People’s Party (RKP)   - Common measures at EU level to combat climate change. - Common EU immigration policies.
The economic debate focused on tax evasion and business competition. SDP, VAS 
and VIHR argued that corporate tax competition constituted a threat to the welfa-
re state and a minimum community tax would address the problem. The other par-
ties argued that the EU should not take decisions in matter of tax policy.  
The role of the EU in ﬁghting climate change was also a heated topic during the 
campaign, with the PS taking issue with all other parties. PS adopted the same stra-
tegy as in the national elections by questioning the need for immediate actions, and 
especially the need for Finland to lead the way. While there were differences in how 
much it was emphasised, all other parties were in principle in favour of coordina-
ted European measures to address climate change. 
The debate on immigration revolved mostly around a compulsory quota system 
for member states. Most parties (SFP, KOK, VIHR, VAS, RKP) were in favour of the 
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Table 2 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Finland
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
National Coalition Party (KOK) EPP  380,460 20.8
Green League (VIHR) G-EFA  292,892 16.0
Social Democratic Party (SDP) S&D  267,603 14.6
Finns Party (PS) ECR  253,176 13.8
Centre Party (KESK) ALDE  247,477 13.5
Left Alliance (VAS) GUE-NGL  126,063 6.9
Swedish People’s Party (RKP) ALDE  115,962 6.3
Christian Democrats (KD) EPP  89,204 4.9
Others  57,208 3.1
Total 1,830,045 100
Turnout (%) 42.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
3 3 -1.8
2 3 +6.7 +1 +2
2 2 +2.3
2 2 +1.0
2 2 -6.1 -1 -1
1 1 -2.4
1 1 -0.4
-0.4
13 14 +1
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quota system, while KESK argued that this proposal was irrelevant since it would ne-
ver be accepted by other member states. PS opposed it. 
The debate among the top candidates for the European Commission Presiden-
cy held in Brussels on May 15th gathered some attention by national media. Seve-
ral major media outlets provided a commentary and it was generally perceived to 
have been a quiet event where no major disagreements emerged. 
 
results 
 
Advance voting is popular in Finland. As about 21% of all registered voters had vo-
ted by May 21st, it became clear that the turnout would have been about the same 
as in 2014. In the end, the turnout slightly increased, by 1.6 percent, compared to 
2014. In 2019 42.7% of all eligible voters cast their vote. 
When the results of the advance voting were announced, it appeared clear that 
pre-election expectations would largely be fulﬁlled. Three hours after the closing of 
the polling stations, the preliminary results were available for the whole country. In 
the end, the outcome conﬁrmed the expectations that KOK would remain the ﬁrst par-
ty with 20.8% of the votes (three seats). However, even more successful were the gre-
ens (VIHR), which became the second largest party with 16.0%, a 6.7 percentage points 
increase in comparison to 2014, gaining a second seat. SDP also gained votes in com-
parison to 2014 (+2.3%) and received 14.6% of all votes (two seats), however, this 
result was below the one they obtained in national elections. PS gained 1 percenta-
ge point compared to 2014, but the 13.8% result was disappointing for them, con-
sidering the 18% forecasted before the elections. KESK was the major loser, as it only 
received 13.5% of the votes, 6.1 percentage points less than in 2014 (and losing one 
of its previous two seats). VAS gained 6.9% of the votes and kept their only seat. The 
most important development during election night was that RKP increased their sha-
re of the votes to 6.3% and climbed the list to cling on to the thirteenth seat. 
The battle for the fourteenth seat that will become available when UK leaves the 
EU was very close, and the prediction of which party would win the reserve seat chan-
ged several times. In the end, it went to the Greens.  
 
conclusion 
 
Considering the pre-electoral poles, the result may be considered a cautious win for 
the pro-EU side. Although a turnout of 42.7% is by no means impressive, it is sati-
sfactory considering the context and the proximity to national elections. 
Furthermore, the widely-projected win for the Eurosceptic forces did not occur 
in Finland, where the most successful parties all championed pro-integration agen-
das for ensuring economic growth, and preventing climate change. Although PS gai-
ned votes, they failed to win an additional seat and clearly underperformed compared 
to the predictions. By contrast, Finland contribute to the European wave of support 
for green parties, as voters seemed to expect European institutions to engage in cle-
ar efforts to ﬁght climate change. 
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The ﬁnal results are similar to those in the national elections. Therefore, the Fin-
nish electoral landscape now has several mid-sized parties, instead of three big par-
ties and several small ones. The 2019 European election was one of the rare occa-
sions where most parties found reasons to be satisﬁed with the outcome. Even KESK, 
the only party that lost a seat, was relieved that the loss was not even more pronounced. 
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France: Setting the stage for 2022 
romain lachat
The European Parliament elections took place in metropolitan France on 26 May (over-
seas departments had already voted the day before). Seventy-four seats were to be 
filled, with an additional five seats on reserve in the event of a Brexit. The election 
is based on a proportional system, with a five per cent minimum threshold: only lists 
that pass this threshold obtain representatives in the European Parliament. The par-
ty lists are closed, meaning that citizens vote for one list, but cannot express any pre-
ference for specific candidates within that list. While this electoral rule was similar 
to the one used in 2014, the division of electoral districts changed, passing from 8 
regional constituencies to a single national electoral district. 
 
the campaign 
 
This election represented an important test for French President Emmanuel Macron 
and his party The Republic on the Move (LaREM), as this was the first national poll 
since his victory in the presidential and legislative elections of May and June 2017. 
Furthermore, this campaign followed months of people’s protests by the Yellow Vests 
(Gilets Jaunes). This movement started in October 2018, initially as a protest against 
an increase in fuel prices. It grew rapidly, largely spreading via social media, and led 
to massive, weekly demonstrations all over France. While the claims of this move-
ment were quite diverse, they centred around issues of social and fiscal justice, the 
rise in the costs of living, and a demand for new forms of participation, such as the 
introduction of a citizens’ initiative referendum. More generally, this movement ex-
pressed a profound discontent with mainstream parties and with the government’s 
policies. 
The unofficial launch of the campaign was perhaps represented by Emmanuel 
Macron’s letter to European citizens, an opinion piece published in newspapers across 
all EU member states in early March 2019.1 He proposed a series of reforms for a “Eu-
ropean Renaissance” and warned that “retreating into nationalism” offered no al-
ternative. This call for European unity and for further European integration echo-
ed some of the central themes of his 2017 presidential campaign. It also framed the 
1. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/04/europe-brexit-uk.
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – France
party ep groupa votes (n) votes (%)
National Rally (RN) ENF 5,281,576 23.3
The Republic on the Move! (LaREM)/ 
Democratic Movement (MoDem) 5,076,363 22.4
Europe Ecology - The Greens (EELV) G-EFA 3,052,406 13.5
The Republicans (LR) EPP 1,920,530 8.5
France Unbowed (LFI) GUE-NGL 1,428,386 6.3
Socialist Party (PS), Public Place (PP),  
New Deal (ND) S&D 1,401,978 6.2
France Arise (DLF)  794,953 3.5
Generation.s  741,212 
Union of Democrats and Independents 
(UDI) ALDE  566,746 2.5
French Communist Party (PCF)  564,717 2.5
Animalist Party (PA)  490,570 2.2
Ecology Generation (GE)/ 
Independent Ecological Movement (MEI)  411,793 1.8
Popular Republican Union (UPR)  265,957 1.2
Others  657,037 2.9
Total 22,654,224 100
Turnout (%) 50.1
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5.0
Source: https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Elections-europeennes-2019/ 
Resultats-des-elections-europeennes-2019. The 2014 results for the PS-PP-ND list are the  
joint results of the separate lists of PS and ND. For UDI, they correspond to the result of its  
joint list with MoDem. No results are reported for the PCF in 2014, as it formed part of a  
coalition with other parties, including the forerunner of LFI (a joint list that obtained 6.6%  
of the vote and 4 seats).
aAs changes in EP groups are expected, an EP group is only indicated for parties  
with incumbent MEPs.
seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
22 23 -1.6 -2 -1
21 23
12 13 +4.5 +6 +7
8 8 -12.3 -12 -12
6 6
5 6 -10.7 -8 -7
-0.3
-7.4 -7 -7
+0.7
+0.8
74 79
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European election as a contest between pro-Europeans progressives and liberals, on 
the one hand, and Eurosceptic parties and populist movements, on the other. 
This opposition dominated the French campaign, setting the Renaissance list (La-
REM and MoDem, the Democratic Movement) of the president’s party and its allies 
against the National Rally (RN, formerly the National Front) of Marine Le Pen, in a 
replay of the 2017 presidential runoff. Emmanuel Macron’s personal involvement 
in the campaign, particularly during the ﬁnal days, was unusual for a president. Also, 
Marine Le Pen was not the leading candidate of her party (she took one of the last 
positions on the list). However, the competition between them contributed to giving 
the election a plebiscitary character: an anti-Macron referendum for Le Pen, and a 
vote for or against Europe for Macron. 
A record number of 34 lists (12 more than in 2014) were competing. While most 
of these had no chances of reaching the ﬁve per cent threshold, this multiplicity of 
lists testiﬁes to the continuing fragmentation of the French partisan landscape. On 
the left, ﬁve lists of parties with incumbent European MPs (MEPs) were competing: 
France Unbowed (LFI), the party of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who ﬁnished in fourth po-
sition in the ﬁrst round of the last presidential election, the French Communist Par-
ty (PCF), the Socialist Party (PS), Generation.s, the movement of Benoît Hamon, can-
didate of the Socialist Party in the 2017 presidential election, and Europe Ecology – 
the Greens (EELV). On the right, the National Rally faced competition from the Re-
publicans, which has traditionally been the main right-wing party, and by other far-
right lists, such as France Arise and The Patriots. 
 
results 
 
Contrary to fears of a high level of abstention, which were often expressed during 
the campaign, the election was marked by a significant increase in voter turnout. It 
reached 50.1%, an increase of almost nine points compared with the previous Eu-
ropean election (42.4% in 2014). It is the first time in the last 25 years that turnout 
at a European election in France passed the 50% threshold. 
The RN won the head-to-head contest with the Renaissance list, ﬁnishing ﬁrst with 
23.3% of the vote (see the detailed results in Table 1). The margin of victory was qui-
te small, less than 1%, and the RN vote share actually diminished compared with its 
historic success in the 2014 European election (Russo, 2014). Nevertheless, this re-
sult represents an important symbolic victory for Marine Le Pen, as both leaders had 
clearly set a goal of ﬁnishing in ﬁrst place. 
Obtaining almost 46% of the vote (and 58% of seats), the two frontrunners left 
their competitors far behind. The third most supported list was EELV. This was an 
unexpected success for the Greens: With a vote share of 13.5%, they clearly out-
performed the campaign polls, which never had put them above 10%. In contrast, 
the traditional governing parties, the PS on the left and LR on the right, produced 
their lowest scores ever in a European contest. The Socialists’ vote share is even less 
than the already low score achieved in the 2017 presidential contest. They lost more 
than half of their seats in the European Parliament. While this only conﬁrmed the 
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Socialist’s recent electoral defeat, the election outcome was more of a surprise in the 
case of the Republicans. With 8.5% of the vote (and eight seats), they scored signi-
ﬁcantly below expectations, as opinion surveys conducted during the ﬁnal weeks of 
the campaign promised them a vote share of about 13%. The ﬁnal list that passed 
the threshold of representation was LFI, who won 6 mandates, with a vote share si-
milar to that of PS. This was also a disappointing result, given the strong showing 
of Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s party in the 2017 elections. 
 
conclusion 
 
The results of the European elections confirm the profound transformation of the 
French partisan landscape, which was initiated by the 2017 presidential and legi-
slative contests (Perrineau, 2017). While French politics have been dominated for 
decades by a left-right divide between the Socialists and the Republicans (or its pre-
decessors), the recent electoral contests were marked by the opposition between a 
nationalist and a progressive pole. This transformation process is even compounded 
by the strengthening of the Greens. Like many of their European counterparts, they 
benefited from the increased salience of environmental topics and the heightened 
awareness on climate change. But their success also contributes to the decline of the 
traditional mainstream parties and to the waning of the left-right divide. 
With a highly fragmented left-wing camp, and a strongly weakened right, the con-
test between the progressive and nationalist parties is likely to remain the dominant 
axis of political competition in coming years. The electoral victory of the RN was not 
that resounding, but it is sufficient to sustain Marine Le Pen’s claim of representing 
the main force of opposition. It also strengthens her leadership against the critiques 
that were raised following her 2017 defeat. On the other hand, while LaREM did not 
win the election, its score is not much lower than Macron’s result in the ﬁrst round 
of the 2017 presidential election. Governing parties frequently face electoral losses 
in European contests, particularly when they take place in the middle of the natio-
nal electoral cycle (Hix and Marsh, 2011), as was the case for this contest. Even if 
this did not give Macron the breath of fresh air he had hoped for after months of po-
pular protest, the defeat was not sufficiently bitter to force him to change his cour-
se. This is what Édouard Philippe, the Prime Minister, stressed when reacting to the 
election results. He called them “disappointing,” but noted that this score should not 
be seen as a sanction, and that the government would continue its reforms.2 The sta-
ge seems to be already set for the 2022 presidential election. 
 
france: setting the stage for 2022
2. https://www.france24.com/en/20190526-french-far-right-shows-renewed-strength-macron.
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Germany: Second order but still groundbreaking?  
heiko giebler 
introduction 
 
Concurrent to regional-level elections in the state of Bremen and local election in 
nine out of sixteen states, Germany elected its share of representatives for the ninth 
legislative term of the European Parliament (EP) on May 26th. With 96 seats, Ger-
many contributes the largest number of politicians to the EP. These parliamentarians 
are elected based on a proportional electoral system and in a single constituency. Plus, 
for the second time, there is no legal threshold for parties to win seats. This means 
that, due to the large number of seats available, around 0.6% of the votes could al-
ready be enough to win at least one seat. Taken together, these factors lead to high 
party fragmentation, much higher than in the national or regional parliaments, the 
majority of which implement a legal threshold. Moreover, it provides a huge incentive 
for small and micro parties to run in EP elections; in 2014, twenty-five parties com-
peted, fourteen of which won at least one seat. 
Traditionally, and quite similarly to other member states, elections to the EP re-
ceive much less attention than elections to the national parliament; in terms of cam-
paign intensity, media coverage, public interest or turnout (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; 
Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010; Giebler and Wüst, 2011; Giebler and Lichteblau, 2016). 
While this second-order nature also holds true for the 2019 EP elections in Germa-
ny, the results might still prove ground-breaking as recent trends – losses for main-
stream-centre parties, the rise of the Greens and a stabilisation of right-wing populist 
success especially in East Germany – converge into very clear patterns. 
 
initial situation and electoral campaign 
 
For several years, the German party system – once one of the most stable party sy-
stems in the world – has undergone significant changes with drastic increases in par-
ty fragmentation and electoral volatility. In particular, the centre-right, Christian De-
mocratic Union (CDU) and their Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union in Ba-
varia (CSU), and the centre-left, Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) are lo-
sing voters in droves, while the Greens, who have recently moderated their positions, 
have established themselves successfully as an alternative to these older mainstre-
am parties. Since 2013, the rapid rise of the right-wing populist Alternative for Ger-
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many (AfD) has brought the German party system in line with typical Western Eu-
ropean party systems (Arzheimer 2015), further exacerbating problems for the cen-
tre parties and stymieing coalition formation. All these developments seem to be lin-
ked to more general societal changes leading to major shifts of political competition 
and cleavages with more and more focus on socio-cultural and identity-related po-
licy issues (Franzmann et al. forthcoming).      
These societal developments are accompanied by major internal challenges for 
many of the German parties. For example, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that she 
would not seek an additional term after 2021, and she gave up party leadership in 
December 2018, which caused internal power struggles in the CDU. This internal 
power struggle was further complicated by the fact that the CSU continues to cater 
more and more to the (populist) right, even after receiving the worst electoral re-
sult in a Bavarian state-level election since 1950. The SPD is in even worse shape af-
ter breaking their promise not to enter another Grand Coalition and continuing to 
suffer from leadership changes at the top of the party. Meanwhile, the AfD was hit 
by several scandals, many of them related to potentially illegal party donations and 
strong links of some politicians to far-right networks. Lest we think this is a problem 
only for right and centre parties, the socialist Left was harmed by Sahra Wagenknecht’s 
– one of the party’s most important and most visible politicians – efforts to form a 
left-wing movement similar to the “Yellow Vests” in France. The only parties that have 
managed to avoid serious internal struggles in recent months are the Greens and the 
Free Democratic Party (FDP). 
In a situation of political change and internal party struggles, in which other pri-
marily national factors were so important, it would have been surprising had the 2019 
elections constituted an exception to the general patterns of second-order elections 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Even Manfred Weber’s (CSU) candidacy as Spitzenkan-
didaten (with a substantial chance of becoming the President of the European Com-
mission) did not ignite a more intense public debate about European issues.  
Looking to the major parties’ campaigns, CDU and CSU published a common and 
rather short electoral manifesto with a pro-European core. Primarily, they proposed 
to maintain the European Union (EU) as it currently stands – campaigning against 
redistributive efforts and interdictions from the left as well as against right-wing (po-
pulist) challenges. Controlling migration into the EU was a very central topic as well. 
The SPD, instead campaigned for a fairer tax system for large companies, for more 
development aid, and for better controls at its external border in order to decrease 
migration into Europe. The Greens, led by The Greens–European Free Alliance’s (G-
EFA) Spitzenkandidatin Ska Keller, focused on more EU-wide regulations to ﬁght, 
among other things, climate change and tax evasion. Somewhat similarly, the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) campaigned for a common law on migration and asylum, 
as well as for strengthening the process of drafting a common constitution. At the 
same time – as expected for a liberal, economy-focused party – they supported open 
markets as one of the EU’s central pillars. The Left meanwhile concentrated on is-
sues like solidarity and more social justice, and linked these issues to ecological chal-
lenges. Finally, the AfD gave up their opposition on Germany’s membership in the 
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EU for the duration of the campaign, while at the same time clearly speaking against 
the creation of any substantive competencies on the supra-national level. Additio-
nally, they denied climate change (or any negative consequences of it) and recognized 
as the EU's only merit its guarantee of free trade. In a nutshell, all parties campai-
gned rather close to their ideological core, and low media attention did not encou-
rage much public debate among the parties. The result was, unsurprisingly, a rather 
underwhelming and unexciting electoral campaign.               
However, while the 2019 EP elections may not have sparked a tide of interest in 
European issues, opinion polls do suggest that the interest in EP elections has sub-
stantially increased in comparison to 2014 (infratest dimap, 2019). With the “Fri-
days for Future” movement picking up speed in Germany, and an hour-long video 
of YouTube inﬂuencer Rezo criticising the CDU in particular for their failures regarding 
economic inequality and environmental politics garnering more than eleven million 
views by election day, there seems to be some politicisation going on in the youn-
ger generations and beyond.  
Especially in the minal months before the election, climate crisis, environmen-
tal issues, and sustainability became very dominant topics. In May 2017, about 30%of 
the population stated that environmental issues are one of the most important pro-
blems in Germany while it was only 10% at the beginning of the year (Forschun-
gsgruppe Wahlen, 2019). Traditionally, the Greens are associated with these topics 
and – in the eyes of the population – have high competencies to deal with them, which 
clearly helped them on election day as many other parties were unable to present 
convincing ideas on how to deal with these issues.  
 
results 
 
While the election to the EP was not central to public discourse – and perhaps not 
even to all the parties competing – it nevertheless took place in interesting and ra-
ther polarised as well as politicised times. All in all, fouty-one parties competed in 
the EP – sixteen parties more than in 2014 and seven more than in the 2017 fede-
ral election. The electoral outcomes are presented in Table 1. They are based on the 
preliminary results published by the Federal Returning Officer (2019). Turnout in-
creased substantially and reached 61.4%– 13.3 percentage points more than in 2014, 
and the highest turnout since the 1990s. It seems to be indeed the case that politi-
cisation helped mobilise citizens to cast a ballot. Still, significantly fewer people par-
ticipated than in the federal election 2017 (76.2%) which is typical for second-or-
der elections (Giebler, 2014; Giebler and Wagner, 2015). 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Germany
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) EPP 8,437,093 22.6 23 -7.5 -6
Alliance 90/The Greens 
(Greens) G-EFA 7,675,584 20.5 21 +9.8 +10
Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD) S&D 5,914,953 15.8 16 -11.4 -11
Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) EFD 4,103,453 11.0 11 +3.9 +4
Christian Social Union 
in Bavaria (CSU) EPP 2,354,817 6.3 6 +1.0 +1
The Left (Linke) GUE-NGL 2,056,010 5.5 5 -1.9 -2
Free Democratic Party 
(FDP) ALDE 2,028,353 5.4 5 +2.1 +2
The Party G-EFA/ NI 898,386 2.4 2 +1.8 +1
Free Voters (FW) ALDE 806,590 2.2 2 +0.7 +1
Human Environment 
Animal Protection Other 541,984 1.4 1 +0.2
Ecological Democratic 
Party (ÖDP) G-EFA 370,006 1.0 1 +0.4
Family Party of Germany ECR 273,755 0.7 1 +0.0
Volt Other 248,824 0.7 1
Pirate Party Germany G-EFA 243,363 0.7 1 -0.8
National Democratic 
Party of Germany (NPD) NI 101,323 0.3 -0.8 -1
Other 1,334,737 3.6
Total 37,389,231 100 96
Turnout (%) 61.4
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) none
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Germany will be represented by fourteen parties in the EP – exactly the same num-
ber as in 2014. The pro-European party Volt is the only new party winning parlia-
mentary representation – picking up the seat vacated by the radical right National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). The NPD lost its seat as its voters moved to the 
AfD – a trend already observed in other recent elections. Of the major parties, the-
re is only one real winner: The Greens, who nearly doubled their vote and seat sha-
res. Clearly, this is in part driven by the increased salience of the party’s core issues. 
However, the party has also managed to become more attractive for (socio-econo-
mically) centrist voters in general and, in comparison to other German parties at this 
point in time, the party presents itself as rather homogenous and free from internal 
struggles. While the AfD, the CSU and the FDP also won more votes than in 2014, 
they lost in comparison to the last federal election. Especially the AfD, which in 2014 
mobilised many Eurosceptic voters (Wagner et al. 2015), did not really beneﬁt from 
their programmatic shift away from European issues and towards topics like immi-
gration and Islam (Giebler et al. 2019). 
Without a doubt, the CDU and especially the SPD, traditionally the two largest 
parties in Germany, suffered heavy defeats. It is quite common that (large) parties 
in government lose votes in EP elections, and that such losses are the highest in the 
middle of the national election term (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In fact, when EP elec-
tions took place in 2004, right the middle of the national term, losses for the then 
government (SPD and the Greens) were even more substantial. Nevertheless, the two 
parties can only be described as the biggest losers of May 26th, as their results represent 
a long progressive trend of de-alignment from the two centre parties. Moreover, it 
seems that the reasons behind this decline are manifold, ranging from unpopular po-
licy positions, inadequate assignment of salience to certain issues, communication 
problems and substantive problems of party leadership. To a certain degree, this also 
applied to the Left – the only smaller party present in the Bundestag which lost vo-
tes not only in comparison to the last federal, but also to the 2014 EP election.         
Seven small parties managed to gain seats due to the absence of a legal electo-
ral threshold. These parties have vote shares that vary from  0.7% (Pirate Party Ger-
many) to 2.4% (The Party, founded by the editors of a German satirical magazine). 
Most of these parties managed to increase their vote share, and two of them (The Par-
ty and Free Voters) even managed to win an additional seat in comparison to 2014. 
This might be the clearest sign that, on the one hand, electoral systems indeed in-
ﬂuence electoral behaviour and, on the other hand, that EP elections are second-or-
der elections: about 13% of the voters would have been left without parliamentary 
representation if the 5% threshold used at the federal level would have been applied.   
Finally, there are two interesting features at the level of  the electorate, one con-
cerning age and one territorial. The Greens are the favourite party among voters youn-
ger than 60 (roughly 25%), but only 13% of citizens older than 60 voted for them. 
The CDU, CSU and SPD are more popular among the older generations – as is the 
AfD. This trend is not new, but it has never been so pronounced.. Secondly, while 
the AfD did not perform that well overall – or, at least, not as well to justify the po-
pulist tide rhetoric so often used in public discourse (and especially by the media) 
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– they won the most votes in two states in East Germany, and are close or above 20% 
in all East German states except Berlin. In contrast, the AfD only won more than 10% 
of the votes in one West German state (Baden-Wurttemberg). The pattern is inver-
ted for the Greens, which do much better in West Germany.  
 
conclusion 
 
The EP election provided some very interesting insights into the ongoing upheaval 
of the German political sphere. First of all, turnout increased significantly, which is 
a good sign for democracy and probably also some indication that EP elections, or 
at least, international issues, bear some relevance to voters. However, the election 
was primarily influenced by ecological issues – whose importance is obviously not 
limited to the European level – which speaks in favour of a continuing substantive 
impact of the national arena on citizens’ party choice.  
As interesting as these results are, they are not surprising. The downwards trend 
of the CDU and SPD, as well as the all-time high of the Greens, has been foreseea-
ble when looking to public opinion trends since 2017. The AfD did not strengthen 
in comparison to the last federal election but has nevertheless stabilized its vote sha-
re and is building up strongholds in East Germany.    
This election was another clear indication that the German party system, as well 
as parties’ attachments to speciﬁc societal groups, is changing. As the new patterns 
abovementioned have never before been so prominent, this election might still be 
characterised as second order but is also, to a certain degree, ground-breaking. Par-
ties will have to react to these developments, and Germans will have to get used to 
much higher party fragmentation and rather broader ideological coalitions on different 
political levels. With Angela Merkel no longer available for another chancellorship, 
the 2021 federal election has clear potential to not only produce interesting and sur-
prising results, but also results with far-reaching consequences.   
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Greece: A story of government punishment  
and party-system stabilisation  
eftichia teperoglou
In Greece the 2019 European Parliament elections took place on May 26th, together 
with municipal and regional elections. The governmental party of the radical left SY-
RIZA suffered severe losses, whilst the centre-right party of New Democracy (ND) 
increased its electoral strength and gained a plurality for the first time since the 2012-
2015 period. The outcome of the election had immediate consequences for the na-
tional electoral arena. On the night of the election, the Greek PM Alexis Tsipras cal-
led for snap elections (four months ahead) to be held on 7 July 2019. 
 
the context 
 
The 2019 European election in Greece was the first contest after the national elec-
tions in September 2015. It arrived after a very busy political timeline, as from 2012 
to 2015 there were four consecutive national elections, the 2014 EP election and the 
referendum of 2015 on acceptance or rejection of an EU/IMF lending proposal (the 
third bailout agreement since 2010). The majority of citizens still share high levels 
of Eurosceptical attitudes towards the EU (e.g. only 25% have a positive image to-
wards the EU according to the standard Eurobarometer 90 in autumn 2018, while 
the European average is 43%) – a reflection on the economic crisis. 
From the 2014 to the 2019 European elections, the country experienced a ten-
se period both in economic and socio-political terms. Under the ﬁrst coalition go-
vernment between SYRIZA and the nationalist right-wing party of Independent Gre-
eks/ANEL (formed in the aftermath of the January 2015 national elections), the coun-
try entered a phase of sharp economic instability. SYRIZA won again the Septem-
ber 2015 snap election and formed another coalition government with ANEL. Du-
ring this second term, the government had to implement a harsh economic programme 
which created disillusionment among its supporters.  Moreover, the coalition go-
vernment agreed with the creditors on the third and last bailout programme which 
expired on August 20th 2018. Overall, during the last year before the European elec-
tions one could say that the Greek economy had been stabilised. However, social and 
political dissatisfaction was very high. Unemployment rates went down, but these 
were still high (18.5% in February 2019), and more severe taxes have been impo-
sed especially on the middle/upper class. Additionally, there was a sense of growing 
dissatisfaction of citizens with the perceived ineffective and sometimes dangerou-
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sly inept administration of SYRIZA (e.g. the ﬁres in the summer of 2018 in the At-
tica region with more than one hundred deaths). The coalition government formally 
ended in February 2019 due to disagreement between the two parties over the Ma-
cedonia name dispute. On June 12th 2018, an agreement was reached between Gre-
ek PM Alexis Tsipras and his counterpart Zoran Zaev, whereby the name Republic 
of North Macedonia would be adopted. It was an international issue that had remained 
unsolved for more than twenty years, but according to the majority of Greeks (and 
especially those living in the Greek region of Macedonia) the agreement was a bad 
one for Greece and the PM himself was often labelled as a traitor by nationalist op-
position groups. Therefore, part of the explanation for the losses by SYRIZA can be 
attributed to this issue, especially in Northern Greece. 
 
the electoral campaign: european elections without europe 
 
The debate between the two main parties, SYRIZA and ND, overshadowed any other 
aspect of the campaign. National issues – especially the future of the Greek econo-
my and the Macedonia dispute – were predominant. The election was a typical re-
ferendum contest with a very high level of polarisation. The socialist party of PASOK 
tried to mobilise part of its old electorate, and positioned itself as an alternative po-
litical solution. It was part of the centre-left coalition Movement for Change (KINAL), 
which was founded in March 2018. Some new parties participated in these elections. 
Among them the Course of Freedom by Zoe Kontantopoulou, a former SYRIZA MP, 
the new pan-European party European Realistic Disobedience Front (DiEM25) for-
med by Yanis Varoufakis, a former MP of SYRIZA and ex-minister of Economics, as 
well as Greek Solution by Kyriakos Velopoulos, an ex-parliamentary member of the 
nationalist Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) who had also been a member of ND from 
2012 to 2015. Overall, forty parties participated, ranging from the communist left 
to the extreme right. A proportional electoral system with a 3% electoral threshold 
and open lists (since 2014) was adopted. The latter feature produced a personalised 
electoral campaign with EP candidates running individual campaigns throughout Gree-
ce. A major issue was the mobilisation of younger voters. A significant change com-
pared to previous elections was the passage of a new electoral law by the SYRIZA go-
vernment, in which the eligible age for voting was reduced from 18 to 17 years old. 
SYRIZA claimed that this election had to be seen as a vote of conﬁdence on the 
government after the end of the bailout programmes.  Its main slogans were “We have 
the power, we do not go back”, “We join our forces. For the Greece of the many, for a Eu-
rope of the peoples”, “The time of the many has arrived!”. The party blamed ND for sup-
porting the candidacy of Manfred Weber, from the European People’s Party, as next 
President of the European Commission. Weber is widely perceived as a champion 
of austerity for the countries of Southern Europe. On the other hand, ND highlighted 
the necessity for change: “On 26 May we vote for political change”. Its leader, Kyria-
kos Mitsotakis promised an economic programme with a restructuring of the taxa-
tion system aiming to reduce taxes. SYRIZA pushed for welfare and pension bene-
ﬁts, as well as favourable payment plans for taxpayers with arrears, in the run-up 
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to the contest. Almost no political actor talked about European issues. This is par-
ticular striking given the fact that in both the economic and ongoing refugee-im-
migration crises, Greece is very much involved and affected. 
 
turnout  
 
Greece is a country where, in principle, voting is compulsory. However, the relevant 
penalties for not voting are never imposed. Participation reached 58.7%, as shown 
in Figure 1 – a reduction of 1.27 percentage points compared to the 2014 Europe-
an election – but an increase compared to the previous national elections of September 
2015 (+2.13 percentage points, which translates into 352,507 more voters). Ne-
vertheless, when observing this increase, it is important to take into account that, 
compared to 2015, 161,289 additional citizens were entitled to vote because of the 
lowering of the voting age (from 18 to 17). 
 
Figure 1. Turnout % in National (N) and European (E) elections in Greece 1981-2019 
results 
 
The election stands as another example of a momentous contest in the history of Eu-
ropean elections in Greece. Back in 2014, there was a historical shift with SYRIZA 
winning the elections (Teperoglou et al., 2015). This time there is again a shift, but 
towards a new equilibrium.  SYRIZA was severely punished (23.8% of the vote) and 
the opposition party of ND obtained 33.1 %. The difference in the vote share bet-
ween the two parties (9.3 percentage points) is the biggest one ever observed in a 
Greek European Parliament election. The party of ND managed to increase its vote 
share compared to the national election of September 2015 (+5.03 percentage points) 
while SYRIZA lost much ground (-11.7 percentage points ). According to the exit poll 
data (by Metron Analysis, Alco, Marc and MRB opinion poll companies), SYRIZA ma-
naged to hold 58% of its 2015 electorate, while the figure for ND was 85%.  
The smaller coalition partner, ANEL gained only 0.8% of the total vote (a decrease 
of 2.89 percentage points compared to 2015). Overall, the punishment of the coa-
lition is a classic example of “voting with the boot” (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996) 
greece
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Greece
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
New Democray (ND) EPP 1,873,080 33.1 8 +10.4 +3
Coalition of Radical Left 
(SYRIZA)
GUE-
NGL 1,343,788 23.8 6 -2.8
Movement for Change 
(KINAL) S&D 436,735 7.7 2 -0.3
Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE) NI 302,677 5.4 2 -0.8
Popular Association- 
Golden Dawn (GD) NI 275,822 4.9 2 -4.5 -1
Greek Solution-Kyriakos 
Velopoulos others 236,361 4.1 1
Mera25 169,286 3.0
Course of Freedom 90,859 1.6
The River S&D 86,003 1.5 -5.1 -2
Centre Union 82,072 1.5 +0,8
Greece-the other way 
Notis Marias 70,286 1.2
Popular Orthodox Rally 
(LAOS) 69,524 1.2 -1.5
Independent Greeks 
(ANEL) ECR 45,149 0.8 -2.7 -1
Other parties 574,480 10.2
Total 5,656,122 100 21
Turnout (%) 58.7
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) 3%
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against government policies, given also the fact that the European election took pla-
ce late in the ﬁrst–order national electoral cycle.  The concentration of votes for SY-
RIZA and ND – a total of 56.9% – (compared to 49.3% in 2014) conﬁrms a shift in 
the Greek party system towards a more modest form of two-partyism which has gra-
dually been restored in the post-crisis period, with SYRIZA replacing PASOK as the 
major left-of-centre party.  
A point worth mentioning is the decrease in vote share for the neo-Nazi Golden 
Dawn party (-2.1 percentage points  compared to 2015, and -4.5 percentage points 
compared to the 2014 European election). This decline could be due to internal con-
ﬂicts and ongoing legal troubles for the party’s leadership, but also to vote-switching 
in favor of ND and “Greek Solution”. The electoral performance of KINAL remained 
stable, but the coalition became the third largest political actor because of the de-
cline of Golden Dawn. The performance of the communists remained stable too, whi-
le the party The River did not manage to repeat its electoral success of 2014. The bre-
akthrough of the newly formed nationalist “Greek solution” party is perhaps a ty-
pical example of elections that function as a “midwife assisting in the birth of new 
parties” (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). The party of DiEM25 failed by only a few 
hundred votes to reach the 3% required to elect an MEP. 
 
Because of the losses by incumbent parties and its referendum character, this elec-
tion could be classiﬁed as a second-order national election (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), 
even though turnout was higher compared with the previous national election. The 
results were not favourable for smaller parties, with the exception of the newly for-
med nationalist party.  
 
conclusion 
 
The 2019 European election - similar to the one of 2014 – could serve as a prelude 
of a shift in the balance of power in the forthcoming national elections. This time, 
presumably, the party of ND will win the national elections of July 7th 2019. The first 
major lesson of this election is that a second-order election prefigures changes in first-
order electoral politics, rather than the other way around (Schmitt and Teperoglou, 
2018). A second lesson is that the Greek party system has entered a new period of 
stabilisation.  
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Hungary:  
A paradoxical episode under electoral authoritarianism 
gábor tóka
May 26th 2019 saw an electoral paradox in Hungary: a long-serving government won 
big on a record-high turnout, yet the winners looked frustrated whilst the losers were 
positively re-charged. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz-KDNP electoral allian-
ce took well over 52% of the popular vote and 62% of the country’s twenty-one se-
ats in the European Parliament (EP). That is one seat and 1 percentage point of the 
vote up compared to the 2014 EP elections, and just one seat and 4 percentage points 
of the vote less than their all-time best in 2009. But Fidesz’ leaders appeared di-
sappointed, and the government shortly announced unexpected policy concessions 
(Balogh, 2019).  
The opposition received a lower vote share than in any one of the 2010, 2014 
and 2018 parliamentary elections.1 The numbers appear unpromising because in tho-
se three races Fidesz won a two-thirds majority in the only chamber of Parliament, 
enough to change constitutional rules and fill positions on high courts, prosecution 
services, and all public agencies. Yet, the 2019 results made the opposition appear 
re-energized. Outside of government propaganda outlets, the apparently dismal re-
sults probably even increased the credibility of the opposition challenge in the fall 
local elections, for which unprecedentedly broad opposition alliances are expected 
to sweep some of the country’s biggest municipalities. 
Orbán’s campaign used a dramatic narrative and vast resources. With his op-
position demoralized and toothless after the 2018 national elections, the proudly 
“illiberal” prime minister put himself forward as the champion of a new style coa-
lition of the European People’s Party with anti-immigration far-right parties in the 
European Commission after the 2019 election.2 He expected this change to result 
1. Local parlance denotes as opposition an ideologically colorful set of parties pledged to rede-
mocratize the authoritarian political system that emerged under Orbán’s successive gover-
nments since May 2010. Of the parties running in the EP election, it excludes Fidesz and its 
satellite the KDNP, as well as the explicitly pro-government Mi Hazánk and Munkáspárt. For 
lack of political significance, the KDNP, Munkáspárt, MKKP (Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Par-
ty, a Dadaist opposition collective satirically mocking government and opposition alike) and 
Párbeszéd (the electoral alliance partner of MSZP) will not be discussed here.  
2. See Orbán’s speeches between June 2018 and May 2019, translated into multiple languages 
on https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches. The 
quotes are from Orbán (2018).
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from illiberal parties increasing their vote across Europe after campaigning on a strict 
anti-immigration stance, and the EPP shifting to the right. The political agenda of 
the new Commission would then go against multiculturalism and social liberalism; 
it would have friendlier relations with Russia and Turkey, and it would give EU mem-
ber states “the right to defend the nationally strategic economic sectors and markets”, 
as well as veto rights on “the most important issues” in the EU. His campaign nar-
rative argued that Europe’s “exclusively liberal” leaders proved “unable to defend 
Europe against immigration” because “instead of a Europe resting on Christian foun-
dations, it is building a Europe of ‘the open society’ … [where] European people can 
be readily replaced with immigrants; the family has been transformed into an op-
tional, fluid form of cohabitation; the nation, national identity and national pride 
are seen as negative and obsolete notions; and the state no longer guarantees security 
in Europe.” The “liberal elite” pursues the “Soros-plan” to bring to Europe and na-
turalize so many Muslim immigrants that the “Christian Democratic” side can ne-
ver again win over the “left liberals” in Europe’s national elections. According to this 
plan, “those groups preserving Christian traditions will be forced out of politics, and 
decisions about the future of Europe will be made without them.” 
The Hungarian government and Fidesz spared no resources on promoting this 
message, even fielding a 28-nation multi-year survey series to monitor its reception 
across Europe. Back home, a continuous government advertising campaign started 
on all conceivable platforms in 2016 to argue that immigration, allegedly promo-
ted by Hungarian-born billionaire George Soros, poses an imminent threat to Hun-
gary, and it is supported by the European Commission. The billboards posted in the 
first three months of 2019 alone cost nearly forty million Euros (Jandó, 2019), the 
total EP campaign expenditure of the two biggest Swedish parties, and that was just 
one medium in a short period of the entire campaign. Government advertising was 
supplemented with Fidesz’ well-honed get-out-the-vote efforts that reach out with 
highly targeted and repeated personal contacting to over half the potential Fidesz 
electorate. 
The opposition campaigns had miniscule financial resources in comparison, no 
meaningful contact lists of supporters, and a meagre activist pool of a few thousand 
altogether. 
The largest opposition party, the formerly far-right Jobbik (“Movement for a Bet-
ter Hungary”), clearly, if inconsistently, has shifted to more moderate rhetoric and 
policy positions since 2013, fully embracing EU membership, inter alia. From 2015 
on, however, Fidesz’ growing popularity, fed by an economic upturn and an anti-im-
migrant stance, pushed Jobbik down to a 20% vote share in the 2018 national elec-
tion (Tóka, 2018). The frustrated hopes of emerging as a viable single-party chal-
lenger to Fidesz prompted a further move by Jobbik to political coordination with 
the rest of the opposition, and the exodus of the party’s far-right and pro-government 
faction into the Mi Hazánk (“Our Homeland”) splinter party in summer 2018. Mi Ha-
zánk launched a conspicuously well-founded campaign for the EP election, while Job-
bik was paralysed by arbitrary fines meted out by the National Audit Office for cam-
paign law violations. Unable to conduct an election campaign before the May 2019 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Hungary
party ep group votes (n) votes (%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Fidesz Hungarian Civic 
Alliance - Christian De-
mocratic People's Party 
joint list (Fidesz-KDNP)
EPPa  1,824,220 52.6 13 +1.1 +1
Democratic Coalition 
(DK) S&D  557,081 16.1 4 +6.3 +2
Momentum Movement 
(Momentum) RE  344,512 9.9 2 +9.9 +2
Hungarian Socialist  
Party - Dialogue Party 
joint list (MSZP-P)
S&D 
(MSZP), 
G-EFA (P)
 229,551 6.6 1 -11.5 -2
Movement for a Better 
Hungary (Jobbik) NI  220,184 6.3 1 -8.3 -2
Our Homeland  
(Mi Hazánk)  114,156 3.3 +3.3
Hungarian Two-Tailed 
Dog Party (MKKP)  90,912 2.6 +2.6
Politics Can Be Different 
(LMP) G-EFA  75,498 2.2 -2.8 -1
Workers’ Party  
(Munkáspárt)  14,452 0.4 +0.4
Total  3,470,566 100 21
Turnout (%) 43.5
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) 5
aMembership is in fact suspended since March 2019.
election, Jobbik’s 6.3% vote share was barely more than half the support it had in 
opinion polls. 
Neck and neck with Jobbik in most pre-election polls was MSZP (the Hungarian 
Socialist Party), a moderate successor of the party ruling the country prior to de-
mocratization in 1989-1990. From 1994 untill 2010 MSZP was the main government 
party in social-liberal coalitions except for four years in opposition to Orban’s first 
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right-wing government in 1998-2002. As a result of the unpopularity of Ferenc Gyur-
csány’s 2006-2009 government, the party lost over half of its former vote by the time 
of the 2010 election. Its survival as by far the biggest opposition party left of the ne-
wly emerged Jobbik was a credit to its well-entrenched organization and earthy po-
litical pragmatism, but has often been seen as more of an obstacle to than a resource 
for an effective left-wing challenge to Fidesz’ rein. Their lacklustre 2019 campaign 
lacked identifiable messages, and was hampered by scandals and a controversial ran-
king of candidates for the EP.  
All this may explain the staggering swing of votes from MSZP to DK (Democra-
tic Coalition) towards the end of the EP election campaign. The rather liberal DK (De-
mocratic Coalition) was created in 2011 by former socialist premier Gyurcsány to-
gether with some of Fidesz’ most determined liberal and conservative opponents. 
For many years, DK struggled to make an impact except as a junior member of elec-
toral alliances with MSZP. The 2019 EP election’s list PR system was DK’s one-off op-
portunity to take over the MSZP before crucial bargains between the opposition par-
ties for the fall 2019 local elections, and they went all-in with their resources. Their 
campaign smartly invested in a social media presence and focused on a politically 
gifted ticket leader who, being Mr. Gyurcsány’s popular wife, could push the divi-
sive party leader into the background while retaining the loyalty of his supporters. 
The loudly oppositional and pro-EU campaign of DK could capitalize on a subdued 
MSZP campaign and the fact that previous electoral alliances made the two parties’ 
electorates mutually interchangeable. DK thus ended up with 16%, and the MSZP-
Párbeszéd joint list with just 6.6% of the vote. 
The liberal Momentum, winning just 3% of the vote in their first election in 2018, 
merely needed to show up for the 2019 campaign to take over much of the previous 
LMP electorate and more. LMP (Politics Can Be Different) is a green party that emer-
ged in 2009, with its identity still rooted in the opposition to Gyurcsány and the MSZP 
as much as to Orbán’s policies. This ambiguity threw the party into a crisis after the 
2018 election, as the party’s views regarding electoral alliance options came into open 
conflict with the visible majority of its electorate. Momentum offered an obvious al-
ternative that the socially liberal urban electorates readily accepted, landing LMP 
at 2.2%, and Momentum at 9.9% of the vote in 2019. 
Thus, the paradoxes reflected surprises. An audacious bid did not pay off for Or-
bán, unlike many such previous bids, because of his overambitious international go-
als. Lively competition among the opposition parties, which undermines them in ma-
joritarian elections, spared them a public relations disaster for once. The credibili-
ty of Jobbik, LMP and MSZP as effective vehicles for political change was badly da-
maged in previous national elections. With only another fiasco on offer at the EP elec-
tion, they kept their best for the local elections. For DK and Momentum, May 2019 
meant everything: show your viability now or your frustrated supporters may move 
elsewhere in search for a party that can challenge the regime. The opposition sup-
porters rewarded a visible will to fight the regime, and won hopes of greater success 
in the future. 
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Ireland: Something for almost everyone 
michael marsh
The 2019 European Parliament election in Ireland was notable in many ways. First, 
we saw the main party in government improving on its performance in 2014 (when 
it was also in government) and on its 2016 general election vote. Fine Gael won 30% 
of the vote (up seven points), and will send five EPP MEPs to Brussels in the Irish 
complement of eleven or thirteen. (Ireland has eleven seats, but this will rise to thir-
teen if the UK leaves the EU.)   
A second feature was a notable increase in support for the Green Party, now ap-
parently forgiven for its participation in the government in power when the econo-
mic crash and subsequent ‘bailout’ occurred. The party won 11% of the vote, and its 
candidate topped the poll in the Dublin constituency. Its MEPs will take their seats 
in the G/EFA group. One immediately and a second after Brexit.  
The third was a poor showing by Eurosceptic (or more outspokenly euro criti-
cal) parties, notably Sinn Féin and parties of the far left, but this was more than ba-
lanced by the success of three anti-establishment independents (including one in-
cumbent), all of whom will sit in the GUE group. Sinn Féin lost two of its three se-
ats and saw its vote drop to a little over half of the 2014 ﬁgure. Independents4Chan-
ge, a label of convenience for two independent TDs (members of the Dáil, Irish lo-
wer house), saw both candidates elected.  
The fourth feature was the failure of the main opposition party, Fianna Fáil, to 
fulﬁl its potential in European elections. In 2014 its was unable to turn its vote in se-
ats, ﬁnishing up with just one, and while it did get two MEPs this time (who will sit 
with ALDE), its vote was well down on 2014. Fifth was the continued success of in-
dependents in Irish politics. There is no sign of their popularity receding, and the-
re are now three MEPs who are independent of traditional parties as opposed to two 
in 2014 (one in ALDE, one in S&D), neither of whom stood this time.  
Fifth was the absence of anything like the right-wing populist parties seen el-
sewhere. The one candidate who did make a point of talking about immigration in 
negative terms was an independent who had made a good showing in the 2018 Pre-
sidential election after a series of negative remarks about Irish travellers (an indi-
genous itinerant minority ethnic group). He won only 10% of the vote in his con-
stituency and was not elected.  
A ﬁnal feature was the big contrast in voting between these European elections 
and the local elections held at the same time.  Most notably, Fianna Fáil’s local vote 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Ireland
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
Fine Gael EPP  496,457 29.6
Fianna Fáil ALDE  277,703 16.5
Sinn Féin GUE-NGL  196,078 11.7
The Green Party G/EFA  190,814 11.4
Independents 4 Change GUE-NGL  124,046 7.4
Labour S&D  52,746 3.1
Solidarity/People Before Proﬁt  38,763 2.3
Social Democrats  20,331 1.2
Independents GUE-NGL  264,085 15.7
Others  17,055 1.0
Total  1,678,078 100
Turnout (%) 49.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
4 5 +7.3 +1
1 2 -5.7 +1
1 1 -7.8 -2 -2
2 2 +6.5 +2 +2
2 2 +7.4 +2 +2
-2.2
-1.0
+1.2
1 2 -4.1 -2 -2
-1.6
11 13 +2
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was ten points higher than its European one, and Fine Gael’s ﬁve points lower.  My 
analysis of the RTE Exit poll indicates that only half of all voters chose the same par-
ty (or voted independent) in both elections, a drop of at least 10 percentage points 
on such behaviour in previous sets of elections back to 2004 (Marsh, 2019b). 
Full results are in Table 1.  
 
The campaign was uneventful, and mercifully free from overly negative campaigning, 
or sinister material on social media.  As always, there was ample decoration of all avai-
lable poles with candidate posters, and extensive door-to-door canvassing by candi-
dates and campaign teams. There was good coverage on radio and television, with de-
bates on more than one channel between the candidates in the three constituencies 
within which the thirteen seats were allocated. Such debates were inhibited by the num-
ber of candidates with twenty-three standing in the largest constituency, representing 
many small parties as well as independents. Not everyone could feature, but all had 
the opportunity to make recorded statements that were broadcast and available on line.  
For once the main issue was not the economy. Growth is strong, employment con-
tinuing to rise and unemployment below 5 %. The major domestic issues are conti-
nuing crises in housing and health but neither featured much in debates. There was 
no discussion of the next Commission leader. The issues that did get talked about 
included climate change and carbon taxes, Brexit – and its likely impact on the bor-
der with Northern Ireland and the food industry – immigration, moves in the EU to 
harmonise defence (a European Army) and its implications for Irish neutrality, and 
the importance of Ireland’s low corporation tax rate.  These debates undoubtedly in-
troduced the candidates to many voters unfamiliar with them. A strong performance 
in a May 21st debate, and subsequent twitter storm, saw the odds against an unknown 
and inexperienced young Green candidate’s taking a seat fall from 50-1 to 4-1, al-
though she eventually just missed out. 
Candidates are important in all Irish elections. This is in part because of the small 
scale of contests and the preferential electoral system. It is also because the focus on 
individuals rather than parties and ideologies has been encouraged by the nature 
of competition within the political system (Marsh et al., 2007; Courtney and Weeks, 
2018). This may be particularly true in European elections (Marsh, 2019a).  Voters 
typically cite candidate-centred reasons for their choice when asked in the exit poll 
about the factors behind motivations and, without taking this purely at face value, 
the responses are striking. 37% cited the candidates’ stances on issues, 31% their abi-
lity to stand up for ordinary people, 29% their personalities/qualities and just 23% 
the party that candidate represents. 25% cited national and local issues, and 16% 
issues at European level. Just 9% were protesting against the government.  
Some of the more successful candidates were predictably so. In Fine Gael, a vice 
president of the EPP was running in one constituency and a former Justice Minister 
in another; a well-known government spokesman ran from Fianna Fáil; and there 
were several sitting TDs. The exceptions were arguably the Green candidates. Their 
voters were most likely to mention stances on political and social issues and the can-
didate’s party as important in their choice.  
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Gender played a part in voter behaviour. Once again, a majority of MEPs will be 
women in 2019. 42% of candidates were female, well up on Dáil and local elections, 
and women were slightly more likely to vote for a woman than were men. Analysis 
of the exit poll suggested 50% of women chose a woman as opposed to 42% of men 
(see Marsh, 2019a). The gap existed to varying degrees for all parties.  
The implications of the election remain to be seen, but they can be expected 
to be significant. One question was whether results might prompt an early natio-
nal election. The current minority government has persisted for more than three 
years because it has a confidence and supply arrangement with Fianna Fáil, and 
because of Brexit-related uncertainty. This has already been extended once. Both 
parties would like an election, but neither will risk one without some clear evidence 
that they will improve their position. Arguably, the European result would encourage 
Fine Gael into an early election, but the local results, a better guide to individual 
voting behaviour, would caution strongly against that. This position is complica-
ted by the fact that the election of MEPs who are sitting members of the Dáil will 
prompt four by-elections (which must be held by the start of 2020), something that 
could erode the government’s position and which could certainly cause an em-
barrassing distraction.  
The second potential impact arises from the swelling of the Green vote, particularly 
in Dublin. Already, government ministers (and all other party leaders) are making 
friendly noises about Greens and positive noises about tackling climate change, con-
veniently on the back of an all-party committee report. (This was the basis for the 
Dáil declaring a Climate Change Emergency last month).  Meanwhile the Green Par-
ty will be seeking candidates to ﬁght the next general election in the conﬁdent hope 
of pushing its current number of deputies well above the two it has currently and per-
haps above the seven it held in 2007.  
The election will prompt self-analysis in Sinn Féin, the third largest party in the 
Dáil and holder of three seats in 2014, who saw its vote cut by 8 points.  As with the 
small parties to its left, it will blame reduced turnout in key areas. Overall this was 
down only 2%, but 2014 was fought in the middle of a long, well supported protest 
about domestic water chargers which mobilised working class urban areas, and in 
which Sinn Fein was heavily involved. The party has stalled in the polls since 2016 
and its hopes of replacing Fianna Fáil now seem decidedly unrealistic.  
Some uncertainly hangs over the two extra seats that, after Brexit, will go to the 
runners-up in the South and the Dublin constituencies, a Green and a Fianna Fáil 
candidate respectively, with Sinn Féin next placed in both. Under the Irish electoral 
system of single transferable vote the deﬁnition of a runner-up is problematic (Gal-
lagher, 2019). Although the government amended the electoral law to address this 
problem, the issue could still end up in the Supreme Court (O’Malley, 2019).  
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Italy: Complete overturn among government partners –
League doubled, M5S halved 
irene landini and aldo paparo 
Italy was among the countries going to the polls for the European Parliament (EP) 
2019 elections on Sunday, May 26th. The electoral system comprises five constituencies, 
which, however, are not relevant for seat allocation among parties, as this is done 
purely on the basis of votes received nationwide. Furthermore, there is a 4% legal 
threshold.1 In addition to the European Parliament (EP) elections, municipal elec-
tions were held in just under half of the 7,915 Italian municipalities – involving rou-
ghly a third of Italian voters.2 
 
campaign and competitors 
 
A total of eighteen lists competed in the European Parliament (EP) elections. The main 
contenders were identical to the recent general elections, held in March 2018 (Pa-
paro, 2018). Besides the government parties, three other parties were expected to 
meet the 4% threshold – the Democratic Party (PD), Forza Italia, and Brothers of Ita-
ly (FDI). Of all other parties, only More Europe (+EU) was considered to be in cre-
dible contention for EP seats. 
The most salient issues during the electoral campaign were the future of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), management of migrants and asylum seekers, unemployment, 
and redistribution. However, to put the EP election in context, we should also men-
tion that in June 2018, after the non-decisive results of the general elections, M5S 
and League formed a coalition government – the ﬁrst mainstream-free cabinet in all 
of EU history (Chiaramonte et al., 2018). In the months preceding the EP elections, 
numerous conﬂicts emerged. The tensions between the government allies and the 
prospect of survival of the government itself were also very prominent during the 
electoral campaign. 
Focusing on the main parties, the League represents a particularly interesting case. 
Formerly an ethno-regionalist party of the North (Tronconi, 2009), in the past ﬁve 
years – under Salvini’s leadership – it has turned into a nationwide radical right-wing 
1. We must mention that the threshold does not apply to parties representing linguistic mino-
rities, which is the case for the South Tyrolean People's Party (SVP).  
2. Moreover, regional elections were held in one of the twenty Italian regions – Piedmont.
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party (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018). This turn proved successful in the 2018 gene-
ral elections, when the party scored a historic 17.4%, and polls indicated a continuing 
positive trend. The League is now part of the Europe of Nations and Freedon group 
(ENF), and it shows the most critical position towards the EU among the main Ita-
lian parties. During the campaign, it supported stronger sovereignty for nation Sta-
tes and a sort of pre-Maastricht cooperative model between EU member States – cen-
tered on mere economic cooperation. As in 2018, migrant repatriation and stricter 
rules to secure EU external borders were salient issues in Salvini’ s campaign. Fiscally 
speaking, the League proposed overcoming the economic rigidity imposed by the Fi-
scal Compact and reducing taxation by means of a low-rate ﬂat tax. 
The M5S (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, EFDD) also represents a 
peculiar case in comparative terms (Tronconi 2015; 2018). In 2019, it campaigned 
mainly on welfare issues, namely the implementation of an EU minimum wage sy-
stem, stronger welfare provisions for European citizens in need, and a more acces-
sible education system. While the party cannot be deﬁned as completely pro-Euro-
pe, it advocated for giving stronger powers to the EP in order to bring the Union clo-
ser to its citizens. 
The PD (Socialists and Democrats, S&D) approached the EP elections with a ne-
wly appointed leader – Nicola Zingaretti. It is one of the most pro-European parties 
in Italy, and it advocated for a stronger European political and economic leadership 
at the international level. Besides, the party supported increasing public investments 
to foster employment, and welfare measures to help disadvantaged groups – such 
as a European minimum wage. On immigration, the PD stressed solidarity and bur-
den-sharing among EU member states in hosting new arrivals. 
Forza Italia (European People’s Party, EPP), once again with Silvio Berlusconi 
as its main candidate, shared some proposals with the PD – such as the desire for a 
stronger European leadership on the world stage and increased investments to fo-
ster employment. It also agreed with the League on reducing taxes and implemen-
ting the ﬂat tax. 
Tax reduction was proposed by FDI (European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR) 
as well. The party also campaigned on abandoning austerity measures and for re-
focusing Italian economic policies on supporting Made in Italy production. On im-
migration, FDI supported military controls of European external borders and a “Mar-
shall Plan” for African countries. 
Finally, More Europe (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ALDE) is 
the most pro-European party in Italy. In its manifesto, Europe was seen as a ‘bastion’ 
of civil and social rights. The platform also dealt with social issues, especially the pro-
posal of a European system of unemployment subsidy, and the implementation of 
green economy measures. 
 
results 
 
In contrast to what emerged in many EU countries, voter turnout in Italy decreased 
– from 58.7% at the 2014 EP elections to 56.1%. This is in line with the half-a-point-
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per-year decline observed since the mid-70s due to generational replacement. Still, 
this also represents the new historical low for turnout in an Italian nationwide elec-
tion. 
The indisputable winner of the elections was the League. Salvini’s party recei-
ved 34.3% of the votes, nearly doubling the unprecedented result of the 2018 Ita-
lian general elections. Compared to the previous EP elections, the League has gai-
ned 28 percentage points and twenty-three EP seats (Table 1).3 
In contrast, its government ally M5S has been downgraded from being the lar-
gest party in Italy (in the 2018 general elections) to third place, almost halving its 
result– from 32.7% to 17.1%. Moreover, the party also lost compared to the 2014 
EP elections, by 4 percentage points and three seats. 
The M5S’s decline is paired with the “comeback” of the PD (CISE, 2019). Whi-
le in the 2018 general elections the PD suffered a historic defeat (18.8%), it has now 
grown back to 22.3%, thus becoming the second-largest party in Italy. Yet, it did not 
increase its vote total in absolute terms. Moreover, compared to the historic success 
obtained in the 2014 EP elections (Maggini, 2014), the PD has lost over 18 percentage 
points and twelve seats. 
Forza Italia continues its electoral decline. Berlusconi’s party is basically halved 
in comparison with the 2014 EP elections (from 16.8% to 8.8%), and it lost seven 
seats. Already in 2018, FI was no longer the largest party within the center-right ﬁeld, 
but at 14% it was close to the League (17.4%), which in turn now has virtually qua-
drupled its votes. 
Conversely, a surprising result was achieved by FDI, managing to grow in spite 
of the rise of the League. FDI gained 2.8 percentage points compared to the previous 
EP elections, moving from 3.7% to 6.5% – therefore surpassing the electoral thre-
shold and obtaining ﬁve EP seats. This result also represents an increase compared 
to the 2018 general elections, where it reached 4.4%. 
The remaining ﬁfteen parties running in the elections did not overcome the elec-
toral threshold. Among those, three deserve some attention. Although slightly gai-
ning compared to 2018, More Europe merely succeeded in being the largest party 
to miss the threshold, with 3.1%. Green Europe can claim a marginal victory as well, 
having received 2.3% of the votes, more than twice its 2014 result. By contrast, The 
Left (an electoral coalition of left-wing parties) got 1.7%, a disappointing result com-
pared to the result of a similar cartel in 2014 (4% and three MEPs). 
 
discussion 
 
Overall, the results of the 2019 EP elections confirm the turmoil that characterizes 
the Italian party system. Compared to 2014, electoral volatility is at 37.3, marking 
italy
3. The additional seats will become twenty-four when Brexit will be effective. Italy is assigned 
three of the twenty-seven  Brexit seats. A total of seventy-six seats has been allocated accor-
ding to the electoral results, but only seventy-three will be effective until Brexit has been fi-
nalized. The League, FI, and FDI are the winners of the three Italian Brexit seats.
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Table 1 – Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Italy
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
League (Lega) ENF  9,153,638 34.3
Democratic Party (PD) S&D  6,050,351 22.7
5 Star Movement (M5S) EFD  4,552,527 17.1
Forza Italia (FI) EPP  2,344,465 8.8
Brothers of Italy (FDI) ECR  1,723,232 6.5
More Europe (+EU) ALDE  822,764 3.1
Green Europe (EV) G-EFA  609,678 2.3
The Left (SIN) GUE-NGL  465,092 1.7
South Tyrolean People's Party (SVP) EPP  141,353 0.5
Others  799,862 3.0
Total  26,662,962 100
Turnout (%) 56.1
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 4
177italy
seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
28 29 +28.2 +23 +24
19 19 -18.1 -12 -12
14 14 -4.1 -3 -3
6 7 -8.0 -7 -6
5 6 +2.8 +5 +6
+2.4
+1.4
-2.3 -3 -3
1 1 +0.0
-2.3 -3 -3
73 76 +3
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the second extremely volatile EP elections in a row (Emanuele et al., 2019). As de-
scribed above, electoral change is also remarkable in comparison with the 2018 ge-
neral elections.  
The most impressive outcome is the complete reversal of fortunes, in electoral 
terms, between the two government partners. The change in the electoral geogra-
phy is also particularly noteworthy. While maintaining its strongholds in the North 
(where it is above 40%), the League now receives above 20% in all Southern regions 
(De Sio, 2019a). These results represent the ultimate success of Salvini’s strategy to 
transform the Northern League into his League, namely a nationwide radical right-
wing party In 2018 the North was. represented by the League; and the South, re-
presented by the M5S. Now, Salvini’ s party has become the center of gravity at both 
governmental and territorial level. The challenge will now be to actually reconciliate 
and satisfy the demands and needs of both the North and the South. 
Paradoxically, the League is now more nationalized than its governmental ally. 
In fact, the M5S lost more (roughly 50%) in the Northern regions, where it was al-
ready weaker in 2018. Minor losses are registered in the South, where the party had 
about 45% in 2018 and lost approximately a third of its support. In 2013 M5S was 
the most geographically uniform party in Italian history (Emanuele, 2015), with al-
most the same results throughout the different regions of Italy. The party now sco-
res just 10% in the North and its supporters are mainly conﬁned to the least eco-
nomically productive areas of the country (Emanuele and Maggini, 2019). Histori-
cally, all Italian parties undergoing a similar process, experiencing a strong decline 
in the long run. 
Finally, the PD has clearly improved its position within the Italian party system, 
although it is still weaker in the South – slightly below 20%. As the second-largest 
party in the country, it now represents the most viable option for those who do not 
want Salvini in office. Therefore, it may attempt to form a coalition with other par-
ties in the center-left ﬁeld – such as Green Europe and More Europe. Nevertheless, 
in light of the EP election results, something else appears to be required in order for 
Salvini not to win the next general elections – either a coalition with the M5S, or the 
ability to attract large numbers of M5S voters (De Sio 2019b). 
 
conclusion 
 
The consequences of the 2019 EP elections will be relevant for the whole Italian par-
ty system. In brief, Salvini achieved a “triple victory” (CISE, 2019). First, in mere nu-
merical terms, the League represents the center of gravity of the current governmental 
coalition. Secondly, from a geographical perspective, it now has quite homogenous 
electoral support across the whole country. Finally, from a strategic point of view, 
Salvini now has multiple alternative options. He may consider bringing down the 
current government to pursue an alternative government coalition – after new ge-
neral elections. He can either pursue the classic center-right alliance with FI and FDI, 
or a smaller coalition with FDI only. The latter could win a majority of parliamen-
tary seats as well, provided that the EP elections results were replicated. Hence, the 
179
leader of the League is now the arbiter of Italian politics. His strategic choices in the 
next few months, and how the other parties react, will determine not just his own 
fate, but the futhre development of the Italian party system as a whole.  
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Latvia: EUropean expertise matters 
jaˉnis ikstens
Latvia was one of the few EU countries that went to the polls on Saturday 25 May, 
although advance voting was also available for three days. According to the Central 
Elections Commission (CEC), there were 1,411,955 Latvians eligible to vote – a de-
crease of 4% compared with 2014. A party list system is used to choose eight MEPs, 
and voters can express either a positive or a negative preference for each candida-
te on a list that they vote for. As in all countries, there is a threshold of 5 per cent in 
order to access the European Parliament, although the effective threshold (due to 
the small number of seats) tends to be higher. Whilst national elections in Latvia di-
vide the country into five electoral districts, for the European elections the whole 
country constitutes single electoral district.  
 
the campaign 
 
Both registered political parties and their alliances having no fewer than five-hun-
dreds members are allowed to field candidate lists in European elections in Latvia. 
The CEC registered sixteen candidate lists representing both coalition and opposi-
tion parties in the national parliament. along with parties that did not clear the elec-
toral threshold in the 2018 Saeima elections, and organisations that did not parti-
cipate in those elections.  
Electoral performance of new parties only recently elected to the Latvian national 
parliament were a matter of some interest during the campaign. Both the New Con-
servative Party and the KPV LV party (Kam pieder valsts?, which means: Who owns 
the State?) mobilised their supporters by heavily criticising the government, and by 
accusing the political establishment of corruption and of mismanaging public ad-
ministration. As a result of a complicated coalition building process, both parties be-
came part of the ruling coalition headed by Prime Minister Krišja¯nis Karin,š of New 
Unity (center-right). That, however, coincided with an ebbing of popular support for 
the KPV LV party, which prompted some pundits to conclude that its accession to the 
governing coalition had not been politically beneﬁcial for this populist party. Moreover, 
the KPV LV faced intensive political inﬁghting among its political leaders that arguably 
contributed the decline of the party’s support. The New Conservatives, however, sto-
od united and suffered almost no loss of public support. 
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Nevertheless, it was the Social Democratic Party Harmony, a main advocate of 
political interests of Slavic minorities, that experienced the most turbulent campaign. 
The party was largely caught by surprise in February when MP Vjac˘eslavs Dombrovskis 
was removed as the party’s top candidate to be replaced by Nils Ušakovs, a long-ser-
ving Mayor of Riga, and Andris Ameriks, former Deputy Mayor of Riga and a close 
ally of Ušakovs, against the backdrop of corruption charges brought against a num-
ber of managers of the largest municipal transportation company. The meaning of 
this sudden overhaul became more apparent in May when the Anti-corruption Bu-
reau searched premises of the Riga Tourism Development Office (RTDO) a few we-
eks before the elections, and the media reported ﬁnancial transactions implicating 
the use of RTDO funds to ﬁnance the 2018 national election campaign of Harmo-
ny. After this news emerged, Ušakovs disappeared from public view, exemplifying 
Harmony’s inclination to avoid public discussions throughout this campaign.  
Manifestos of major contestants seemingly paid more attention to European is-
sues (as compared to earlier campaigns) and to increasing the percentage of gross 
national income to be redistributed via the EU budget. While more funding for hi-
gher education and research in the next multiannual ﬁnancial framework was broa-
dly supported, centrist parties such as Development/For! and the Progressives were 
keen to redistribute the support provided by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
This was opposed by several right-of-the-centre parties, most notably the Union of 
Greens and Farmers who, on the other hand, emphasised fostering bioeconomics, 
reducing waste and transitioning away from fossil fuels. Centrists took the lead in 
offering EU-related solutions to social problems in Latvia – creating a pan-Europe-
an pension fund, setting a uniform minimum wage formula, or even introducing a 
uniform tax system across the EU.  To this end, they were joined by the pro-Slavic 
Harmony party that inter alia pledged to ﬁght nationalism and xenophobia and cal-
led for municipalities’ direct access to EU funding. This take on devolution was fur-
ther elaborated by the Russian Union of Latvia calling for a federal Europe and ex-
tensive cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities in the EU. 
The New Conservative Party and the National Alliance, in turn, wanted to in-
creasingly allocate EU funding for vocational education and life-long learning to meet 
the demands of labour market. The two parties saw the EU as yet another mecha-
nism to provide security from Russia by means of battling misinformation, impro-
ving cyber security and supporting select EU Eastern neighbourhood countries. The-
se two parties spoke about the EU as a union of nation states, while the ideologically 
proximal New Unity argued in favour of a strong and united EU that discourages any 
transfer of ownership of strategic European companies to ‘unfriendly third countries’. 
The populist KPV LV party offered a catch-all platform emphasising both social se-
curity, economic development, CAP and transparency of EU governance, as well as 
an inclusive society that supports the culture of smaller nations.  
According to data provided by the parties, overall ﬁnancial investment in the elec-
troal campaign was lower than in the 2018 national elections. Harmony and Deve-
lopment/For! were the top spenders, followed by New Unity and the Russian Union 
of Latvia. Moreover, media strategies of parties differed. While Harmony invested 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Latvia
party ep group votes (n) votes (%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
New Unity (JV) EPP  124,193 26.4 2 -19.8 -2
Social Democratic Party 
‘Harmony’ S&D  82,604 17.6 2 +4.4 +1
National Alliance ‘All for 
Latvia’-’For Fatherland 
and Freedom/LNNK’ 
(NA)
ECR  77,591 16.5 2 +2.2 +1
For Development/For! 
(A/P) NI  58,763 12.5 1 +1
Russian Union of Latvia 
(LKS) EPP  29,546 6.3 1 +0.1
Union of Greens and 
Farmers (ZZS) ALDE  25,252 5.4 -2.9 -1
Regional Alliance  
of Latvia (LRA) NI  23,581 5.0 +2.5
New Conservative Party 
(JKP) NI  20,595 4.4
Progressives (P) NI  13,705 2.9
Political Party KPV LV 
(KPV) NI  4,362 0.9
Latvian Nationalists 
(LN) NI  3,172 0.7
Centre Party (CP) NI  2,312 0.5
Awakening (A) NI  2,242 0.5
Social Democratic Wor-
kers’ Party of Latvia 
(LSDSP)
NI  922 0.2 -0,1
New Harmony (JS) NI  829 0.2
Party of Action (RP) NI  791 0.2
Total  470,460 100 8
Turnout (%) 33.5
Legal threshold for 
obtaining MEPs (%) 5
Source: https://epv2019.cvk.lv/pub/velesanu-rezultati 
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heavily in TV advertising, Development/For!, Regional Alliance of Latvia and the New 
Conservative Party prioritised radio advertisements. The Progressives and the New 
Unity were geared towards outdoor billboards but KPV LV relied on social media that 
had worked to its favour in 2018. 
Election administration was plagued with problems after Arnis Cimdars, a long-
standing Chair of CEC, was removed from office in March. The media reported that 
up to 700,000 eligible citizens may have not received an official letter indicating the 
polling station at which they are to vote. Although measures were taken to ﬁx the 
problem, not all elegible voters received the correct information. The government 
announced that people could go to any polling station on the three days of advan-
ce voting. However, this option was closed for parts of the second and third day of 
advance voting due to a technical problem. Because of these setbacks , the Mayor 
of Daugavpils, Andrejs Elksnin‚ š,’ argued that  these elections were illegitimate.  
 
results  
 
Voter turnout rose by a little more than three percentage points in comparison to the 
previous EP elections, reaching 33.5%. This increase follows a trend observed in many 
EU countries. Although the technical problems abovementioned were occasional-
ly blamed for keeping voter activity low this year, one could argue that media coverage 
of this issue increased awareness of the elections and that the option to vote at any 
polling station for a few days actually increased turnout. 
New Unity received more than a quarter of all votes cast. However, this repre-
sented a sharp decline compared with 2014, when this party garnered support from 
nearly a half of voters. In contrast, the Harmony party improved its performance by 
four percentage points and one MEP seat, as compared with 2014. The National Al-
liance also gained one more MEP seat. The Russian Union of Latvia reaped the fruits 
of a notable investment in the election campaign as it managed to retain one MEP 
seat in a ﬁerce competition with Harmony. Finally, the Union of Greens and Farmers 
continued to lose public support and failed to obtain representation in the Europe-
an Parliament.  
 
conclusion  
 
The 2019 EP elections in Latvia suggested the importance of the candidates’ ex-
perience of European affairs. New Unity beneﬁtted from the presence on the party’s 
candidate list of Valdis Dombrovskis, the Vice-President of the European Commis-
sion, and several seasoned MEPs. Roberts Zı-le, a long-serving MEP representing the 
National Alliance (NA), likely mobilised voter segments that would otherwise not 
support NA. Tatjana Ždanoka of the Russian Union of Latvia, another experienced 
MEP, helped her party secure representation in the EP. 
In line with the theory of second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), se-
veral smaller parties performed well (New Unity, Russian Union of Latvia). Howe-
ver, opposition parties showed mixed results – while Harmony increased its vote sha-
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re, the Union of Greens and Farmers lost their EP representation. Similarly, new par-
ties had divergent fortunes. While Development/For! obtained one EP seat, New Con-
servatives and KPV LV did not clear the electoral threshold. For the populist KPV LV 
this crushing defeat followed excellent results in the national elections eight 
months earlier. This could be a consequence of serious conﬂicts within the party’s 
leadership, accompanying gradual disillusionment of KPV voters, that will likely re-
sult in a disintegration of this party before the 2021 municipal elections. 
Slavic parties (Harmony and the Russian Union of Latvia) mobilised their sup-
porters in greater numbers and increased their combined representation in the EP. 
Some political rivals have hastily claimed this resulted from a low turnout. Based on 
official returns, this appears to be a candidate visibility (Ušakovs) effect. Moreover, 
sending Ušakovs to the EP will likely affect not only his public visibility and support, 
but it may also trigger both more profound changes within the Harmony party and 
competition for the position of Mayor of Riga.  
While EP election results are rarely taken as an indication of party support at the 
national level in Latvia, some politicians have voiced a proposal to choose the next 
EU commissioner on the basis of party performance in the elections. This approach 
is not favoured by several participants of the current coalition, and therefore the next 
commissioner will likely be a result of a broader political compromise involving other 
important decisions. 
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Lithuania: Defeat of Eurosceptic parties  
in the shadow of a presidential campaign1 
mažvydas jastramskis
The 2019 European Parliament (EP) election in Lithuania was overshadowed by a 
simultaneous direct presidential election. Three main contenders were close in the 
polls during the preceding months. The second round between the two frontrunners, 
Ingrida Šimonyte˙ and Gitanas Nause˙da, was held two weeks after the first one, si-
multaneously with the EP vote. The overlap of two elections raised the otherwise (po-
tentially) low turnout in the EP election (53.1% of Lithuanians voted), but it also me-
ant that less attention was given to the EP campaign by the main political parties.  
 
context and campaign 
 
European Parliament elections in Lithuania conform quite closely to the second-or-
der theory by Reif and Schmitt (1980): voters choose on the basis of national-level 
questions and sympathies, instead of voting according to specific EU-related topics. 
When held without a concurrent national election in2014, the European election re-
ceived very little attention (in 2009, the turnout was 21%). The competition is ske-
wed in favour of the pro-European political powers, as Lithuania is one of the most 
EU-trusting countries in the union: in the Eurobarometer of Autumn 2018, 65% of 
Lithuanians tended to trust EU with only 21% tending not to trust it (European Com-
mission, 2018). 
Except for the debates carried by the public broadcaster LRT (in the two weeks 
before the election), as well as a number of posters and social media advertising, the 
electoral campaign was barely visible.  The two largest parliamentary parties tried 
to enhance their electoral prospects by giving high positions in their lists to popu-
lar ﬁgures that have no experience in politics whatsoever. The right-wing, opposi-
tion Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) gave their number-
one position to the academic Liudas Mažylis, who became famous two years ago for 
discovering the document of the 1918 Lithuanian declaration of independence. The 
largest government party, Lithuanian Farmers and Greens (LVŽS), gave the second 
spot in their list to former basketball player Šaru¯nas Marc˘iulionis. 
1. Author is grateful for the support of the Lithuanian Research Council (Grant no. S-LIP-19-67).
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In contrast with 2014, the election lacked a salient European issue for the par-
ties to campaign “for” or “against” (which, in the previous EP election, had been the 
introduction of euro), as immigration is very low in Lithuania. However, there still 
are differences on the European dimension, according to the Lithuanian voting ad-
vice application “Mano balsas” (2019). Among the parliamentary parties, the Order 
and Justice (PTT) is moderately sceptical of European integration and authority. Si-
milar views are held by the party of the Polish ethnic minority, Electoral Action of 
Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance (LLRA-KŠS). The main governing par-
ty (winner of the 2016 parliamentary election), LVŽS, along with their coalitional 
partner, Lithuanian Social Democratic Labour Party (LSDDP, founded in 2018 in a 
split from LSDP) are in the centre of the pro-/anti- European axis. The remaining 
parties of traditional centre right and left are moderately pro-European in the mat-
ters of EU integration and authority: TS-LKD, Liberal Movement of the Republic of 
Lithuania (LRLS) and Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP). 
The number of electoral lists increased from ten to sixteen due to the decision 
to allow public electoral committees to compete. The main difference between a com-
mittee and a political party is that the latter needs a minimum membership of 2000, 
and is eligible for state ﬁnancing. Committees have been taking part in local Lithuanian 
elections since 2011. Five national public committees participated in this EP elec-
tion, alongside eleven political parties. 
 
results 
 
With no active campaign, the election resembled a referendum on the LVŽS - LSDDP 
government. LVŽS obtained two members of the European parliament (MEPs) – one 
more than in 2014. However, they came in third place in terms of votes: obviously 
a disappointing result for the largest parliamentary party. This was foreshadowed 
by the first round of presidential elections where Prime Minister Saulius Skverne-
lis also finished third, not entering the second round. This EP election proved again 
that, quite similarly to the other post-communist countries (Roberts, 2008), the Li-
thuanian electorate is prone to hyperaccountability. It is worth mentioning that all 
the previous Lithuanian governments lost the EP elections, with an exception of 2009 
where the turnout was so low that TS-LKD capitalised on the loyalty of their voters 
(Ramonaite˙ et al. 2014). Currently, LVŽS MEP Bronis Rope˙ belongs to the Greens–
European Free Alliance. 
The LSDDP experienced a ﬁasco, receiving only 2.2% of votes (5% are needed 
for a seat) and losing the battle for left-leaning voters to LSDP. These elections wit-
nessed a recovery of the LSDP that used to be the main party of the centre-left but 
came third in the 2016 parliamentary elections, suffered a split and stagnated sin-
ce then. The party ﬁnished second with 15.1% of votes and gained two MEPs (the 
same result as in 2014). Their performance was probably enhanced by the leader 
of list – Vilija Blinkevicˇiu¯te˙, one of the most active MEPs from Lithuania. LSDP be-
longs to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Lithuania
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Homeland Union –  
Lithuanian Christian  
Democrats (TS-LKD)
EPP  245,918 18.6 3 +2.1 +1
Lithuanian Social  
Democratic Party 
(LSDP)
S&D  199,220 15.1 2 -1.2
Lithuanian Farmers 
and Greens Union 
(LVŽS)
G-EFA  157,603 11.9 2 +5.7 +1
Labour Party (DP) ALDE  112,985 8.5 1 -3.6
Liberal Movement of 
the Republic  
of Lithuania (LRLS)
ALDE  81,916 6.2 1 -9.4 -1
Public Electoral Com-
mittee “Train of Aušra 
Maldeikiene˙” (AMT)
EPP  
(provisional)  80,683 6.1 1 +6.1 +1
“Bloc of Valdemar  
Tomaševski” –  
Coalition of Electoral 
Action of Poles in  
Lithuania – Christian 
Families Alliance and 
Russian Alliance 
(LLRA-KŠS)
ECR  69,262 5.2 1 -2.4
Lithuanian Centre  
Party (LCP)  64,091 4.8 +4.8
Public Electoral  
Committee “Movement 
of President Rolandas 
Paksas” (PRPJ)
 50,129 3.8 +3.8
Public Electoral  
Committee “Vytautas 
Radžvilas: Let’s Get 
Back the State!” 
(VRSV)
 41,859 3.2 +3.2
Party “Order and  
Justice” (PTT) EFD  34,298 2.6 -10.9 -2
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(continued) Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Lithuania
party ep group votes (n) votes (%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Lithuanian Social  
Democratic Labour  
Party (LSDDP)
 29,591 2.2 +2.2
Lithuanian Greens  
Party (LŽP)  28,126 2.1 -1.3
Lithuanian Freedom 
Union (liberals) (LLS)  23,828 1.8 +0.4
Public Electoral Com-
mittee “Strong Lithua-
nia in United Europe” 
(SLVE)
 16,671 1.3 +1.3
Public Electoral Com-
mittee “Decisive Leap” 
(LŠ)
 14,195 1.1 +1.1
Spoilt votes  71,661 5.4
Total 1,322,036 100 11
Turnout (%) 53.1
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%)
5 per 
cent 
from all 
votes
Quite similarly to 2014, this election was won by the largest parliamentary op-
positional party, right wing TS-LKD (which belongs to the European People’s Party 
in EP). It received 18.6% of votes and three MEPs. Voting for TS-LKD was probably 
reinforced by a second-placed presidential candidate Ingrida Šimonyte˙ – a non-par-
tisan who is affiliated with the party (she won the primaries of TS-LKD and also be-
longs to the party’s parliamentary grouping).  
Eurosceptic parties suffered a defeat. In 2014, the populist right PTT gained two 
MEPS, the same as the other three pro-European election winners. In this election 
PTT received only 2.6% of votes, 10.9 percentage points down. Several factors pos-
sibly contributed to this. Firstly, the campaign lacked a salient European issue to cam-
paign against (in 2014, the PTT campaigned against the introduction of the euro). 
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Secondly, it suffered from a split: former leader Rolandas Paksas founded his own 
committee and participated separately in the election. Thirdly, some of their votes 
could have gone to another Eurosceptic list, the committee “Vytautas Radžvilas: Le-
t's Get Back the State!”. Together these three lists received 9.6% of votes, but sepa-
rately none of them climbed over the ﬁve per cent threshold needed for at least one 
MEP. The only moderately Eurosceptic power that received a MEP (5.2% of votes) 
was the Bloc of Valdemar Tomaševski, the Coalition of Electoral Action of Poles in 
Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance and Russian Alliance (LLRA-KŠS). The lea-
der of the coalition, Tomaševski, is expected to join the European Conservatives and 
Reformists, as previously. 
One new political force entered the EP from Lithuania: the electoral committee 
Train of Aušra Maldeikiene˙, led by charismatic and explicitly pro-European politi-
cian Maldeikiene˙, which  received 6.1% of votes and gained one MEP. The remai-
ning two seats went to the centre-populist Labour Party (8.5% of votes) and the li-
berals LRLS (6.2% of votes). Maldeikiene˙ announced that she will join European Peo-
ple’s Party, please correct the text accordingly. 
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Luxembourg:  
The permanent downfall of Luxembourg’s dominant party? 
patrick dumont, raphaël kies and dan schmit 
the context 
 
The 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections were held only a few months after the 
October 2018 parliamentary elections. Surveys for the latter elections had predic-
ted that the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) would win votes and return to go-
vernment after being an opposition party during 2013-2018, the second time sin-
ce World War II. In the end, the CSV lost 5.2 percentage points, of the national vote, 
compared to 2013, and two of its parliamentary seats. The government coalition of 
the liberal DP, the social democratic LSAP and the Greens kept a majority of seats 
(thirty-one out of sixty) and stayed in power.  
In the previous European elections in 2014, the parties of the newly formed go-
verning coalition had lost votes, while the CSV obtained its best result in any Euro-
pean election. Two main reasons were identiﬁed to explain these results. First, a sub-
stantial proportion of the electorate considered that the coalition parties had by-pas-
sed the largest party CSV when forming a government, which was considered un-
fair. This was due to the fact that, unlike all EP elections since 1979, the 2014 ones 
did not coincide with the national elections in Luxembourg: a governmental crisis 
in October 2013 had led to the ﬁrst early elections in Luxembourg since the 1960s 
and the DP, LSAP and Greens had the numbers to unseat the usual and incumbent 
senior government party. Possibly unconvinced by the ﬁrst months of this unusual 
coalition, a number of voters had chosen to punish the coalition parties in the 2014 
EP election. Secondly, Jean-Claude Juncker – while not being on the ballot for the 
2014 EP elections himself – was one of the candidates for the post of the European 
Commission president, which is assumed to have helped his party, the CSV (Dumont 
and Kies, 2014).  
For the 2019 European elections, the context was different. The DP, LSAP and 
Greens coalition had been conﬁrmed after ﬁve years in power while the CSV had suf-
fered substantial losses at the preceeding national elections. Furthermore, Jean-Clau-
de Juncker decided that he would not be a candidate for a second term as Commission 
president and the three MEPs elected in 2014 did not stand for re-election. The only 
incumbent of the CSV was Christophe Hansen, who had only taken over Viviane Re-
ding’s seat after her election to Luxembourg’s parliament in the October 2018 na-
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tional election. For these reasons, it was generally expected that the CSV would lose 
votes compared to its 2014 high.  
There was, however, great uncertainty about the election outcome due to the ab-
sence of survey data or other reliable predictors.  
 
campaign strategies 
 
A total of ten parties competed for the six Luxembourgian seats in the European par-
liament. Although most parties knew that they would not have a chance of winning 
one of these few seats, campaigning for the European elections was anyway critical 
for them, as public party finance is determined by a party’s performance at the par-
liamentary and European elections.1 For those parties that did not have a realistic 
chance of passing the threshold to receive any party finance, the main aim was vi-
sibility. The ten parties included the seven parties represented in Luxembourg’s par-
liament since 2018: the Christian Democratic CSV, the liberal DP, the social demo-
cratic LSAP, the Greens, the sovereigntist ADR, the Left Party, and the Pirate Party, 
which had won their first parliamentary seats at those elections. The Conservatives 
and the Communist Party, which both stood for the 2018 elections, also presented 
candidate lists. In addition, the “pan-European” party VOLT presented a list for the 
EP elections in Luxembourg.  
Except for the ADR, the Left Party, the Communist Party and the Conservatives, 
all parties expressed a clear pro-European message. As the largest Eurosceptic par-
ty, the ADR campaigned for a European Union with strong nation states rather than 
a centralisation of competencies in European institutions.  
A lot of attention has been paid to the selection of candidates. Except for the Pi-
rate Party and the Conservatives, all parties nominated three men and three women 
as candidates. This increase in female candidates was a consequence of party ﬁnance 
legislation that requires electoral lists to be fully gender balanced for the European 
elections if a party is to receive its full funding.2 
Only three incumbent MEPs (Charles Goerens (DP), Christophe Hansen (CSV) 
and Tilly Metz (The Greens)) stood for re-election, while Georges Bach and Mady 
Delvaux-Stehres decided to retire from public office, and Frank Engel decided to fo-
cus on his new role of national president of the CSV.  
1. Basic requirements for party funding is the presentation of full lists in all four constituencies 
for the national election and in the country-wide single constituency for the European elec-
tion and reaching at least 2 percent of the vote in each of those elections. Once this threshold 
is met, a lump sum is awarded but parties can also receive a fixed amount for each additio-
nal percentage point of votes received in national and European elections. 
2. Parties only receive the full additional funding linked to their electoral performance (above 
the minimum of 2 percent) if they their electoral lists contain at least 40% of candidates of 
each gender for the national election and a 50%-50% balance for the EP election (for instance 
they would only receive 25% of that funding if they presented only six male – or female – can-
didates for the European elections), see the Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 
Mémorial A, 264, 2016,  http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2016/12/15/n2/jo.
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Another characteristic of these elections was the decision of the four largest par-
ties to nominate two rather than one Spitzenkandidaten for their lists. For the CSV 
these were incumbent MEP Christophe Hansen and Isabel Wiseler-Santos Lima, wife 
of the party’s leader in the recent national campaign. The liberal DP nominated MEP 
Charles Goerens and Monica Semedo, who was primarily known for her earlier ca-
reer as a television anchor in Luxembourg. The lead candidates for the LSAP were 
former minister Nicolas Schmit (who had been designated as future Luxembourgian 
commissioner during the 2018 coalition negotiations), and the 24-year old Lisa Kersch. 
Finally, the Greens nominated the incumbent MEP Tilly Metz (who had only taken 
over the Green EP seat one year earlier, when her predecessor and vice-chairman of 
the Greens/European Free Alliance in the EP, Claude Turmes, joined Luxembourg’s 
cabinet after the death of a junior minister), along with her parliamentary assistant 
Meris Sehovic.  
Overall, the campaign focussed a lot on candidates, which is arguably due to Lu-
xembourg’s electoral system, which puts a lot of importance on preferential votes. 
A particularity of the voting system is the possibility of spreading one’s votes across 
candidates from different parties, a practice usually referred to as panachage (Du-
mont et al, 2008; Farrell, 2011).  
Except for the parties’ global message, which was predominantly pro-European 
among the largest parties, there was no particular topic dominating the campaign. Ge-
nerally, despite being only the second time an EP election was not held simultaneou-
sly with the national one, the electoral campaign was perceived as almost non-existent. 
A question debated in the campaign was whether the principle of unanimity in 
the council of ministers should be abolished in favour of qualiﬁed majority voting 
in the area of ﬁscal policy. The liberal DP and the sovereigntist ADR insisted on main-
taining unanimity because of the importance of the ﬁnancial sector in Luxembourg.  
Data on the usage of the Luxembourgian voting advice application (VAA - smar-
twielen.lu) has shown that the interest in the European election campaign was ex-
tremely low until a few days before the election, when a larger proportion of the elec-
torate (voting is compulsory in Luxembourg) started seeking information by using 
the website.  
The main incident during the EP elections campaign was triggered by an arti-
cle on the Pirate Party on the news website reporter.lu. The article discussed the chan-
ges  that occurred in the party since its creation, and how the current MP Marc Go-
ergen and the leading EP candidate Daniel Frères were taking over the party and tran-
sforming it into a populist party. Goergen reacted to the reporting by labelling it as 
“fake news”. His reaction backﬁred, as it was seen as backing up the arguments made 
in the reporter.lu article.  
 
results 
 
After getting its best result ever in the 2014 European elections, this time the CSV 
scored by far its worst result, as it lost 16.6 percentage points. With 21.1% of the vo-
tes – the party had never received less than 30% since 1979, the first direct elections 
luxembourg
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Luxembourg
party ep group votes (n) votes (%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Democratic Party 
(DP) ALDE 268,910 21.4 2 +6.7 +1
Christian-Social  
People’s Party EPP 264,665 21.1 2 -16.6 -1
The Greens  (DG) G-EFA 237,215 18.9 1 +3.9
Luxembourgian  
Socialist Workers’  
Party (LSAP)
S&D 152,900 12.2 1 +0.4
Alternative  
Democratic Reform 
Party (ADR)
ECR 125,988 10.0 +2.5
Pirate Party (PPL) 96,579 7.7 +3.5
The Left (DL) GUE-NGL 60,648 4.8 -0.9
VOLT (VOLT) 26,483 2.1 +2.1
Communist Party  
Luxembourg (KPL) 14,323 1.1 -0.4
The Conservatives 
(DK) 6,652 0.5 +0.5
Total 1,254,363 100 6
Turnout (%) 84.1
Legal threshold for 
obtaining MEPs (%) none
In Luxembourg each voter has as many votes as their seats, i.e. a voter has 6 votes for EP elections. 
240044 voters have submitted a ballot paper of which 217806 were valid. This means that on average 
voters used 5.7 votes.
197
of the EP – it also lost the third seat that it had regained in 2004, after two disap-
pointing results in the 1990s.  
The main winner from this dramatic shift was the Democratic Party with an in-
crease of 6.7 percentage points. With 21.4% of the vote it obtained a second seat (it 
had only ever received two seats in the ﬁrst directly elected EP 1979-1984) and be-
came the strongest party in these elections. This is primarily the result of a high num-
ber of preferential votes cast for the candidates of the party and its lead candidate 
Charles Goerens in particular.  
The other two coalition parties also increased their vote shares. Without Clau-
de Turmes (who had joined Luxembourg’s cabinet in 2018 after being the face of the 
Luxembourgian Greens on the European stage for years), the party obtained 
18.9% of the votes, thus improving its result by almost 4 percentage points compa-
red to 2014, and reaching its best score ever at European (or national) elections. The 
Social democrat LSAP got 12.2% of the votes, showing a slightl recovery with respect 
to its historically lowest score at European elections in 2014.  
Two other major winners were the Pirate party (which almost doubled its 2014 
result, obtaining 7.7% of the votes), and the sovereigntist ADR (which received 10% 
of the votes). However, despite their good results, none of these parties were even 
close to receiving a seat.  
The Left was supported by 4.8% of the electorate (down 1 percentage point com-
pared to 2014).  
The transnational movement VOLT received 2.1% of the votes at its ﬁrst parti-
cipation in elections in Luxembourg, while the Communist Party and the Conservatives 
received less than 2% of the votes.  
Based on the party votes shares and the preferential votes each candidate received, 
the following six candidates were elected: Charles Goerens, Monica Semedo (both 
DP), Christophe Hansen, Isabel Wiseler-Santos Lima (both CSV), Tilly Metz (The Gre-
ens) and Nicolas Schmit (LSAP).  
 
conclusion  
 
Dramatic increases or losses of vote share are rare in Luxembourg. In that sense the 
16 percentage point loss of the CSV is already a significant occurrence in Luxem-
bourgish politics. While it only means the loss of one European parliament seat, the 
long-term impact of that electoral result can potentially be serious for the party. In 
fact, it is the first time in post-war history that the CSV is not the strongest party in 
an election contested on the national level.  
The CSV has always been considered a pillar of Luxembourg’s party system, gua-
ranteed to be the strongest party as well as to have a place in government. Having 
been beaten in this election and now being in opposition for the second period in a 
row, means the CSV has lost this special status.  
These elections conﬁrm the trend of increasing fragmentation of the party sy-
stem in Luxembourg and they may mark the point from which the CSV has deﬁni-
tely ceased to be Luxembourg’s dominant party.   
luxembourg
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Malta: Unstoppable Labour? 
roderick pace and marcello carammia
introduction 
 
Contrary to the general European trend, the Maltese Labour Party [Partit Laburista 
(PL), S&D] won the European election held on May 25th by a comfortable majori-
ty, and took four of the six European parliament seats allotted to Malta. It had also 
won a majority of votes in 2014, although only three seats (Carammia and Pace, 2015). 
While the opposition Nationalist Party [Partit Nazzjonalista (PN), EPP] failed to halt 
its electoral decline, the roots of which go back to 2004, it won the other two seats.  
As in the previous three European elections, the Europhile parties won more than 
96% of the valid votes cast.1 This is consistent with the public opinion surveys conducted 
by Eurobarometer, which show that the majority of Maltese are supportive of the EU.2 
The election result does not contradict the public opinion polls published by the 
leading national newspapers prior to the election, which predicted a PL victory bet-
ween 55-57%.3 
 
1. Partit Laburista (PL), Partit Nazzjonalista (PN), Partit Demokratiku (PD), Alternattiva De-
mokratika (greens, AD). Some of the independents particularly Mr Arnold Cassola, former 
AD leader, are also pro-EU. 
2. According to the Standard Eurobarometer, no 90 of Autumn 2018, to the question of what 
image does the EU conjure, 43% of Maltese were totally positive (EU-28 average 43%), 10% 
were totally negative (EU-28 average = 20%), 43% were neutral (EU-28 average = 36%) and 
4% answered “do not know” (EU-28 average = 1%). http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffi-
ce/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/survey-
Ky/2215 (viewed 28.05.2019) 
3. Times of Malta, 19 May 2019. online portal at https://www.timesofmalta. 
com/articles/view/20190519/local/labour-on-track-to-capture-55-per-cent-of-vote-poll-
suggests.710181; MaltaToday 19 May, online portal at https://www.maltatoday. 
com.mt/news/europe-2019/95082/maltatoday_survey_labour_set_for_another_landsli-
de_in_european_elections#.XO-kHntS9PY 
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results4 
 
The governing PL secured a comfortable majority of votes (54.3%), taking four of 
the six parliamentary seats allotted to Malta [Refer to Diagram]. The opposition PN 
won the other two seats with 37.9%, but its vote tally contracted by 2,174 while La-
bour’s grew by 6,805 votes.    
Contrary to European trends, Democratic Alternative’s (Alternattiva Demokra-
tika, AD, Greens) share shrunk from 7,418 (3% of valid votes) in 2014 to 1,866 (0.7%) 
– a drop of 5,552 votes. This must have been inﬂuenced by the fact that two of AD’s 
star candidates, Arnold Cassola and Michael Briguglio, had changed party allegiance. 
Altogether, their votes almost equal the number of votes lost by AD in comparison 
with its 2014 result. 
Diametrically opposite were the fortunes of the right-wing, anti-immigrant par-
ty Empire Europe (Imperium Europa, IE) which won 8,238 votes, overtaking AD as 
the third party after the PL and PN. Close behind it with 5,276 votes came the De-
mocratic Party (Partit Demokratiku, PD) which contested the European election for 
the ﬁrst time, but which had managed to win two seats in the national parliament 
in the 2017 election on the back of a short-lived electoral coalition with the PN. 
 
turnout and the campaign 
 
In 2019, voter turnout declined for a third consecutive time – although the fall was 
greater in traditional PN strongholds, prompting speculation that Nationalist voters 
may have shown their disgruntlement with the party leadership by staying at home.5  
The 2019 turnout at 72.7% was still much higher than the EU average turnout of 
50.5%. However, while the EU’s turnout improved for the first time in two decades, 
the Maltese one continued to drop from its original very high levels (Hirczy, 1995). 
Internal divisions and squabbling have become a way of life among the highest 
echelons of the PN and party rank-and-ﬁle. No policy proposals have so far attrac-
ted voters’ attention and induced a sufficient number of them to begin shifting their 
allegiance from the PL. The PN’s quixotic campaign on abortion wasted what little 
energy and desire existed for a positive, propositional campaign. 
As for the PL, favourable economic fundamentals still convince the majority of 
voters to stick with it and surprisingly, the strains of rapid economic growth such as 
rising prices in the housing market, the expanding urban spread, environmental de-
terioration and growing social challenges are not taking their toll (Pace, 2017). Nor 
have serious allegations of corruption, rule of law deﬁciencies and the erosion of de-
mocracy dented the party’s popularity. The chickens may one day come home to ro-
ost, some hope; but for the time being they have still not hatched. 
4. All figures quoted here are the official ones published by the Electoral Commission, Malta at 
https://electoral.gov.mt/ElectionResults/MEP (viewed 28.05.2019). 
5. Turnout in the 2004 election was 82.4% below the national election level which stood at ; in 
2009 it dropped to 78.8%, then 74.8% in 2014 and 72.2% in 2019. 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Malta
party ep group votes (n) votes (%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Labour Party (PL) S/D  141,267 54.3 4 +0.9 +1
Nationalist Party (PN) EPP  98,611 37.9 2 -2.1 -1
European Empire (IE) -  8,238 3.2 +0.5
Democratic Party 
(PD) -  5,276 2.0
Democratic  
Alternative (AD) G-EFA  1,866 0.7 -2.1
Independent  
Candidate -  2,674 1.0
Others  2,280 0.9
Total  260,212 100 6
Turnout (%) 72.7
Legal threshold for 
 obtaining MEPs (%) none
Note on the electoral system: the ‘quota’ for electing a candidate is based on the number of valid votes 
cast. The Droop Quota is used to establish the number of votes that candidates need to poll to secure a 
seat: Q=((Valid votes)/(Total number of seats + 1)) + 1. 
Source: Electoral Commission Malta https://electoral.gov.mt/.
Campaigning focused almost entirely on national issues. The PL concentrated on 
its record in office since it was elected to govern the country in 2013 and was re-
conﬁrmed in the 2017.  The PN spent its energy scaremongering voters on abortion, 
claiming that as a member of the S&D, the PL would succumb to pressure to intro-
duce it in Malta – where it is still illegal and unpopular. The PL criticised the incumbent 
PN MEPs with harming Malta’s international image by raising rule of law issues in 
the European Parliament. However, its targets proﬁted from this criticism and were 
re-elected for another term. 
When the EU cropped up in the verbal campaign deluge, it was only to try and 
stir voters’ emotions by giving the impression that the (whichever) party would ﬁght 
for Malta’s interests in the European institutions. 
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Immigration, which tops the list of citizens’ concerns, was not a main campaign 
issue although the nationalistic, anti-immigrant parties like MPM and IE tried to pro-
ﬁt from it. 
Pre-election public opinion polls accurately predicted that the PL would win by 
a comfortable margin, and that the PN was unlikely to hold on to its third seat which 
it had won in 2014 by a meagre margin of 206 votes. The polls were mostly correct 
concerning which candidates were likely to be elected. 
The media, both traditional and new, was heavily involved and manipulated by 
all sides. Social media has become the pivotal campaign tool in the attempt to sway 
voters. The dominance of the two large parties in all media sectors ensured the crow-
ding-out of the smaller parties.  
Although populism and nationalism did not make inroads in the form of little-
known small radical parties displacing established ones, both ideologies featured pro-
minently in the political discourse of the mainstream parties. This implies that the 
ﬁnal chapter on this phenomenon in Malta may still be pending, and the threat has 
not been completely warded off. 
The 2019 election was different from the previous three in some crucial ways. 
For the ﬁrst time, sixteen-year olds were given the right to vote after the 2014 de-
cision to give them the right to vote in local elections. They will also be eligible to 
vote in national elections, with the next one most likely to be called no later than 2023.  
The other novelty was that a new electronic system was introduced to accelerate 
the vote counting, but the election results could only be published in the early hours 
of Monday some thirty hours after the closure of the polling stations. 
Concurrently with the European elections, voting also took place to elect all six-
ty-seven local councils for a fresh ﬁve-year term. Previously, these councils enjoyed 
a three-year mandate and elections were held in successive years for three groups of 
councils. In 2015 Act XL, approved by Parliament, grouped all Local Council Elections 
together and scheduled them to take place on the same day of the European elections.6 
The déjà vus were many, the most salient one being that the electoral campaign 
was mostly conﬁned to domestic, national issues. The intensity and style of party cam-
paigning was no less intense than in previous electoral contests. The main tussle was 
between the governing PL and the opposition PN. The PL billed this as a contest bet-
ween its leader (and Prime Minister), Dr Joseph Muscat, and the leader of the op-
position, Dr Adrian Delia. 
This may be another major factor which discouraged people from voting, not-
withstanding the “This time I am voting” campaign spearheaded by the European 
Parliament and supported by the European Commission. 
The small parties came nowhere near to winning a parliamentary seat. Extremist, 
Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant parties performed better than they normally do in 
national elections, but at no time were they a threat to the mainstream parties. 
6. The whole text of the ACT is available on the Justice Portal at http://www.justiceservi-
ces.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lp&itemid=27225&l=1 
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Following the electoral result, pressure increased to force PN leader Delia to re-
sign. Another long bout of intra-party brawling looms on the PN’s horizon. 
 
the maltese meps 
 
Of the six MEPs elected, four are incumbents, and the leading candidates in both main 
parties were women. The first to be elected was Labour’s Miriam Dalli, with 
63,438 preference votes, who will lead the PL delegation over the next five years; 
and on the Nationalist’s side it was Roberta Metsola, with 38,206 votes. Both in-
cumbents were elected on the first count, in the slightly complicated Single Tran-
sferable Vote (STV) voting system (Katz, 1984) where voters mark their preferen-
ces (1, 2, 3, etc.) on the ballot sheet and are permitted to cross party lists, although 
few do so. 
 
Five of the six MEPs are university graduates and hold a doctorate – four of them in 
law. Dr Alfred Sant is a former PL leader and Prime Minister. The rest have never been 
elected to the Maltese Parliament. 
 
 
conclusion 
 
The European election in Malta had no surprises and followed closely an expected 
script. It lacked many of the splits present in the rest of the EU – although this is not 
to say that they were completely absent. Anti-EU and anti-immigration feelings sim-
mer under the surface, held back by the weakness of their most vocal proponents, 
the so-called fringe or peripheral parties, and by the absoluteness of the dominant 
Europhile parties.  
 
Malta’s economic success has also helped in conjuring a positive image of the EU that 
keeps these forces in check. However, this situation is dynamic and may not last for 
ever, as indicated by the gains made by IE.  
 
references 
 
Carammia, M. and Pace, R. (2015). The Anatomy of a Misﬁt: The 2014 European 
Election in Malta. South European Society and Politics, 20(3), 425-444. 
Hirczy, W. (1995). Explaining near-universal turnout: The case of Malta. European 
Journal of Political Research, 27(2), 255–272. 
Katz, R. (1984). The single transferable vote and proportional representation. In A. 
Lijphart and B. Grofman (Eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alter-
natives. New York: Praeger. 
Pace, R. (2017). Winning against the trend: Labour’s victory in the 2017 Maltese par-
liamentary election. South European Society and Politics, 22(4), 509-529. 
 
malta: unstoppable labour?

Netherlands: A Timmermans (Spitzenkandidaten) effect? 
arjan h. schakel
introduction 
 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the first member states to hold Eu-
ropean elections on Thursday May 23rd 2019, ahead of other European Union (EU) 
member states which followed on  May 24th or later. One may have expected that the 
Netherlands and the UK would cast a ‘Eurosceptic’ cloud over the EP elections to be 
held in the remaining 26 EU member states, but this was not the case for the Ne-
therlands. In fact, what happened was quite the opposite. The big winner was the 
pro-EU Labour Party (PvdA) which won the largest vote share (19.0 per cent), up 
9.6 per cent compared with the 2014 EP elections. Newcomer and staunch anti-EU 
party Forum for Democracy (FvD) won 11.0 per cent of the votes, although its sup-
port was mirrored by a significant vote share loss of 9.8 per cent by the equally stan-
dfast anti-EU Party for Freedom (PVV) (Table 1). Frans Timmermans – First Vice Pre-
sident of the European Commission – was the lead candidate for the PvdA and was 
the Spitzenkandidat for the EP party group Socialist and Democrats (S&D). Spit-
zenkandidaten (lead candidates for the position of President of the European Com-
mission) are a novelty in the European electoral arena, and were introduced with 
the 2014 European elections in an effort to increase interest and participation in Eu-
ropean elections (Braun and Popa, 2018; Hobolt, 2014). In this chapter, I will ex-
plore in how far the Dutch 2019 European election result can be explained by a ‘Tim-
mermans’ or Spitzenkandidaten effect.  
In the next section I will brieﬂy discuss the European party manifestos of the par-
ties and the campaign. In the third section I will compare the outcomes of the 2019 
EP elections with previously held national (2012 and 2017), provincial (2015 and 
2019), as well as European (2014) elections, enabling me to analyse to what extent 
the 2019 EP election results can be explained by increasing EU salience (vote sha-
re swings from pro- to anti-EU parties), ‘second-orderness’ of EU elections (vote sha-
re swings from parties in national government to opposition parties), or, indeed, a 
‘Timmermans effect’. The ﬁnal section offers a short discussion.  
 
 
 
 
 
De Sio, L., Franklin, M.N. and Russo L. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 2019, Luiss Uni-
versity Press, Rome, 2019.  
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections: the Netherlands
party ep group votes (n)
Labour Party (PvdA) S&D  1,045,274 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) ALDE  805,100 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) EPP  669,555 
Forum for Democracy (FvD) ECR  602,507 
Green Left (GL) G-EFA  599,283 
Democrats 66 (D66) ALDE  389,692 
Christian Union (CU) -Reformed Political Party (SGP) ECR  375,660 
Party for the Animals (PvdD) GUE-NGL  220,938 
50 Plus (50+)  215,199 
Party for Freedom (PVV) NI  194,178 
Socialist Party (SP) GUE-NGL  185,224 
Volt Netherlands (VN)  106,004 
Think (DENK)  60,669 
Others  28,530 
Total  5,497,813 
Turnout (%)
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%)
Sources: European Parliament (2019), Kiesraad (2019), NOS (2019). 
votes (%) seats votes change from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change 
from 2014 
 in case of brexit
19.0 6 9.6 +3 +1
14.6 4 2.6 -1
12.2 4 -3.0 +1
11.0 3 11.0 +3
10.9 3 3.9 +1
7.1 2 -8.4 -2
6.8 2 -0.9
4.0 1 -0.2
3.9 1 0.2 +1
3.5 -9.8
3.4 -6.3
1.9 1.9
1.1 1.1
0.5 -1.8
100 26 +1
41.9
none (effective 
threshold of 
3.85%)
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the campaign 
 
Except for the PVV and the pan-European list VN, all parties produced lengthy par-
ty manifestoes for the European elections. The PVV is downright Eurosceptic, which 
is mentioned in one sentence on their one-page election manifesto: ‘The Netherlands 
independent again. So out of the EU.’ (Nederland weer onafhankelijk. Dus uit de EU) 
(PVV, 2019). Although FvD is similarly anti-EU, the party wishes to hold a referen-
dum on EU membership (FvD, 2019). On the other side of the spectrum stands D66, 
which campaigned with the slogan ‘In Europe we make our future’ (In Europa ma-
ken we de toekomst) (D66, 2019), GL, which started its election manifesto with the 
sentence ‘The European Union is indispensable’ (De Europese Unie is onmisbaar) (GL, 
2019), and the pan-European party VN (VN, 2019). All other parties can be placed 
in between these two extremes as they take a ‘Euro-realist’ approach (Vollaard et al., 
2016). These parties are in favour of collaboration between EU member states on 
issues such as immigration, single market, and security (CDA, 2019; PvdA, 2019), 
although some of them are clearly against a widening and deepening of the EU (CU-
SGP, 2019; SP, 2019; VVD, 2019). Other smaller parties are not anti-EU either, but 
would like to significantly reform the EU and for the EU to take action in particular 
policies such as animal welfare, the elderly, the environment, or the multicultural 
society (50Plus, 2019; DENK, 2019; PvdD, 2019).  
It is not customary for Dutch political parties to choose key political ﬁgures to 
head their European election party lists (Vollaard et al., 2016). The 2019 EP elec-
tions were no exception, bar the PvdA whose list was headed by Frans Timmermans 
who, as a long-serving member of parliament and former state secretary and mini-
ster for foreign affairs (Parlement.com, 2019a), is a well-known politician in the Ne-
therlands. Despite his political stature in the Netherlands and some attention paid 
to his participation in the Spitzenkandidaten debate held in Maastricht (NRC, 2019a; 
Trouw, 2019a; Volkskrant, 2019a), Timmermans did not receive much media coverage 
during the campaign. For example, one of the main daily newspapers featured in-
terviews with the list-leaders for FvD and D66 in the ﬁnal week of the campaign (De 
Volkskrant, 2019b, 2019c). Another example is the ‘head-to-head’ debate between 
minister-president Mark Rutte (VVD) and Thierry Baudet (FvD) which was broad-
casted on TV on the evening before election day and which attracted 1.5 million vie-
wers (AD, 2019; NU.nl, 2019). Despite receiving limited media attention, the PvdA 
became the clear winner of the 2019 EP elections (Table 1), which also makes the 
election outcome quite remarkable because this was not at all predicted in the pu-
blic opinion polls (Ipsos, 2019a; NRC, 2019b; Volkskrant, 2019d; Trouw, 2019b).  
 
the election outcome: increasing eu salience,  
an anti-government swing, or a timmermans effect? 
 
Table 2 compares the 2019 European election results with the outcomes of the 2015 
and 2019 provincial elections, the 2012 and 2017 national, and the 2014 EP elec-
tions. The comparison reveals the extent to which the 2019 European elections con-
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trast with other types of elections and with overall electoral trends. The success of 
the PvdA in the 2019 EP elections puts the party close to the level of vote share it won 
in the 2012 national elections. It is too early to tell whether this is the start of a re-
cuperation, the effective number of parties (ENP) – a measurement that indicates 
the extent to which the vote is fragmented across parties, taking the number and re-
ceived vote shares of parties into account (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) – indica-
tes that the vote has not become more splintered across parties. Instead, one needs 
to look at aggregate movements in voter preferences across elections to gain insight 
into the 2019 EP election outcome. 
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Table 2 - Election results since 2012
national 
12-sep-12
european 
22-may-14
provincial 
18-mar-15
national 
15-mar-17
provincial 
20-mar-19
european 
23-may-19
PVV 10.1 13.3 11.7 13.1 6.9 3.5
FvD 1.8 14.5 11.0
CU-
SGP 5.2 7.8 7.5 5.5 7.6 6.8
VVD 26.6 12.0 15.9 21.3 14.0 14.6
CDA 8.5 15.2 14.7 12.4 11.1 12.2
D66 8.0 15.5 12.5 12.2 7.8 7.1
PvdA 24.8 9.4 10.1 5.7 8.5 19.0
GL 2.3 7.0 5.4 9.1 10.8 10.9
SP 9.7 9.6 11.7 9.1 5.9 3.4
PvdD 1.9 4.2 3.5 3.2 4.4 4.0
50Plus 1.9 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.9
DENK 2.1 1.7 1.1
Other 1.0 2.3 3.7 1.5 3.2 2.5
Tur-
nout 74.6 37.3 47.8 81.6 56.2 41.9
ENEP 5.9 8.9 8.9 8.4 10.4 8.9
Notes: ENEP = effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera (1979). NAT = national; EP = Europe-
an Parliament; PRO = provincial. Sources: European Parliament (2019), Kiesraad (2019), NOS (2019).
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eu salience 
 
EU salience theory would predict that vote share swings can be attributed to an in-
crease in EU saliency, resulting in higher turnout and triggering a move from pro-
EU to anti-EU parties except for Green parties, which should also win vote share (Vio-
la, 2016). Figure 1 displays combined vote shares for anti-EU and pro-EU parties across 
national, provincial and European elections since 2012. In the 2019 EP elections, anti-
EU parties won a combined vote share of 32.6%, which is rather similar – within six 
per cent deviation – to the combined vote shares these parties received in previous 
European, national, and provincial elections, except for the 2019 provincial elections. 
Another indication that an increase in EU salience is not a likely explanatory factor 
is given by the turnout rates displayed in Table 2. The 2019 EP elections were mar-
ked by the highest turnout in European elections over the past twenty years; however, 
in the Netherlands higher turnout is part of a general trend rather than an indica-
tion of increased EU salience. Turnout in the 2017 national election was 7.0 per cent 
higher than for the 2012 national election and turnout in the 2019 provincial elec-
tion was 8.4 per cent higher compared to the 2015 provincial election. If anything, 
the mere 4.6 percentage points increased turnout for the 2019 EP election compa-
red with the 2014 European election is an indication of low salience. Finally, the Gre-
en parties (GL and PvdD) did not significantly increase their 2019 European and pro-
vincial vote shares compared to the 2017 national election (Table 2).  
 
Notes: Anti-/pro-EU parties are classiﬁed according to expert ratings of the positions taken by par-
ty leaders in 2014 regarding whether the Netherlands had beneﬁted from being a member of the 
EU (1 = beneﬁted; 2 = neither beneﬁted nor lost; 3 = not beneﬁted). Anti-EU parties (average ex-
perts score above 2.5): CU-SGP, FvD, PVV, PvdD, SP, 50Plus. Pro-EU parties (average expert sco-
re below 1.1): CDA, D66, GL, PvdA, VVD, DENK. FvD and DENK are classiﬁed by the author. Other 
parties: same as for Table 1. 
Source: CHES (2019).  
Figure 1. Vote share for anti-EU and pro-EU parties since 2012. 
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anti-government swing 
 
The vote share swings could result from an anti-incumbency swing, considering that 
the PvdA was in national government after the 2012 national election but in oppo-
sition after the 2017 national election. The ‘punishment vote’ for government parties 
in European and subnational elections is attributed to the second-order nature of the-
se elections (Viola, 2016). First-order national elections are perceived by voters, par-
ties, and the media as more important contests than European and subnational elec-
tions because more is ‘at stake’, given that national governments take decisions on es-
sential issues such as taxes, the welfare state, and foreign policy (Reif and Schmitt, 
1980). Figure 2 displays combined vote shares for parties in national government and 
opposition parties across national, provincial and European elections since 2012. Go-
vernment parties received only half of their 2012 national vote shares in the 2014 Eu-
ropean and 2015 provincial elections, indicating that European and provincial elec-
tions are both perceived to be second-order elections. In this light, the 10 per cent vote 
share loss for government parties in the 2019 European and provincial elections com-
pared with 2017 national election can be considered quite modest.  
 
Notes: Government parties are parties that form the executive at the national level: VVD 
and PvdA in 2012 and VVD, D66, CDA, and ChristenUnie in 2017. Opposition parties won 
seats in the national parliament (Tweede Kamer) but did not participate in or provide sup-
port to the national government. Other parties: same as for Table 1. 
Source: Parlement.com (2019b).  
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Figure 2. Vote share for government and opposition parties since 2012. 
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timmermans (spitzenkandidaten) effect 
 
Despite the close timing of the 2019 provincial and European elections, Table 2 reveals 
significant aggregate vote share swings between parties. The big winner of the 2019 
provincial election was FvD, which won 12.8 per cent compared to the 2012 national 
election. Most likely, voters moved from the VVD which lost 7.3 per cent and the PVV 
which lost 6.1 per cent vote share compared to the 2012 national election. The 2019 
provincial and European elections display quite comparable results except for the tre-
mendous gain for the PvdA, from 8.5 to 19.0 per cent of the vote share. The main lo-
sers were FvD (-3.5%), PVV (-3.4%), and the SP (-2.5%), whose combined vote sha-
re loss of -9.5 percentage points comes close to PvdA’s vote share gain of 10.5 percentage 
points. Are these vote share swings an indication of a Spitzenkandidaten effect whe-
reby Timmermans was able to attract voters from across the whole political spectrum?  
Table 3 presents vote shares for elections held since 2012 for the eight largest 
parties in the province of Limburg. This province is interesting because it is consi-
dered to be ‘the home’ of Timmermans. Frans Timmermans was born in Maastricht, 
the provincial capital of Limburg, went through secondary education in Heerlen (a 
city in Limburg) where he still has a house, and was an (unsuccessful) candidate to 
become Commissioner of the King of the Limburg province in 2011 (Parlement.com, 
2019a). Frans Timmermans is known to be a polyglot and, apart from mastering Dutch 
and the Limburgs dialect, he also speaks English, French, German, Italian and Rus-
sian. He is an outspoken ‘pro-European Unionist’ and launched his campaign as the 
S&D Spitzenkandidat for the 2019 EP elections in Heerlen in the province of Limburg. 
Frans Timmermans clearly gave his campaign a Limburg-twist, this being a border 
province where numerous cross-border interactions with Belgium and Germany have 
historically taken place. For example, Timmermans started his acceptance speech 
as lead candidate with references to his grandfather and his great-grandfather who 
moved from Germany to Heerlen to work in the mines (Timmermans, 2019).  
Table 3 shows that although the eight major parties were able to attract almost 
95%of the vote during national elections, during European and provincial elections 
they collectively lose up to almost 7% vote share. This highlights the second-order 
nature of these contests whereby voters are inclined to support small and new par-
ties because they move from strategic to sincere voting (Marsh and Mihaylov, 2010). 
As observed in Table 2, the 2019 European elections are remarkable because of the 
tremendous vote share gain for the PvdA compared to earlier elections. Voters in Lim-
burg behaved similarly to other Dutch voters, but the aggregate vote share swings 
are larger in magnitude. What stands out in Table 3 is that when the 2019 provin-
cial and European elections are compared to each other, vote share losses for the PVV 
(-7.1%), FvD (-2.4%), VVD (-0.8%), CDA (-2.5%), D66 (-1.4%), GL (-1.3%), and 
SP (-4.6%) total up to -20.1 percentage points which is very close to the 23.2% vote 
share gain for the PvdA. Despite the similar second-order election nature of both the 
European and provincial 2019 elections, a clear Timmermans (Spitzenkandidaten) 
effect can be observed. In response to the question to what extent the head of the 
party list was important for their vote choice, no less than 48% of PvdA voters in-
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dicated that this was important, whereas the second highest percentage was a mere 
18% recorded for PVV-voters (Ipsos, 2019b). Timmermans seems to have been able 
to attract voters from the whole left-right political spectrum, and his voters seemed 
less concerned about punishing parties in national government or to vote according 
to their opinion on EU issues (see also Ipsos, 2019b).  
 
conclusion 
 
The analysis in this chapter clearly suggests that a Timmermans (Spitzenkandida-
ten) effect may underlie the outcomes of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament 
in the Netherlands. Table 3 reveals significant vote share swings in Limburg which 
are not observed for nationally aggregated data (Table 2). For example, the PvdA 
lost 14.1 percentage points vote share when the 2014 EP election is compared with 
the 2012 national election. The beneficiaries were D66 (5.8%) and the PVV 
(3.1%). Significant voter movements are also detectable when the 2015 provincial 
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Table 3 - Election results (per cent vote share) for eight major parties in Limburg
party nat-2012 ep-2014 pro-2015 nat-2017 pro-2019 ep-2019
PVV 17.7 20.8 17.8 19.6 13.6 6.5
FvD 2.0 14.6 12.1
VVD 22.7 20.8 11.5 17.9 10.2 9.4
CDA 9.7 12.2 22.9 14.9 18.7 16.1
PvdA 21.8 7.7 7.3 4.0 6.5 29.7
D66 6.3 12.2 9.4 10.6 5.8 4.4
GL 1.8 0.9 3.9 10.6 8.4 7.2
SP 14.4 12.7 15.5 13.7 8.7 4.1
Total 94.4 87.2 88.4 93.3 86.4 89.5
Notes: NAT = national; EP = European Parliament; PRO = provincial.  
Sources: Kiesraad (2019); nlverkiezingen.com (2019); NOS (2019). 
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election is compared with the 2014 European election. In this comparison the CDA 
is the clear winner (10.8%), whereas the VVD was the significant loser (9.2%). It 
seems that voters in Limburg (and in the Netherlands as a whole, see Table 2) from 
both the left and right of the political spectrum are floating, and that they can be 
attracted by an appealing candidate who reaches out to the voters by campaigning 
locally (see also Gatterman et al., 2016 and Schmitt et al., 2015). This would be an 
interesting hypothesis to explore further through election survey analysis, which would 
make it possible to tap into voter motivations underlying party vote choice.  
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Poland: A skirmish before the decisive battle 
michał kotnarowski and mikolaj czesnik 
introduction 
 
Elections to the European Parliament (EP) in Poland took place on Sunday, May 26th 
2019. As in 2014-2015, they were part of a long ‘election marathon’ during which 
Poles elected their representatives in local government (October-November 2018), 
MEPs (May 2019), MPs and senators to the national parliament (most likely Octo-
ber 2019) and the President (most likely May 2020). Such serial electoral contests 
have several precedents, as this is the fourth time it has happeneds in the history of 
EP elections  in Poland. The circumstance is not without consequences.  
The 2019 EP Polish elections are one of the skirmishes in the long ‘electoral wa-
r’of 2018-2020 among the main protagonists of Polish politics. Because of this, the-
se elections had primarily a national character. The political discourse was prima-
rily concerned with domestic and internal issues (discussed in detail below); EU and 
European issues were invisible. In this sense, the 2019 European Parliament elec-
tions in Poland were typical second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Poli-
ticians deﬁned them – and voters accepted this deﬁnition – as a tool of domestic po-
litics, serving political accountability and aggregating the interests of particular seg-
ments of the electorate. 
 
main actors and electoral campaign 
 
In the 2019 European Parliament Elections in Poland, only six national committe-
es – which submit lists in all constituencies – were registered. This is the smallest num-
ber in the history of EP elections in Poland; never before have so few (national) elec-
toral committees registered lists in all the constituencies. In 2004 there were four-
teen national committees registered, in 2009 ten , and in 2014 nine. 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´ (PiS) is the largest and strongest party that registered can-
didates in the 2019 EP elections in all districts. This party had been in power since 
2015 as part of an informal, not fully institutionalised coalition with Solidarna Pol-
ska and Porozumienie. The party has been described in scholarly literature as populist 
and Eurosceptic (Stanley, 2019). Its ideology is an unusual combination of Christian 
democracy, social and national conservatism, solidarity and interventionism. Sin-
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ce its founding, it has been advocating Poland’s membership in the European Union 
and the expansion of the EU’s structures. However, its politicians postulate is that 
the EU should be reformed. The European policy of PiS could be described as con-
federative and supporting the ‘Europe of nations’. 
In preceding months, prominent PiS politicians made several statements that di-
minished the signiﬁcance of the EU for Poland. This led opposition parties and po-
litical commentators to accuse Law and Justice (PiS) of calling for PolExit. This could 
be politically harmful to PiS, due to high popular support for the EU. As a result, PiS 
presented itself in the election campaign as a deﬁnitely pro-European party. Fur-
thermore, during the EP election campaign, PiS promised a lot of social transfers to 
disadvantaged groups – the same strategy it had followed in national elections. PiS, 
as a party in office, had several problems during the electoral campaign. The party 
was accused of employing its activists in lucrative positions in state-owned compa-
nies. A teachers’ strike broke out in the period preceding the elections, which crip-
pled the operation of state schools in Poland for a month. The strike was caused, among 
other things, by the chaos that arose after the introduction of educational reforms. 
The Prime Minister (M. Morawiecki) was accused of opaque land trading in the pe-
riod before taking office. The last few weeks before the elections, Poland was sha-
ken by an independent documentary on paedophiles in the Polish Catholic Church. 
One of the crucial themes of the ﬁlm was the covering up of paedophile scandals by 
church hierarchy. It was speculated that this might weaken the PiS in elections be-
cause of the party’s strong relationship with the Catholic Church.  
Koalicja Obywatelska (KE) is the second largest organisation to run for EP elec-
tions in 2019 with candidates registered in all constituencies. KE is a coalition block 
consisting of Civic Platform (PO), Modern (N), Polish People’s Party (PSL), Allian-
ce of Democratic Left (SLD) and Zieloni (Greens). The coalition united political for-
ces against PIS. It is a broad movement, therefore also very eclectic, composed of for-
mer communists and anti-communists, supporters of economic liberalism and sta-
te intervention in the economy, agrarian parties and green parties. The leaders of 
the electoral lists were former prime ministers coming from different political tra-
ditions. Apart from being an opponent of the PiS, it was difficult to identify a clear 
programme proposal. It also seems that MEPs elected from KE lists will join a variety 
of groups in the European Parliament (EPP, ALDE, S&D).  
Two new and signiﬁcant political forces appeared in time for the EP elections. 
The ﬁrst one was Wiosna (Spring). It is a left-wing party with a social welfare agen-
da, which aims at introducing a real separation of church and state and a liberali-
sation on moral issues. In the context of a traditional and conservative society, it is 
meaningful that the leader of the party is Robert Biedron´ – a person who is openly 
gay. Wiosna, since its foundation in January 2019, presented itself as the third po-
litical alternative to the duopoly PiS vs PO. Spring targets those voters who do not 
appreciate the authoritarian practices of PIS, but, on the other hand, are also not sa-
tisﬁed by simply voting for a non-ideological anti-PIS coalition.  
Another new actor is a rather exotic coalition called the Konfederacja - Korwin, 
Braun Liroy Narodowcy. This group brought together several ﬁgures of the Polish ra-
dical right wing. They include Janusz Korwin-Mikke, a veteran of the Polish right, 
an anti-democrat, a supporter of radical economic liberalisation and at the same time 
a promoter of the traditional model of social roles, G. Braun, a monarchist who stri-
ves for the coronation of Jesus Christ as the king of Poland, Kaja Godek, a suppor-
ter of a total ban on abortion, and Liroy, a former rapper who supports the legali-
sation of marijuana. This party is also supported by a group of (mainly young) ac-
tivists of national organisations. The group targeted the right ﬂank of the PiS voters. 
Those who were dissatisﬁed with the conciliatory (according to them) actions of PIS, 
e.g. in the matter of the abortion ban and relations with the EU or Israel.  
Finally, there was a populist, anti-establishment citizens’ movement, set up in 2015 
for the parliamentary elections, called KUKIZ 15. They attack the ‘partiesocracy’ (al-
legedly functioning in the Polish party system), arguing that the PiS-PO divide is a 
spurious cover for an entrenched cartel of professional politicians. Their key proposals 
include the introduction of a single-member majoritarian (FPTP) electoral system 
(to promote individual accountability to the electorate) and the replacement of the 
liberal-democratic political system with a system based on more extensive use of di-
rect democracy. 
According to pre-election polls, it was a close race between PiS and KE. Both par-
ties had predicted support between 35% and 40%, and it was difficult to determi-
ne who would be the winner. The polls also expected signiﬁcant support for Spring 
(about 8-10%) and Konfederacja (about 6-8%). The expected support for Kukiz15 
was on the border of the electoral threshold (5%). 
 
 
results 
 
Voter turnout was 45.7% - a significant increase compared with the turnout of pre-
vious EP elections, (20.9% in 2004, 24.5% in 2009, and 23.8% in 2014). This increase 
was most likely caused by an intense political conflict dividing Polish society, which 
strongly mobilises voters.  
The results of the election were surprising given what the polls predicted. The 
best result in the election was achieved by the ruling party PiS (45.4% of vote and 
twenty-seven seats in the EP). The second-best result was achieved by KE (38.5% 
and twenty-two seats). Spring had the third-best result, with 6.1% of the vote and 
only three seats. The remaining parties did not reach the electoral threshold. The 
KBLN Confederation (4.6%) and KUKIZ (3.7%) had a surprisingly poor result.  
The election results suggest the apparent victory of the PiS. Such a victory was 
somewhat unexpected for several reasons, not only because of the polls. PiS has been 
in power for three and a half years. During this time, they have made many con-
troversial decisions, including some that expose them to allegations of violating the 
constitution, anti-democratic actions and breaking the rule of law. However, during 
the election campaign, the party announced the introduction of new measures, such 
as a PLN 500 allowance for each child (previously only distributed from second child 
onwards) and the introduction of a thirteenth month pension for the retired.  
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The leaders of the eclectic KE had expected a win, also predicted by the liberal 
media. One of the reasons for the defeat could have been the aforementioned lack 
of ideological cohesion of the KE, in which the only binding force was the desire to 
remove PiS from power. Another problem for the KE is the lack of a clear leader as 
the former one, Donald Tusk, is now President of the European Council.  
Support for Spring was also lower than expected. The KE camp criticised Spring 
for dismantling the anti-PIS block. The weaker than expected outcome of the Spring 
may paradoxically indicate the maturity of Polish democracy. It turns out that it is 
impossible to found a party a few months before the elections and achieve a dozen 
or so per cent of support.  
Only these three election committees gained seats in the EP. The extreme right 
was very close to the threshold, reaching 4.6%. Their attempt to circumvent the PiS 
on the right and gain the support of the radical part of the PiS voters failed. 
Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Poland
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
Law and Justice (PiS) ECR  6,192,780 45.4
European Coalition - Civic Platfrom, Polish 
People’s Party, Alliance of Democratic Left, 
Modern, Greens (KE - PO PSL SLD .N Z)
EPP and S&D  5,249,935 38.5
Spring (W) S&D  826,975 6.1
Confederation (KKBLN)  621,188 4.6
Kukiz’15 (K’15)  503,564 3.7
Left Together  168,745 1.2
Other  84,124 0.6
Total 13,647,311 100
Turnout (%) 45.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5%
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These elections revealed many differences in the structure of voters supporting 
particular groups. The factor that sharply differentiated voters was their place of re-
sidence. In rural areas, PiS gained more than twice as much support as the KE (56% 
voted for PiS vs 28% for KE), while in large cities, the KE received almost twice the 
votes of the PiS (27% voted for PiS vs 50% for the KE). There was also a much hi-
gher increase in turnout in rural areas compared to the previous EP elections. It may 
mean that the victory of PiS was partly due to the mobilisation of the rural electo-
rate.  
Voting for PiS was also associated with lower education, being older, performing 
manual jobs, being unemployed or retired (Exit polls results: https://www. 
tvn24.pl/wybory-do-europarlamentu-2019/wyniki,450). Apart from being metro-
politan, the electorate of the KE also consists of specialists, entrepreneurs and bet-
ter-educated people. The age group in which the KE had the greatest support was 
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
26 27 +13.6 +7 +8
22 22 -9.87 -6 -6
3 3 -2.6 -4 -4
+3.7
+1.2
51 52 +6 +7
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40-49. Among the youngest voters (under the age of 30), PiS and KE had similar sup-
port. In this group, however, the extreme right Konfederacja gained most support. 
 
conclusion 
 
These election had the highest turnout in the history of EP elections in Poland (46%) 
(Czesnik and Kotnarowski, 2014). Although Polish turnout is lower than the EU ave-
rage (53%), it is higher than the turnout registered in many CEE countries. The elec-
tion results indicated the dominance of two political blocs, as PiS and KE received 
84% of the valid votes. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that there is a two-
party system in Poland. The KE consisted of several groups, quite diverse in terms 
of their programmes. Therefore, it is not clear how long this coalition will last. Mo-
reover, the victory of PiS in Poland does not mean that this party is of great impor-
tance in the European Parliament. PiS belonged to the European Conservatives and 
Reformists faction and will probably continue to do so. This faction is of little si-
gnificance in the EP and, after Brexit, PiS will be the faction’s largest national group. 
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Portugal: Defeat for the right, challenges for the left 
marco lisi 
introduction 
 
During the last five years, Portugal has been regarded as a successful case in the Eu-
ropean context from both an economic and political point of view (see Fernandes 
et al, 2018). On the one hand, the country has turned the page on its 2011-2014 cri-
sis, when a financial assistance programme was implemented with painful austeri-
ty policies. On the other hand, unlike other Southern European countries, Portugal’s 
party system has proved to be very resilient. Although mainstream parties have strug-
gled to retain their electoral support, the Socialist Party (PS, Partido Socialista) and 
the Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partido Social Democrata) continued to alterna-
te in government and to rally more than two thirds of the votes in the last national 
and European elections. The stability of the party system was also due to the strength 
of the two radical left parties, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP, Partido Co-
munista Português) and the Left Block (BE, Bloco de Esquerda), which channelled some 
popular discontent, especially during the austerity period. Nevertheless, no new par-
ties – notably extreme-right populist ones - have entered parliament despite high le-
vels of anti-party sentiments, institutional mistrust and growing disaffection (Jala-
li, 2019).  
After the 2015 legislative elections, the two radical left parties decided to give 
the PS their parliamentary support. This was the ﬁrst time since the establishment 
of democracy that left-wing parties had agreed to cooperate at governmental level 
(Lisi, 2016). This solution – called ‘Geringonça’ (‘contraption’) – aimed to revert au-
sterity policies and increase internal consumption, while maintaining ﬁscal conso-
lidation and controlled budget execution. The choice of the Socialist Minister of Fi-
nance as the President of the Eurogroup in December 2017 highlighted this successful 
trajectory. 
 
the campaign 
 
The Socialists have the most pro-European positions, defending the possible adop-
tion of taxes at European level and the strengthening of European institutions’ role 
vis-à-vis that of national governments. The two rightist parties (PSD and CDS) are 
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slightly less optimistic about the process of European integration, especially with re-
gard to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). On the other hand, the two ra-
dical left parties are clearly Eurosceptic despite displaying marked nuances. While 
the PCP is openly against the euro and the loss of sovereignty associated to EMU, the 
BE presents itself as pro-European, but against the process of European integration 
based on neoliberal policies. 
Seventeen parties/coalitions were allowed to run in the 2019 European elections, 
one more than in the previous contest. Three completely new parties were formed 
and are standing in elections for the ﬁrst time. The ﬁrst is Alliance (Aliança), a new 
rightist party formed by an ex-PSD leader, Pedro Santana Lopes. Besides neolibe-
ral positions on the socioeconomic front, the party takes a soft Eurosceptic line and 
defends traditional values in the cultural domain, thus trying to compete with the 
PSD to appeal to rightist and conservative voters. The second new party is the Liberal 
Initiative (Iniciativa Liberal), which combines a strong emphasis on liberal econo-
mic policies (lowering taxes) with an anti-establishment discourse. Finally, the third 
new player is the coalition PPM.PVC/CDC, whose main force (Basta!, literally ‘Tha-
t’s enough’) adopts a clear populist discourse, targeting primarily the political elite 
and immigrants.  
The campaign was conditioned by a political crisis that emerged unexpectedly 
at the start of May. Prime Minister António Costa (PS) threatened to step down if the 
right supported a proposed bill from the two radical left parties that would grant tea-
chers compensation for the freezing of their salaries during the crisis period. The So-
cialist leader accused both PSD and CDS-PP of being incoherent and presented the 
government as a responsible actor capable of combining ﬁnancial stability with im-
proved incomes. Although the crisis was overcome one week later, the debate deﬁ-
nitely removed any pretence to discuss Europe-related issues. In addition, this event 
boosted the Socialist campaign and undermined the image of right-wing parties among 
moderate voters. 
The European-elections campaign proved to be the ﬁrst round of the national le-
gislative elections, scheduled for October 2019. The PS highlighted the government’s 
achievements, especially in terms of macroeconomic performance, international cre-
dibility and improving domestic demand. On the other hand, the two rightist forces 
pursued a strategy of criticising the government and associating the PS in with the 
other left radical party. The attempt to polarise the debate sought to gain more sup-
port among moderate voters and discontented socialist sympathisers. The inﬂuen-
ce of the national context on the campaign was also visible in terms of the slogans 
adopted (e.g. ‘make the difference’, adopted by PSD) and the strong involvement of 
the party leaders. The two radical left parties also tried to claim the credit for the 
improvement in living conditions, especially for the lower social sectors of the so-
ciety. In addition, they avoided giving public support to anti-European stances; this 
was particularly the case of the PCP, which has defended leaving the euro since 2015.  
Despite the low salience of European issues, two topics debated during the cam-
paign were associated with the EU. The ﬁrst was the environment. As in other Eu-
ropean countries, all parties agreed with strengthening environmental standards at 
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the European level, as well as the implementation of incentives to improve more su-
stainable practices in everyday life. The second was the use of European funds in or-
der to boost modernisation (especially in inland regions) and to strengthen welfa-
re policies. These can be considered as ‘valence issues’, since no signiﬁcant differences 
emerged between parties. 
Overall, the two main parties were relatively close at the start of the campaign, 
according to opinion polls, but the PS clearly emerged as the frontrunner after the 
political crisis, leading by a margin of approximately 8-10 percentage points. The fo-
recast vote for the remaining parliamentary parties was below two digits, while new 
parties seemed to have little chance of electing MEPs. According to pre-election polls, 
abstention will register a new record high. 
 
results 
 
The first word from all parties after the close of the ballot box was on the record-high 
abstention, which reached 69%, the highest score among Western European coun-
tries (and the fifth highest in Europe). The results of the 2019 European elections 
gave a comfortable relative majority to the PS; however, its score was only slightly 
higher than in the 2014 EP elections (33.4% and 31.5% respectively). This was in-
terpreted as a victory not only because the government avoided punishment, but more 
particularly because of the distance between the Socialists and its main competitor. 
Indeed, the PSD had its worst result ever in either a European or a legislative elec-
tion. The PSD lost heavily everywhere and failed to mobilise its own electorate. BE 
was undoubtedly one of the main winners of the election night, increasing the num-
ber of its MEPs (to one more than at the previous national elections) and coming clo-
se to its highest score in European elections (10.7% in 2009). The People, Animals 
and Nature party (PAN), a small environmentalist party, was another winner as it 
was able to elect its first MEP and to consolidate the results obtained in the 2015 le-
gislative elections, when achieved 1.4% of the vote and elected one MP. The issue 
of climate change debated during the campaign boosted its performance, especial-
ly among electors voting abroad (notably in Europe) and the most populous cities 
(particularly Lisbon, Setúbal, Oporto and Faro). Contrary to the lack of media co-
verage of new parties, PAN also benefited from its institutional position and the ima-
ge of its leader. On the other hand, the PCP (which ran in coalition with the Green 
Party, PEV, under the label CDU, Democratic Unitary Coalition) confirmed the bad 
performance obtained in the 2017 local elections, achieving only 6.9% of the vote 
and losing one MEP. This was also the case of the right-wing party CDS-PP.  
The 2019 EP elections can be interpreted as a vote of conﬁdence for the PS, which 
obtained positive results especially in the main urban districts. Despite the signs of 
wear on the government, the PS beneﬁted from the recovery of the economy and ﬁ-
nancial stability, as well as from the strategy and involvement of the Prime Minister 
in the campaign. By contrast, the right was clearly penalized by its fragmentation 
and the lack of an alternative project to oppose to the PS.  
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Portugal
party ep group votes (n) votes (%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Socialist Party (PS) S&D  1,106,345 33.4 9 +1.9 +1
Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) EPP  727,207 21.9 6 *
Left Block (BE) GUE-NGL  325,534 9.8 2 +5.2 +1
Democratic Unitary 
Coalition (CDU) GUE-NGL  228,157 6.9 2 -5.8 -1
Social Democratic 
Centre-Popular Party 
(CDS-PP)
EPP  205,111 6.2 1 *
People, Animals,  
Nature (PAN) none  168,501 5.1 1 +3.4 +1
Alliance (A) none  61,753 1.9 +1.9
Free (L) none  60,575 1.8 -0.4
PPM.PPV/CDC none  49,496 1.5 +1.5
We Citizens (NC) none  34,672 1.0 +1.0
Other  117,157 3.5
Blank and invalid  229,915 6.9 -0.1
Total  3,314,423 100 21
Turnout (%) 30.7
Legal threshold for 
obtaining MEPs (%) none
Note: *  In the 2014 EP elections, PSD and CDS-PP run in the coalition AP (Portugal Alliance), obtai-
ning 27.7% of the votes. 
Source: https://www.europeias2019.mai.gov.pt/ 
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conclusion 
 
The 2019 EP elections confirm two broad trends that characterise the evolution of 
the Portuguese party system. The first is the increasing level of fragmentation through 
the emergence of new parties, especially on the right side of the ideological spec-
trum. This fragmentation has contributed to eroding the concentration of the votes 
in the two main parties, which now get the support of barely half of the electorate. 
The 2019 contest also confirmed that EP elections are a favourable ground for the 
breakthrough of minor parties (see also Freire and Santana-Pereira, 2015). Yet Por-
tugal still remains an outlier in the European landscape as no extreme-right popu-
list party has been able to break the mould and Eurosceptic forces represent only a 
small minority of voters. In other words, the Portuguese party system seems to be 
very resilient to the process of electoral realignment experienced in other Europe-
an countries. It is also remarkable that populist strategies continue to be electoral-
ly unsuccessful in the Portuguese political system (see Lisi and Borghetto, 2018). 
At the national level, the 2019 EP elections marks the beginning of the campaign 
for the next legislative elections. From this viewpoint, it will be interesting to see whe-
ther the PS, in case of victory at those elections, will opt for a minority government 
or for some kind of alliance with other minor parties (BE, PAN or PCP). The bad re-
sults of the PCP were probably linked to the ‘Geringonça’, and this may make it think 
twice about renewing its support for the PS government. Therefore, the challenge 
for the left is to ensure government stability and to impede the success of new chal-
lenger parties, as well as to reverse the widespread political disaffection of Portu-
guese citizens. 
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Romania: Between national politics and European hopes 
sorina soare and claudiu tufis¸
introduction 
 
Romania organised elections for the European Parliament (EP) for the third time sin-
ce joining the European Union (EU) in 2007. This time the elections occurred du-
ring the Romania six-month rotating Presidency of the EU. During this Presidency, 
Romania organised various meetings with representatives of the member states, co-
vered intensively by national media. As a result, the European agenda became more 
visible in the public debate, the peak being reached during the informal summit of 
EU heads of state or government held in Sibiu to discuss the EU strategic agenda for 
the post-election period. 
 
political context 
 
Romania is regularly mentioned as one of the most pro-European countries in the 
post-communist area (Clapp, 2017). Since 1995, in the name of the national inte-
rest, there has been a strong convergence among all mainstream parties on pro-EU 
positions, implicitly inducing radical parties to moderate their stances (Pytlas and 
Kossack, 2015). Occasionally, critical voices have emerged within different parlia-
mentary parties; however, parties’ official positions have regularly been aligned on 
a stable pro-EU discourse. This positioning echoed the high level of endorsement of 
the EU within Romanian society. A closer look at the Eurobarometer pinpoints a de-
cline in this support over time. By the early 2010s, the previous trans-party consensus 
had started to crack. In particular, the topic of Europe has been indirectly politici-
sed by the 2018 referendum on changing the definition of family in Romania's Con-
stitution. The campaign for the referendum featured the opposition between Romanian 
values based on Christian-Orthodox morality and cosmopolitanism and EU values. 
Progressively, the EU has become a confrontational theme with regard to the main-
tenance of the safeguard mechanism for Romania (the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism); with different intensities, the decision received criticism from all par-
liamentary parties. Note that numerous extra-parliamentary parties assumed hard 
Eurosceptic positions (Soare & Tufis¸, 2019). 
For this year’s EP elections, twenty-three parties/alliances and seven indepen-
dent candidates initially registered. After checking eligibility, only thirteen par-
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ties/alliances and three independent candidates hit the campaign trail for the thir-
ty-two Romanian seats in the EP (plus one, after Brexit). The initial increase in the 
number of parties is connected to the 2015 changes in party regulations, which de-
creased the minimum number of members necessary for the registration of a party 
from 25,000 to three members, without any territorial diffusion criteria (Popescu and 
Soare, 2017)1. If we compare the 2014 and 2019 effective number of parties/alliances 
and independent candidates, there are no signiﬁcant changes to be reported.  
However, the supply of parties in competition has changed in a relevant man-
ner. Among the new competitors, there are the Union Save Romania (USR), a pro-
European new party created in 2015 with a platform focused on the ﬁght against cor-
ruption, and the Party for Freedom Unity and Solidarity (PLUS) founded by the for-
mer Prime Minister and former European commissioner for Agriculture and rural 
development, Dacian Ciolos¸, with a liberal and pro-European programme.2 Two new 
parties share origins with the Social Democratic Party (PSD): It is the case of Pro-
Romania Party, recently created by former Prime Minister Victor Ponta and of Pro-
demo, founded by a former social-democrat MEP, Catalin Ivan. If Prodemo’s pro-
gramme is explicitly focused on defending national values, ProRomania’s programme 
officially promotes a modern and pro-European version of social-democracy.  
 
the campaign 
 
As in the previous EP elections, the electoral campaign has been marked by a strong 
national twist. Although the institutional commitments of the EU’s rotating presi-
dency induced an increased visibility of EU themes in the national media, the cam-
paign remained focused on domestic politics. Part of the explanation is connected 
to President Klaus Iohannis's decision to call a consultative referendum on the issue 
of justice to be held on the same day of the EP elections. The president's initiative 
followed a long series of tensions around controversial reforms of the Criminal Code 
promoted by the ruling party (PSD). Note also that presidential elections are sche-
duled for December 2019, with a probable run-off between the incumbent president 
Iohannis, endorsed by the National Liberal Party (PNL), and a possible candidate of 
the ruling social democrats (PSD). The organisation of the referendum has been in-
terpreted as an anticipation of the December elections, with one of the hottest to-
pics in Romanian politics – anti-corruption – taking centre stage. In this context, the 
declaration of the European Socialist Party (EPS)3 expressing deep concerns on the 
1. Note that the number of signatures required for registering candidatures has been a hot to-
pic of debate in the pre-election period, being criticised by civil society organisations and new 
parties on the ground that it provides a major obstacle for participation. According to the law, 
registration procedures require at least 200,000 signatures for a political party and at least 
100,000 for independent candidates. 
2. The two parties run together as Alliance 2020 USR PLUS. 
3. For details: https://www.pes.eu/en/news-events/news/detail/PES-closely-monitoring-
situation-in-Romania/
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matter of the justice system reforms in Romania, promoted by the social democrats, 
induced increased tensions. PES President Sergei Stanishev declared the affiliation 
of the ruling PSD party to be frozen pending a clarified commitment to the rule of 
law. A formal discussion over PSD’s membership is scheduled for June, after the EP 
elections. Similarly tense relations can be found in the case of the PSD government 
partner, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE). The liberal Alliance has been 
explicitly threatened with exclusion from the group of European liberals on the ground 
of their support for the contested reform of the justice system.4 Significantly, the lea-
der of the European liberals, Guy Verhofstadt, participated in the closing meeting 
of the campaign of the 2020 USR PLUS Alliance. 
During the campaign, the cracks in the pro-European consensus have become 
more visible. This is particularly obvious in the patriotic-centred campaign of the three 
main parliamentary parties: PSD, ALDE, and PNL. With the slogan "Patriot in Europe", 
the PSD has organised its campaign around the need to guarantee a representation 
in Europe that “knows how to speak, that desires to speak, has the courage to spe-
ak and to defend the country’s interest”.5 A similar view echoes from the liberals’ cam-
paign whose slogan, “Romania above all”, recalls the slogan of Donald Trump’s pre-
sidential campaign. Note also that the PNL opened its candidate list by recruiting a 
famous journalist, Rares¸ Bogdan, known for his provocative style and nationalist the-
mes.6 ALDE’s campaign also placed a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee the 
respect for Romania in Europe (“In Europe with dignity”). This focus is consistent 
with the vehement criticisms voiced by ALDE head of list, the MEP candidate Nori-
ca Nicolai, targeting “the double standards” of the EU in comparing Romania with 
the old Member States in regard to the justice system reform.7 
 
results 
 
Taking into account the votes from overseas, the total turnout for the EP elections 
in Romania was 51.20% - a significant increase from the turnout in the previous round 
of elections in 2014 (32.44%). There are two main factors that account for the si-
gnificantly higher turnout. Firstly, the elections came after two and a half years of 
pressures from PSD to modify the Criminal Code, on the one hand, and by signifi-
cant street protests organized by civic movements, directed at preventing PSD from 
implementing these changes, on the other. This prolonged confrontation polarised 
the population to a higher extent than before and acted as a mobilizing factor for seg-
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4. For details: https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/tariceanu-dupa-ce-guy-verhofst-
adt-a-amenintat-cu-excluderea-alde-din-familia-alde-europa-1108669. 
5. For details: https://m.adevarul.ro/news/politica/surse-primele-nume-psdpentru-europar-
lamentare-1_5c852ab8445219c57e17767e?f bclid=IwAR03JzLzLuEVcGSKPY-
cyjwMRdqTrBP7Z3Ql0Qht3p8YYKRROViX1rQp68pw. 
6. For details: https://revista22.ro/opinii/rodica-culcer/unde-ne-sunt-liberalii. 
7. For details: https://romania.europalibera.org/a/norica-nicolai-ie%C8%99ire-violent%C4%83-
%C3%AEmpotriva-liderilor-alde-%C8%99i-ppe-destul-m-am-s%C4%83turat-de-dublul-vo-
stru-standard-/29857345.html.
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Romania
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
National Liberal Party (PNL) EPP  2,449,068 27.0
Social Democratic Party (PSD) S&D  2,040,765 22.5
2020 USR-PLUS Alliance (USR-PLUS)  2,028,236 22.4
PRO Romania  583,916 6.4
People’s Movement Party (PMP) EPP  522,104 5.8
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 
(UDMR) EPP  476,777 5.3
European Liberal and Democrats Alliance 
(ALDE) ALDE  372,760 4.1
Gregoriana Carmen Tudoran (Independent)  100,669 1.1
George Nicolaie Simion (Independent)  117,141 1.3
Peter Costea (Independent)  131,021 1.4
Other parties  247,365 2.7
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) EPP
Mircea Diaconu (Independent) ALDE
Total  9,069,822 100
Turnout (%) 51.2
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
10 10 +12.0 +4 +4
8 9 -15.1 -8 -7
8 8 +22.4 +8 +8
2 2 +6.4 +2 +2
2 2 -0.5
2 2 -1.0
+4.1
+1.1
+1.3
+1.4
-13.1
-12.2 -5 -5
-6.8 -1 -1
32 33 +1
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ments of the electorate that were previously less inclined to vote. Secondly, the re-
ferendum initiated by the president and held on the same the day as the EP elections 
also increased the turnout for this round of elections. It should be noted that these 
two factors combined to increase turnout particularly in urban areas, which accounted 
for 57.40% of the total votes.  
PSD and ALDE, current governing partners in Romania, recorded signiﬁcant los-
ses. Despite opinion polls consistently crediting ALDE with about 10% of vote in-
tentions, the party failed to reach the threshold and will not have any European MPs 
(MEPs). At the 2014 elections, PSD received 37.6% of the votes and had 16 MEPs. 
In 2019, although it received a similar number of votes as in 2014, about two mil-
lion, the increased turnout decreased the relative share of PSD to only 22.6%, re-
legating the party to second position and awarding it only eight MEPs. 
The National Liberal Party was the winner in this round, increasing its share of 
the vote from 15% in 2014 to about 27% in 2019, and increasing the number of Eu-
ropean MPs from six to ten. The second undisputed winner is the alliance between 
the Union Save Romania (USR) and the Party for Freedom Unity and Solidarity (PLUS). 
The former became a parliamentary party only in 2016 while the latter was officially 
registered as a party only recently (October 2018), but both have roots in the civic 
movements that fought against the judicial reforms planned by PSD. The newly-for-
med alliance managed to obtain over 21% of the votes, winning eight EP seats.  
Despite PNL’s recent history of governing in coalition with PSD, over the last four 
years the liberals and USR-PLUS have been the main opposition forces in the Romanian 
Parliament, arrayed against PSD, although it remains to be seen how the relation-
ship between them will evolve. The ﬁrst test will come by the end of this year during 
the presidential election campaign, when both parties will have to decide whether 
to have a common candidate or whether they will each propose their own candidate. 
For now, it is important to note that PSD lost its ﬁrst place in all but one of the lar-
gest 20 cities in Romania, while USR-PLUS reached ﬁrst place in 15 cities and PNL 
in the remaining four.  
Among the diaspora votes, the USR-PLUS alliance won close to 44% of the vo-
tes, PNL almost 32%, and PMP won 8% of the votes. PSD, usually not a favourite of 
Romanians living abroad, paid a particularly hard price this time, when it won less 
than 2.5% of the diaspora votes. It should be mentioned that the abysmal performance 
of PSD comes after multiple rounds of elections, which made it very difficult for the 
diaspora to vote, and after the August 10, 2018 protest organised by the diaspora 
in Bucharest, which ended with gendarmes using unnecessary violence against pea-
ceful protesters.  
At the moment it is unclear which European groups some parties will join in the 
EP. For PNL, PMP, and UDMR things are clear, they will stay with the group to which 
they previously belonged, the EPP. The USR-PLUS alliance has purposely avoided 
discussing this issue during the campaign, in an attempt to attract as many voters 
as possible. As already indicated, they are in negotiations with ALDE and it is very 
likely that they will join this group, especially now that the Romanian ALDE has not 
passed the threshold.  
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The PSD membership in the S&D was frozen prior to the elections. Considering 
that the leader of PSD, Liviu Dragnea, was jailed and removed from leadership of 
the party, it is reasonable to believe that PSD will stop trying to modify the Crimi-
nal Code and that it will re-enter the good graces of the S&D group. It helps that PSD, 
even after a w eak performance in this round of elections, is still able to bring eight 
MEPs to the S&D group. The last unknown is the Pro Romania Party, which sepa-
rated from PSD under the leadership of Victor Ponta, a former PSD prime minister. 
As of this moment, it is not clear which EP group the party will join.  
Summing up, the local Romanian context managed to increase turnout to the 
highest level recorded for an EP election in Romania since joining the EU. Moreo-
ver, the local conﬂicts have somehow prevented clear anti-EU parties from becoming 
relevant actors in this round of elections, although PSD has adopted signiﬁcant parts 
of the anti-EU discourse. It remains to be seen whether the party will continue to go 
in that direction (a distinct possibility if S&D refuses them, which is not very like-
ly) or if, being forgiven, the S&D will act as a “civilising” factor that will bring the 
PSD back to a more pro-European stance. 
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Slovakia: Continuation of electoral earthquakes 
peter spácˇ
The 2019 European Parliament (EP) election was held in Slovakia on May 25th, the 
fourth time since the country’s accession to the EU. Two points are worth mentio-
ning at the outset. Firstly, turnout increased considerably since the previous election 
in 2014. However, with roughly one in four voters participating in the election, it was 
still the lowest turnout in the whole EU. Secondly, the results confirmed the substantial 
recent changes in Slovakia's political life, with critical implications for the coming 
years. 
In line with other EU countries, the elections are held under proportional re-
presentation rules. Similar to national elections, there is only one constituency that 
comprises the whole country. The threshold is set at 5%, which effectively bans smal-
ler parties from obtaining EP seats. Similar to several other member states, Slova-
kia does not allow its citizens to vote from abroad in EP elections. The country elects 
fourteen members of the EP (MEPs), although it will only have thirteen until Bre-
xit is ﬁnalised. 
 
background and campaign 
 
In the 2016 general election Slovakia experienced a huge shift of its party system. 
Although SMER-SD lost a considerable part of its support, it maintained its position 
as first party. As for past elections, populist and antisystem parties gained parliamentary 
representation, including the extreme right People’s Party-Our Slovakia (LSNS). This 
electoral success led the new coalition government formed by SMER-SD and its ju-
nior partners to state that they serve as a ‘barrier against extremism’ (Rybárˇ and Spácˇ, 
2017). 
Following the murder of investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his ﬁancée in Fe-
bruary 2018, massive demonstrations were held across the whole country (cf. Me-
sežnikov and Gyarfášová, 2018). The protestors demanded an early election and an 
independent investigation of the crime. After a series of these public protests, several 
members of the government, including the long-term Prime Minister Fico, stepped 
down. However, the parties in government refused to call an early election, thus not 
fulﬁlling the protestors’ principal aim. As a result, support for governing parties, and 
primarily for SMER-SD declined. This trend was observed both in the 2018 local and 
in the 2019 presidential elections. Thus, the 2019 EP election found the country in 
a rather agitated state of mind. 
De Sio, L., Franklin, M.N. and Russo L. (eds), The European Parliament Elections of 2019, Luiss Uni-
versity Press, Rome, 2019.  
ISBN (online) 978-88-6105-424-0 / ISBN (print) 978-88-6105-411-0
240 the european parliament elections of 2019
Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Slovakia
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
Progressive Slovakia/Together (PS/S) ALDE/EPP  198,255 20.1
SMER - Social Democracy (SMER-SD) S&D  154,996 15.7
People's Party - Our Slovakia (LSNS) NI  118,995 12.1
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) EPP  95,588 9.7
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) ECR  94,839 9.6
Ordinary People and Independent Personali-
ties (OLaNO) ECR  51,834 5.3
Party of Hungarian Community (SMK) EPP  48,929 5.0
Slovak National Party (SNS) NI  40,330 4.1
Christian Union (KU) NI  37,974 3.9
We Are Family - Boris Kollar (WF-BK) EAPN  31,840 3.2
Bridge (Most) EPP  25,562 2.6
Christian Democracy - Life and Prosperity 
(KDZP) NI  20,374 2.1
Others  66,164 6.7
Total  985,680 100
Turnout (%) 22.7
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) 5
For the Brexit scenario, Slovakia included a mechanism in its electoral law. Based on it  
the party with the lowest remainder obtains its last seat only after Brexit takes place. In fact  
this mechanism was set in such a way that it allowed a non-logical solution, i.e. the party  
with less votes could get more seats in case a no-Brexit scenario occurs. This possibility truly  
occurred as KDH obtains its second seat only after scenario while SaS with a lower results  
obtains ist two seats right from the beginning. 
Source: Statistical Office of Slovak Republic.
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
4 (2 for 
ALDE and 
2 for EPP)
4 +20.1 +4 +4
3 3 -8.4 -1 -1
2 2 +10.3 +2 +2
1 2 -3.5 -1
2 2 +3.0 +1 +1
1 1 -2.4
-1.6 -1 -1
+0.5
+3.9
+3.2
-3.2 -1 -1
+2.1
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In Slovakia, the timing of the European election is critical. A direct presidential 
election takes place every ﬁve years in spring. The presidential election is the most 
critical competition in the country, and it receives substantial attention from poli-
tical parties, society and media. In 2019, the second round of this election took pla-
ce on March 30th. Until this date the issue of an EP election was marginal. While the 
campaign before the presidential election lasted for about one year, the campaign 
for the EP election took roughly one and a half months. 
Despite its short duration, the campaign was reasonably visible. In comparison 
to the 2014 EP election, which had a non-existing campaign (Spácˇ 2014), the po-
litical parties were overall more active in mobilising their supporters. This was main-
ly true for two new parties Progressive Slovakia and Together - Civic Democracy, which 
emerged at the end of 2017 and later formed an electoral coalition (PS/S) with a 
strong pro-EU stance. It was also true for the liberal Freedom and Solidarity party 
(SaS), the main opposition force in the parliament. Similarly, the extreme right par-
ty LSNS was very active, even though in 2016 it initiated a petition to hold a refe-
rendum about Slovakia’s withdrawal from the EU and NATO. On the other hand, the 
governing parties (and especially SMER-SD) held only a feeble campaign similar to 
that seen at the previous EP election in 2014. 
The campaign in Slovakia did not focus on a dominant issue. Most parties deba-
ted about problems such as security, immigration, double standards for food quali-
ty, environmental protection and further development of EU integration. The stan-
ces of parties ranged from openly pro-EU to Eurosceptic. Along with LSNS, the lat-
ter category included the governing Slovak National Party (SNS) and a new entre-
preneurial party We are Family (WF-BK), led by Boris Kollar, which entered parlia-
ment in 2016. Shortly before the 2019 EP election, the WF-BK joined ranks with the 
parties of Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini, and it was reluctant to condemn the scan-
dal of Austrian Vice-Chancellor Strache. Together LSNS, SNS and WF-BK blamed the 
EU for discriminatory practices (double standards regarding food quality), negatively 
evaluated its immigration policy, labelled its activities a liberal threat to a more con-
servative Slovakia and as a ‘dictate of Brussels’, and called for weakening or even aban-
donment of sanctions against Russia (cf. Gabrižová, Geist and Korenˇ, 2019). The in-
tensive campaigning of the extreme right party, LSNS, led more pro-EU parties to stress 
the risk of spreading extremism not only in Slovakia but in the whole EU as well. Hen-
ce, they used the LSNS as a mobilising topic to encourage their supporters to cast a 
ballot at the EP election so as to avert the risk of a rise of extremist politics. 
 
results 
 
The results of the election confirmed the dynamic evolution of Slovakian politics. 
The coalition PS/S secured more than 20% of votes and won with nearly a 5 percentage 
points margin. The coalition gained four seats in the EP. The election was also a suc-
cess for the LSNS. After scoring less than 2% at the 2014 EP election, the extreme 
right party increased its gains considerably, ending in third position, with more than 
12% of votes, and thus obtaining two seats. 
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By contrast, the election was catastrophic for the three governing parties. As in 
the 2014 EP elections, the support for the SMER-SD declined substantially. In 2009, 
the party dominated the EP election with more than 32% of votes and ﬁve seats out 
of thirteen. Ten years later its vote share had halved, and its number of seats drop-
ped to three. For its two junior coalition partners, the nationalist SNS and the Hun-
garian party Bridge (Most), the results were even worse. Both these parties were una-
ble to pass the threshold of 5% and remained without any representation in the EP. 
Because another Hungarian party, the Party of Hungarian Community (SMK), also 
ended just below the threshold, for the ﬁrst time since 2004, Slovakia will have no 
MEP from this ethnic minority. 
The parliamentary opposition experienced mixed results. While the SaS secu-
red two seats (one more than in 2014), the anti-corruption Ordinary People and In-
dependent Personalities (OLaNO) barely passed the threshold and obtained one seat. 
The cooperation of WF-BK with Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini did not provide 
the result that the party hoped for, as it scored only 3% of votes and no seat in the 
EP. Finally, the election was a triumphant comeback for the Christian Democratic 
Movement (KDH) that dropped out of the national parliament in 2016. The party 
received nearly 10% of votes and obtained two seats (one of them after Brexit). Hen-
ce, in terms of gained seats, none of the EP groups got the upper hand in Slovakia. 
 
conclusion 
 
The 2019 EP election provides essential insight into the politics of Slovakia. Although 
turnout increased to nearly 23% (it was 13% in 2014), it remained the lowest among 
all EU member states. In comparison to the previous EP election, the campaign in 
2019 was more intense and had a stronger mobilising effect. On the other hand, Slo-
vakia partly suffers from the timing of the election. The occurrence of the highly vi-
sible presidential election only two months before the competition for the EP had 
two connected consequences. Firstly, the duration of the campaign for the EP elec-
tion was short, as it lasted around one and a half months. This gave only limited op-
portunities for parties to mobilise the electorate. Secondly, the long-lasting campaign 
for the presidential election made it harder for parties to persuade citizens to take 
part in another vote just a couple of weeks later. 
With regard to the results, for the ﬁrst time since 2006, the SMER-SD did not win 
a national election to a representative body. After a series of disappointing results 
in recent years, the party that once dominated the Slovak party system is following 
a steadily declining trend. The failure of its junior coalition partners in 2019 to ac-
quire any seats in the EP only conﬁrms that Slovakia is experiencing signiﬁcant chan-
ges to its political scene. 
On the other hand, the victory of the coalition PS/S shows that new liberal par-
ties are increasingly popular. If this trends continues, they will have a real chance 
to win the upcoming general election in spring 2020 and to become the senior go-
verning party. However, the success of the LSNS indicates that protest and extremist 
viewpoints also ﬁnd support among a substantial portion of society. With the decline 
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of the SMER-SD as well as of the SNS, the extreme right LSNS might well be able 
to gain more supporters and become a constant player in the political map of Slo-
vakia.  
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Slovenia:  
Split national political identities in EU electoral democracy  
simona kustec 
introduction 
 
The election in Slovenia for eight European Parliament (EP) seats took place on May 
26th. For the EP elections, Slovenia is considered a single electoral constituency. As 
for all countries, a proportional system is adopted. Voters must chooose a party list 
and optionally also give a preference vote to any of the individual candidates on the 
selected party list. EP seats are distributed according to the d’Hondt method. The-
re is no formal electoral threshold. This, together with the official introduction of 
a gender quota system, has proven to be a fairly effective electoral system (Fink-Haf-
ner and Deželan, 2016). 
The interest of Slovenian political lists to compete in the EP elections has tradi-
tionally been quite high. There were fourteen political lists, among which seven com-
peting for the ﬁrst time in EP elections. Out of one-hundred-three candidates, ﬁfty-
one were women and ﬁfty-two men. All nine parliamentary and ﬁve non-parliamentary 
parties submitted candidacies.  
Slovenia is entitled to eight seats in the EP. In 2019 these seats were equally di-
stributed among four party lists (two left-wing and two right-wing parliamentary 
parties), with two seats each. Three of these four lists conﬁrmed their previous EP 
status, one was newly elected, and two from the 2014-2019 mandate lost their bids. 
An 11% threshold of the very low 28.89% turnout rate in Slovenia was needed to 
enter the EP in 2019. As for previous EP elections, strong dependencies on con-
temporary domestic political circumstances and balances of powers have marked this 
year’s EP campaign processes and electoral choices.  
 
powers on the domestic political parquet floor  
as a runway for ep elections 
 
Slovenians’ political trust in the EU is low – similar to domestic political institutions 
and parties – although these are, at the same time, seen as holding solutions to the 
majority of the country’s problems (Toš et al., 2018). Although entring into the EU 
has traditionally been seen as a positive political decision for Slovenia, low trust in 
the EU, expressed both in public opinion polls and through participation in elections, 
is an issue that has not been addressed since the first elections in 2004. To some ex-
tent, this can be directly linked to the role of the EU and its institutions, which in the 
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eyes of citizens are unsuccessful in solving many of the serious problems facing the 
country, such as the 2012 financial crisis and the recent migration issues that lite-
rally paralysed the state’s apparatus in 2015. In this regard, and together with a wea-
ry attitude towards domestic politics, this year’s 28.89% turnout, the second lowest 
among all EU members at 2019 elections, is no surprise.  
From the national political perspective, as in 2014, EP elections have been held 
in the domestic political circumstances of a vague and fragmented minority gover-
nment. Early national elections were held in July 2014 and again in June 2018, both 
of them falling within the same EP election cycle. In both cases, newly established 
liberal political parties took over the leading coalition positions (the Modern Cen-
tre Party (SMC) after the July 2014 elections and the List of Marjan Šarec (LMS) af-
ter the June 2018 elections). Both of these parties formed coalitions with the Social 
Democrats (SD) and the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia DeSUS (both 
traditional parties in the political arena with slight internal reformations from the 
1990s onward). The small and young Party of Alenka Bratušek (SAB) is a third exam-
ple of a new liberal party, originally under the umbrella of the Positive Slovenia par-
ty, leading a coalition between 2013 and 2014 and also joining the current coalition. 
Despite being unusually numerous, the ﬁve current coalition partners are together 
still a minority due to the scattered election results, with all of the partners having 
similar proportions of votes. The absolute winner of the 2018 election, the right-wing 
Slovenian Social Democracy (SDS), was unable to form a coalition and, together with 
New Slovenia (NSi) – a Christian Democratic party –and the Slovenian National Par-
ty (SNS), they became part of the opposition.  
In such fragmented and fragile circumstances, characterized also by positive 
growth cycle statistics of 4.1% GDP growth, 1.7% inﬂation, and 4.4% unemployment 
rate (SORS, 2019), but bound by poor economic growth forecasts, the lack of nee-
ded structural reforms, and active migrant issues, the Slovenian electoral campaign 
for the EP elections got underway.  
 
campaign 
 
The 2019 EP election campaign was implemented without any serious negative at-
tacks, the campaign in general can be labelled as ‘by the book’, with a mixture of pre- 
and post-modern campaign elements (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002). The parties 
and their candidates were active on social media (especially Twitter, Facebook and 
Instagram), all of the EP parliamentary parties distributed large posters, and most 
circulated campaign leaflets. Parties strongly engaged in direct communication on 
the ground, also involving international support such as visits by European politi-
cians. At a certain point parties’ campaigns became so similar that it was almost im-
possible to identify anyone’s campaign as unique.  
 This led to an extensive yet standardised media coverage of the campaign. Me-
dia debates among candidates all focused on a set of salient issues (especially mi-
gration, the future of the EU and the role of Slovenia in the EU). Social media cam-
paigns coincided with EU-run national campaigns projects, like ‘#EUandME', ad-
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dressing young voters, and a video project, ‘Tokratgremvolit.eu’, unsuccessfully cal-
ling for higher electoral participation. 
Interestingly, a series of pre-election opinion polls were released to the public 
during the campaign period with many apparently biased results in favour of cer-
tain parties that were eventually successful.  
With the exception of SDS, NSi and The Left, little can be said about the parties’ 
ideological and policy programme statements, positions or choices, because parties 
used only programme-dashboards or did even less to address the voters’ preferences. 
LMŠ, which gained two EP seats, for example, compensated for a lack of a program-
me statement with the president’s and party list holder’s speeches and press releases. 
It is interesting that, though parties refer to their membership in the European Par-
liamentary groups, they rarely directly apply any of the ‘mother’ group's programme 
statements or manifestos. The campaign’s content was marked by a lot of very basic 
and general statements about the importance of the European Union’s future, the role 
of Slovenia inside it, European values and principles, and only a couple of very gene-
ral policy positions on security, corruption, social, economic and agricultural issues. 
  
results 
 
Of the eight seats available, four went to the parties in the government coalition, and 
four to opposition parties. The leading coalition party, The liberal LMŠ (newly esta-
blished a year before the national elections), and its partner, SD, each got two man-
dates. The leading opposition party (SDS), together with its current EP pre-electo-
ral coalition partner, the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), won three seats. Finally, NSi 
alone (without its EP 2014 pre-electoral coalition partner SLS) got one seat. Alto-
gether, the four elected parties to the EP gained a bit more than 70% of all valid vo-
tes, with all of the eight elected candidates being elected with preference votes. Gen-
der balance was equally distributed between four female and four male MEPs on both 
the coalition and opposition sides. 
Besides the equally distributed domestic political powers, the EP 2019 election re-
sults draw a very interesting picture of the national elite in the EP (Scarrow, 1997). Apart 
from DeSUS, the other traditional parties (those established shortly after Slovenian in-
dependence in 1991), that is SD, SDS and NSi, have been re-elected from the ﬁrst EP 
Slovenian elections in 2004 onwards. Furthermore, at the level of individual MEPs, wi-
thin these parties there is a recognisable set of candidates that is now consolidated. Three 
MEPs from the SDS list and one MEP from SD have been re-elected twice, and a newly 
elected MEP from NSi was previously a sitting MEP in 2004-2009 who, in 2011-2019, 
held a national parliamentary mandate. With regard to the remaining three MEPs, only 
the one elected in the LMŠ list lacks previous political experience, as the second LMŠ 
MEP had gained executive political experience in the extinct liberal party For Real (2008-
2011). Finally, the newly elected MEP from SD served as the Speaker of the National 
Assembly and vice-president of the then coalition-leading liberal party, SMC, during 
the 2014-2018 Parliament, and was re-elected on the SMC list for the 2018-2022 term, 
while transferring to the SD parliamentary group and party list a few weeks later. 
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Table 1: Net vote change between 2004 – 2019 EP elections for selected parties* (%)
party ep group 2004 2009 2014 2019
Slovenian Democratic Party 
(SDS) leading coalition 2004-
2008, 2012-2013 
EPP
17.7% of 
all votes 
(2)
+10 
(2+1**) -1.9 (3)
+1.4 
(with 
SLS) 
(3)
New Slovenia -  
Christian Democrats (Nsi) EPP
23.6% of 
all votes 
(2)
-7.1 (1)
-0.1 
(with SLS) 
(2)
-5.5 (1)
Social Democrats (SD) 
leading coalition 2009-2012 S&D
14.1 % of 
all votes 
(1)
+4.3 (2) -10.6 (1) +10.6 (2)
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia 
(LDS) leading coalition 1992-
2004 ALDE
21.9% of 
all votes 
(with De-
SUS) (2)
-10.4 (1) NR NR
Democratic Party of Pensio-
ners of Slovenia (DeSUS) ALDE
(with 
LDS)
7.2%  
of all  
votes
+1.1 (1) -2.4
For real ALDE NE
9.8 % of 
all votes 
(1)
-8.9 NE
Marjan Šarec List (LMŠ) 
leading coalition 2018- ALDE NE NE NE
15.4% 
of all 
votes 
(2)
Party of Alenka Bratušek 
(SAB) (Alenka Bratušek, still 
as a member of party Positive  
Slovenia leading coalition 
2013-2014)
ALDE NE NE
NR 
(6.6% of 
all votes 
for Positive 
Slovenia)
4%  
of all 
votes
Party of Modern Center 
(SMC) leading coalition 2014-
2018
ALDE NE NE NE
1.6%  
of all 
votes
Believe, List of dr. Igor Šoltes G-EFA NE NE +10.3 (1) NE
The Left GUE-NGL NE NE
8.1% of all 
votes -1.7
Slovenian national party 
(SNS) NI
5 % of all 
votes -2.1 +1.1 +0.01
Legend: Elected (number of MEP posts); * selected parties: all elected lists in the EP, all leading coali-
tion parties at the national level, far left party in the national arena (The Left), central national party in 
the national arena (SNS); ** additional MEP seat due to the 2013 EU enlargement; NE: party not exist; 
NR: party not run for the EP elections; SLS – Slovenian People’s Party.  
Source: own calculations on the basis of SEC, 2019. 
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Table 2 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Slovenia
party ep group
votes 
(n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 (%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Slovenian Democratic 
Party (SDS) and  
Slovenian People’s Party 
(SLS)
EPP  126,534 26.30 3 +1.4
Social Democrats (SD) S&D  89,936 18.70 2 +10.6 +1
Marjan Šarec List (LMŠ) ALDE  74,431 15.40 2 +2
New Slovenia - Christian 
Democrats (Nsi) EPP 53,621 11.10 1 -5.5 -1
The Left (LEVICA) GUE-NGL 30,983 6.40 -1.7
Democratic Party of 
Pensioners of Slovenia 
(DeSUS)
ALDE 27,329 5.70 -2.4 -1
Party of Alenka  
Bratušek (SAB) ALDE 19,369 4.00
Slovenian National  
Party (SNS) NI 19,347 4.00 +0.01
Greens of Slovenia  
(Zeleni) NI 10,706 2.20 +1.4
DOM -national league NI 8,184 1.70
Let’s Unite  
(Povežimo se) NI 7,980 1.70
Party of Modern  
Center (SMC) ALDE 7,823 1.60
Movement United 
Slovenia (ZSI) NI 3,288 0.70
Good state (DD) NI 2,544 0.50
Total 482,075 100 8
Turnout (%) 28.89
Legal threshold  
for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Source: https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2019/Ur/u2019036.pdf, pp. 4280-4283
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It is difficult to identify a real winner of the 2019 Slovenian EP election. SD re-
gained the seat lost after the 2009 elections, LMŠ got two MEP mandates, and the 
NSi lost one seat. All traditional parties only experienced a slight change in vote sha-
res between individual elections, while the emergence and disappearance of new par-
ties point to extremely high volatility (see Table 1; Kustec Lipicer and Henjak, 2015). 
In the case of the 2019 elections, for example, two newly established and former lea-
ding coalition liberal parties at the national level, SAB/Positive Slovenia (2013-2014) 
and SMC (2014-2018), did not obtain a seat in the EP, polling much lower compa-
red to national elections.   
Regarding volatility, we should also mention that more than half of all compe-
ting lists for the 2014 EP elections (nine out of sixteen) did not stand in the 2019 
elections, among them three coalition partners from that term that are today either 
defunct or only regionally active (e.g. Positive Slovenia). On the other hand, exac-
tly half of the completely new political parties ran in this year’s EP elections. SMC 
and SAB did not run in 2014 EP elections while they were preparing for the early na-
tional election that was held in July of that year, and LMŠ was only formed as a par-
ty in 2018, before the early national elections in June that year. Party lists DOM and 
Let’s Unite were formed speciﬁcally for the 2019 EP elections.  
 
conclusion 
 
The debate about Slovenia’s 2019 EP experience is not so much centred on its first- 
or second-order character (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; Hix and Marsh, 2011) 
as it is about split political and party identities in the national arena.  
The following set of ﬁndings call for analytical consideration that is beyond the 
remit of this chapter:  
1) low turnout and template-structured, self-seeking campaign activities that, at the 
same time, promote the EU as a champion for the future of the nation;  
2) asymmetric volatility scores in a context of successful introduction and conso-
lidation of EP elites in traditional parties on both the right and left side of the 
political spectrum, along with the devastating failures of newly established, mo-
stly liberal, parties to retain voter support in successive elections;  
3) an unstable, constantly changing ﬁrst-order national political arena having a di-
rect impact on voting behaviour in national and EP elections. 
 
Considering the 2019 Slovenian EP electoral experience, a call for the stabilisation 
of the national political and party arena and the building of a stronger domestic at-
titude towards EU electoral democracy and political culture is clearly needed, espe-
cially given the forthcoming, traditionally combative, domestic political disputes in 
the process of nominating a national member for the European Commission. This 
has already been triggered by the announcement of the election results (Rtvslo, 2019).  
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Spain: The endless election sequence 
marta fraile and enrique hernández 
introduction 
 
The eighth Spanish European Parliament Election (EPE) marked the end of an elec-
toral sequence that began one month before (on 26 April 2019), with the General 
Election in which the incumbent Socialist Party (PSOE) won a plurality of seats. Ho-
wever, at the time of the EPE, a parliamentary agreement to form a new national go-
vernment had not yet been reached, since most parties were eager to postpone this 
decision until after the election. On top of that, during the EPE campaign, Catalan 
politicians who had organised an independence referendum in October 2017 and 
ran as candidates in the General and European Parliament (EP) elections were held 
in prison while being prosecuted. All these issues contributed to the nationalisation 
of the contents of the electoral campaign leading up to the EP elections. 
Perhaps the most relevant fact regarding the 2019 EPE is that, for the ﬁrst time 
since the ﬁrst Spanish EPE in 1987, they were held on the same date as regional elec-
tions (in twelve out of seventeen regions) and as local elections in all Spanish mu-
nicipalities. Electoral fatigue caused by the succession of elections in a short period 
of time might have deterred participation. However, in comparison to the 2014 EPE, 
participation increased more than 20 percentage points, suggesting a “contagion effect” 
driven by high levels of mobilisation in local and regional elections. During the cam-
paign, polls forecasted close races in many municipalities and regions. Uncertain-
ty about the results of these elections probably contributed to increasing EPE par-
ticipation levels even further.  
 
the electoral campaign  
 
The pre-campaign period was dominated by two topics. First of all, in the aftermath 
of the General Election, most parties and pundits focused on interpreting the con-
sequences of those national election results, paying special attention to the coalition 
agreements that the winning party (PSOE) might reach to form a new cabinet. The 
media also paid significant attention to the failure of the mainstream right-wing par-
ty Partido Popular (PP), which lost half of its seats in parliament. This led to an unu-
sual and substantial fragmentation of the right-wing vote that was divided betwe-
en PP, the new extreme-right contender VOX (which obtained a total of twenty-four 
seats in parliament), and Ciudadanos (a centre-right party). 
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Secondly, four weeks before the EPE the media also drew signiﬁcant attention 
to the fact that Catalan politicians, who were either in prison or abroad to avoid pro-
secution, were running as EPE candidates in the Ahora Republicas and Lliures per Eu-
ropa coalitions. Initially, the National Election Board banned the candidates who were 
abroad, such as former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont, from running. However, 
after an appeal by these politicians the Courts ruled that they could run. In any case, 
at the time of writing it is still unclear whether these politicians can effectively be-
come members of the European Parliament (EP), since that requires them to travel 
to Spain, where they might be arrested.  
In Spain, as in many other countries, it is common for EPE campaigns to focus 
on national issues (Font and Torcal, 2012). The 2019 election was no exception to 
this trend, which was reinforced by the coincidence of these elections with regional 
and local elections. Uncertainty about the results in some important municipalities 
such as Madrid or Barcelona draw disproportionate attention to these contests, to 
the detriment of the EPE. For example, PP leader Pablo Casado characterised the lo-
cal, regional and EP elections as a second-round of the General Election, which pro-
vided a chance for PP to improve on the bad results obtained in that election. Mo-
reover, PP and Ciudadanos, which ended up in second and third place in the Gene-
ral Election but gained a very similar share of votes (16.7%and 15.%, respectively), 
saw the EP elections as an opportunity to determine which of these two parties would 
lead the conservative opposition against the new PSOE government.  
In any event, the Spanish media also characterised the EPE as a plebiscite on the 
future of European integration, due to the threat posed by the potential upsurge of 
Eurosceptic parties. In this context, and for the ﬁrst time ever, the nine EPE candi-
dates of the main parties and coalitions (see Table 1) participated in a debate bro-
adcasted by Spanish public television in prime time. However, while the candida-
tes debated on topics related to the EU such as the relevance of EU immigration po-
licies, or the challenges posed by climate change, the discussion was clearly domi-
nated by domestic issues, most prominently the situation in Catalonia and the hei-
ghtened polarisation around potential solutions to this problem.  
With the exception of VOX, the election manifestos of the main parties (PSOE, 
PP, Ciudadanos, Unidas Podemos) share a positive outlook of the process of European 
integration and propose new policies that would strengthen the EU, such as grea-
ter coordination in ﬁscal matters and on immigration policies. In fact, while each par-
ty emphasises different issues, the policy proposals of all of them are more similar 
among themselves than their manifestos and agendas at the national-level would sug-
gest (Abellán, 2019). The new extreme right-wing party VOX represents an excep-
tion to this general trend. VOX advocates the protection of national sovereignty and 
the return to the (pre-Maastricht) origins of the integration process. We can, the-
refore, characterise VOX  as a soft Eurosceptic party, since it does not have a prin-
cipled objection to EU membership, but clearly opposes further integration and, in 
some policy areas, defends the devolution of competences to national institutions 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002).  
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results  
 
Figure 1 summarises the turnout rates in European and national elections in Spain 
for the 1986-2019 period. The 2019 EPE saw a significant spike in participation, which 
increased from 45.8% in 2014 to 64.3% in 2019. The coincidence of the EPE with 
regional and local elections undoubtedly contributed to this upward shift. However, 
participation was still slightly lower than that of the 1987 EPE, which was also held 
on the same date as local and regional elections. One must note, though, that 1987 
was also the first time Spaniards voted in an EP election, which might have also con-
tributed to high turnout rates. In any case, participation in the 2019 EPE was also 
lower than in the preceding national election held just one month earlier, confirming 
the “second order” character of these elections in Spain (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).  
 
Table 1 summarises the results of the 2019 EPE in Spain. The clear winner of this 
election was the socialist party (PSOE), which was able to capitalise on its recent vic-
tory in the General Election and obtained a total of twenty seats and 3.7 million more 
votes than in the preceding EPE. In fact, its support (32.6%) was even higher than 
in the last national election, where 28.7% of voters supported the socialists. Conversely, 
the PP lost a lot of ground in this election. In comparison to the 2014 EPE, the sup-
port of PP was 6 percentage points lower and the party lost four seats in the EP. Ho-
wever, the PP managed to obtain a higher share of the vote than in the preceding na-
tional election.  
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Spain
party ep group votes (n) votes (%)
Socialist Party (PSOE) S&D 7,359,617 32.6
Popular Party (PP) EPP 4,510,193 20.0
Ciudadanos ALDE 2,726,642 12.1
Podemos-IU * GUE/NGL & G-EFA 2,252,378 10.0
VOX NI 1,388,681 6.1
Republics now** G-EFA 1,257,484 5.6
Together NI 1,025,411 4.5
Coalition for a solidary Europe  (CEUS) ALDE 633,265 2.8
Compromise for Europe (CPE)*** 296,091 1.3
PACMA 294,657 1.3
Coalition for Europe (CEU) ALDE
Union for Progress and Democracy (UPyD) ALDE
Others 859,479 3.8
Total 22,603,898 100
Turnout (%) 64.3
Legal threshold for obtaining MEPs (%) none
Note: * To calculate vote and seats change we consider the change with respect to the  
coalitions “La Izquierda Plural” and Podemos in the 2014 EPE.  
** To calculate vote and seats change we consider the change with respect to the coalitions  
“Left for the right to decide” (EDPP) and “The People Decide” (LPD) in the 2014 EPE elections.  
***To calculate vote and seats change we consider the change with respect to the coalition  
“Primavera Europea” in the 2014 EPE
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seats seats in case of brexit
votes change 
from 2014 (%)
seats change 
from 2014
seats change from 
2014 in case of brexit
20 +9.5 +6
12 -6.1 -4
7 +8.9 +5
6 -8.0 -5
3 +4.6 +3
3 -0.5
2 +4.5 +2
1 +2.8 +1
-0.6 -1
+0.2
-5.4 -3
-6.5 -4
5
258 the european parliament elections of 2019
On the other hand, while the results of Ciudadanos clearly improved with respect 
to the preceding EPE, the party performed worse than in the last national election 
and failed in its attempt to become the dominant right-wing party in Spain. In the 
case of Podemos-IU the results were also negative, since they lost eight per cent of 
their vote share and ﬁve seats in the EP with respect to 2014. In the case of VOX, the 
extreme right-wing party will be represented in the EP for the ﬁrst time with three 
seats. However, its vote share in the EPE (6.1%) decreased four percentage points 
with respect to the preceding national General Election (10.3%).  
Besides these state-wide parties, the Spanish party system is characterised by the 
presence of strong regionally based-parties. Since the single-district nature of the 
EPE electoral system penalises small regionally-based parties, these parties usual-
ly run in coalition with parties from other regions. This is for example the case with 
the Republics Now coalition which, under the leadership of imprisoned Catalan lea-
der Oriol Junqueras and in coalition with nationalist parties from other regions, gai-
ned three seats in the EP. Similarly, the “Coalition for a solidary Europe” led by Ba-
sque centre-right nationalists won two seats. Finally, the centre right coalition To-
gether, led by former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont, won two seats.  
 
conclusion  
 
The 2019 EPE marked the end of an election sequence in Spain and are a clear re-
flection of the electoral climate at the national level. The vote was highly fragmen-
ted in both the left and right-wing camps, although the two mainstream parties PSOE 
and PP ended up dominating each flank. There was a slight predominance of the left, 
combined with substantial support for nationalist parties (these parties received ap-
proximately 13% of the votes). The extreme right-wing party VOX fell short of ex-
pectations, but still managed to enter the EP for the first time.  
Spanish voters still seem to lack a genuine taste for Europe (Molina, 2019). Un-
like in Italy, the UK or France, and despite the recent changes in the Spanish party 
system towards multipartism, political parties seem unwilling to politicise the pro-
cess of European integration from the supply side. On the demand side, Spanish ci-
tizens seem to lack a connection with the European dimension: a political sphere of-
ten perceived by citizens as too remote and detached from their daily problems. Once 
more, the campaign and the results of the 2019 EPE in Spain suggest the lower re-
levance of EP elections in Spanish political life.  
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Sweden: We are all the winners 
maria oskarson 
According to the spontaneous reactions from the parties’ celebrations during the Swe-
dish election night of May 26th, all parties were winners. The parties that lost sup-
port did not lose as much as they had feared, and among the parties that gained, ce-
lebration was loud and joyful. The only exception was the small Feminist Initiative 
that lost the single seat they won in 2014.    
 
background 
 
The 2019 European Parliament election took place less than a year after the natio-
nal election in September 2018, which led to the most prolonged government ne-
gotiations in Swedish history. Not until January 2019 did the Social Democrats and 
the Green party receive support for a coalition government based on an agreement 
with the Centre Party and the Liberals. Even though these parties are not formally 
part of the government, the agreement was on a programme highly influenced by 
the Centre party and the Liberals. The formation of this government ended the pre-
vious two-bloc split between Social democrats, the Greens and the Left party on one 
side and the Centre party, the Liberals, The Moderates and the Christian Democrats 
on the other. The cause of this restructuring of the Swedish political landscape was 
the increased support for the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats, combined with 
a reluctance from the other parties to rely on them for government formation. Even 
though the Christian Democrats and Moderate Party was somewhat more open to 
support from the Sweden Democrats, they failed to convince the former coalition 
partners to form a government with the support of the Sweden Democrats. The re-
jection of the Sweden Democrats by the other parties continued into the campaign 
for the European Parliament (EP) election, where resistance against nationalism, xe-
nophobia and anti-EU sentiments were salient issues in the campaign.  
 
swedes in the eu 
 
For a long time, Sweden was quite a reluctant member of the European Union. The 
membership referendum in 1994 was won by the “join-side” by only a slight majo-
rity, and the referendum on joining the euro in 2003 was won by the “no-side”.  In 
recent years, the Swedish hesitancy towards the EU has changed. Today around 80% 
of public opinion agrees that EU membership is a good thing, and the previously pre-
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vailing “Swexit” demands are no longer heard. The two most EU-critical parties, the 
Left Party and the Sweden Democrats, have both declared that they will not cam-
paign for a “Swexit”, albeit they both have it in their party programmes. A recent re-
port on Swedish EU-attitudes confirms the EU-positive trend. In an analysis of per-
ceptions of consequences of EU-membership for various policy areas, environmen-
tal policies, military security, employment and economy come out on top, whilst im-
migration is the policy area that has fared the worst (Berg et al., 2019).  That EU is-
sues are indeed important was demonstrated in an analysis of the 2014 EP election, 
where proximity on the EU-dimension was confirmed as a secondary decision rule 
for party choice (Oskarson et al., 2016). Increasing EU-support does not, however, 
mean that Swedes are un-critically positive towards further European integration, 
or to joining the euro. Quite on the contrary: the Swedish public support the cur-
rent EU, but no more. It is the instrumental Euroscepticism that has decreased; the 
political Euroscepticism does in many ways still remain (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005).  
 
the campaign 
 
The campaign for the European election was described by most commentators as va-
gue, not addressing current issues in the EU nor visions for the EU’s future. Even though 
the parties in many ways tried to put forward European issues, the media was more 
focused on the national political game. However, themes like law enforcement, bor-
der control, the social pillar and environmental policies such as European tax on car-
bon dioxide were salient on the agenda. But apart from actual issue concerns, the 
campaign was also characterised by several “revelations” in the media regarding such 
things as side-payments, allowances, abortion policies, and sexual harassment ac-
cusations, linked to MEPs from different parties.  
 
the election 
 
Turnout continued the positive trend in Swedish EP elections since 2004 (37.8%) 
and in 2019 landed on 55.3% (preliminary). The increase is a reflection of the in-
creased support for membership, as well as the more polarised political climate.  
The Left Party as well as the Social Democrats got almost the same results as in 
the 2014 election.  This means they keep their seats (1 and 5 respectively). The Left 
Party had been stronger in the polls just preceding the election, and the party lea-
der Jonas Sjöstedt blamed their non-success on a media focus on the expense allo-
wance of the left party MEP. The Social Democrats received their lowest support ever 
but expressed relief that they did not lose more.  
The Green Party had their best ever result in European elections in 2014, with 
15.2% of the votes. However, following the 2014 national election four months la-
ter they joined a coalition government with the Social Democrats, and it came with 
a high price. In response to the refugee crisis in 2015 the Greens, one of Sweden’s 
most pro-immigration parties, had to back the introduction of border controls and 
stricter immigration rules. In the national election in September 2018 they received 
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Table 1 - Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – Sweden
party ep group votes (n) votes (%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
Social Democrats S&D  974,589 23.5 5 -0.7
Moderate Coalition 
Party EPP  698,770 16.8 4 +3.2 +1
Sweden Democrats ECR  636,877 15.3 3 +5.7 +1
Environment Party 
The Greens G/EFA  478,258 11.5 2 -3.9 -2
Centre Party ALDE  447,641 10.8 2 +4.3 +1
Christian Democrats EPP  357,856 8.6 2 +2.7 +1
Left Party GUE-NGL  282,300 6.8 1 +0.5
Liberals ALDE  171,419 4.1 1 -5.8 -1
Feminist initiative S&D  332,143 0.8 -4.7 -1
Other parties  71,617 1.7 -0.4
Total  4,451,470 99.9 20
Turnout (%) 55.3
Legal threshold for 
obtaining MEPs (%) 4%
Source: Valmyndigheten https://www.val.se/ (Offical Swedish authority for elections).
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only 4.4% of the votes. In view of this turbulence, the result of 11.5% in the EP elec-
tion was received as something of a comeback, even though the party lost 3.9 per-
centage points and two seats compared to their 2014 result. However, if/when Bri-
tain leaves the EU, the Environmental will get the additional seat for Sweden. Sup-
port for the Green Party was signiﬁcantly higher among young voters, probably re-
ﬂecting their engagement with climate issues.   
The Centre Party, formerly agrarian but today a liberal/green party, had a very 
good election, gaining 4.3 percentage points and two seats compared to the previous 
EP election. Their campaign was a continuation of their campaign for the national 
election and focused on climate issues, keeping  a clear distance from the radical right 
and national conservative forces, together with a liberal stance on economic issues.  
The other Swedish party in the ALDE group, the very pro-EU Liberals, did not 
have the same good fortune. They more than halved their support compared to the 
last EP election and lost one of their two seats. It was well into the election night be-
fore it was conﬁrmed that the party would be able to keep their only remaining seat. 
With the most pro-EU message, asking for further integration of the EU and intro-
duction of the euro in Sweden, they were too EU-positive for the status-quo senti-
ments of the Swedish electorate. Replacing their experienced and well-known MEP 
with a quite unknown candidate just a few months before the election was proba-
bly not proﬁtable for the party. Finally, the party is in the middle of replacing its par-
ty leader following the turbulence related to national government formation.  
The Moderate Party (EPP) has a history of weak results in European elections, 
was also on the losing side of national government formation, and had weakened 
in the polls since the 2018 election. With an intense campaign, a clear message of 
stricter border controls, anti-criminality measures and continued use of nuclear po-
wer, the party gained 3.2 percentage points and an extra seat. The result was however 
still 3 percentage points below the result from the national election.  
The Christian Democrats were for long seen as quite an insigniﬁcant party in 
Sweden, but this is now changing both in national and European elections. With 
a clear and intense campaign of a “just enough” EU, the party positioned itself as 
safeguarding the subsidiarity principle, not least against the social pillar. With 8.6% 
of the vote, they gained a second seat. The polls just before the election had sug-
gested higher numbers, but the revelation that the party's former MEP had voted 
“anti-abortion” in the national parliament probably meant some lost votes among 
late deciders.  
The Sweden Democrats were in a way the central hub for the European election, 
as well as for the national election last September. How the other parties related, or 
rather did not relate, to the Sweden Democrats at times during the campaigns see-
med more central than actual policy positions. No longer aiming for a “Swexit” but 
rather to “change the EU from the inside”, the party has toned down some of its more 
radical positions. But it is still mostly proﬁled as anti-immigration together with safe-
guarding Swedish national interests against supra-national policies. With support 
of 15.3% of voters they did indeed gain 5.7 percentage points and one seat more than 
in the 2014 EP election. However, compared with the national election less than a 
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year ago, the party lost 2 percentage points. This is actually the ﬁrst back-slide sin-
ce the party gained seats in the Swedish Riksdag in 2010.  
Finally, the small Feminist Initiative party that gained a seat in the 2014 EP elec-
tion now lost it.  The party never gained representation on the national level and, 
with its charismatic former party leader now in the background, the party was out-
side the race. This means that the 2019 EP election in Sweden was the ﬁrst one sin-
ce 2004 where no new party won a Swedish mandate. 
 
conclusion 
 
The Swedish party system is in a state of turbulence. The prolonged government ne-
gotiations after the national election of September 2018 finally broke up the tradi-
tional two-bloc structure that had dominated Swedish politics for decades. This tur-
bulence in many ways spilled over to the European election, shaping it into more of 
a two-level election than a pure second-order election.   
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United Kingdom: European Elections in the run-up to Brexit 
kaat smets
introduction 
 
The campaign for the 2019 European Parliamentary election in the United Kingdom 
did not kick off until the last moment as the country’s government had not planned 
to take part in the election. The UK was originally scheduled to leave the European 
Union on the 29 March, but extensions of Article 50 – the legal and political process 
for leaving the European Union – in late March and mid-April meant that the UK had 
to participate in the European Parliamentary elections under EU law. Despite this, 
it was not until the 7 May that UK Prime Minister Theresa May conceded that the 
UK would indeed take part in the European election on the 23 May. 
Brexit introduced a new issue-dimension in the UK after the 2016 EU referen-
dum (Goodwin and Heath 2016a, 2016b, 2017). Cutting across the traditional li-
nes of political conﬂict, both Remainers and Leavers can be found among suppor-
ters and Members of Parliament of the ruling Conservative Party and Labour, the main 
opposition party. Whilst the Conservative Party’s official stance is pro-Leave, the La-
bour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn has been less clear on its position. 
This difference between the two main parties was also visible during the campaign 
for the 2017 UK General Election (Mellon et al. 2018, Vaccari et al. forthcoming).  
Because of the divisive nature of the European issue, the UK’s two main parties con-
sidered holding EU elections in the run-up to Brexit problematic and both parties were 
eager to avoid this scenario. Against the backdrop of Brexit, the elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament were commonly considered a proxy for a new referendum on the 
question whether or not to leave the European Union, and if so how. This was also true 
for the local elections held on the 2 May in most of England, which saw the two main 
parties suffer a ‘Brexit backlash’ (Walker 2019).  In these local elections, the Conser-
vative Party led by Theresa May lost 1,330 out of 8,410 seats. Labour, the main opposition 
party led by Jeremy Corbyn, was not able to gain from the incumbent party’s defeat 
and lost 84 councillors. The pro-Remain Liberal Democrats and Greens, on the other 
hand, made unexpectedly large gains of 705 and 194 seats respectively. Curiously, this 
result in favour of pro-Remain parties was interpreted by both the Conservative Par-
ty and Labour as a message from the electorate to ‘get on and deliver Brexit’. 
 
For the European elections on the 23 May, two new parties entered the political lan-
dscape. Nigel Farage, former leader of the right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
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made a re-appearance with the Brexit Party. The one-issue party in favour of a no-
deal Brexit, which has supporters instead of members and did not have a party ma-
nifesto, soon led the polls as many disappointed Conservative Party supporters were 
expected to switch allegiance to the Brexit Party. That very same Conservative Par-
ty was expected to see its worst ever performance amidst increasing turmoil within 
the party, talks about Theresa May’s resignation as Prime Minister, changes in the 
party leadership, and a fourth vote in Parliament on Theresa May’s Brexit deal with 
the EU. 
The second new party, the centrist and pro-Remain Change UK – The Indepen-
dent Group (CUK-TIG), was formed by MPs who resigned from the Labour Party and 
the Conservative Party. Unlike the Brexit Party, it never gained much momentum and 
was expected to receive a percentage of the popular vote in only single digits. Besi-
des the Brexit Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens were expected to fare well 
in the election. Both parties were predicted to gain votes from pro-Remain Labour 
supporters disappointed by the fact that neither the party nor its leader Jeremy Cor-
byn ever unequivocally spoke out in favour of remaining in the European Union. 
 
results 
 
On May 23rd, voters in Great Britain and Ireland elected a total of seventy three Mem-
bers of the European Parliament (MEPs). The UK is divided into twelve regions, in 
which voters elect between three and ten MEPs depending on the population size 
of the region. Unlike national elections, where one candidate is elected in each of 
the UK’s six-hundred-fifty constituencies using the first-past-the-post system, the elec-
tions for the European Parliament are held under a proportional system. The ballot 
in Great Britain features parties and names of candidates, and voters either select 
a party or an independent candidate. Seats are allocated in proportion to the sha-
re of votes cast for a party (but not for an individual running for that party) or for 
an independent candidate. Northern Ireland, on the other hand, uses Single Tran-
sferable Vote (STV) to elect its three MEPs and voters rank candidates according to 
their preference. 
EU citizens living in the UK were not automatically registered to vote in the Eu-
ropean Election and had to re-register by May 7th. The 3million, an organisation of 
EU citizens in the UK campaigning for them to retain their existing rights after Bre-
xit, made a formal complaint to the Electoral Commission amid fears that many EU 
citizens would not be able to vote in the election. It argued that the two-step process 
in practice virtually deprived EU citizens of their only chance to voice an opinion on 
Brexit (O’Carroll, 2019). 
After the polls opened on May 23rd the hashtag #DeniedMyVote soon trended 
on Twitter as many EU nationals were indeed not able to vote in the UK election to 
the European Parliament. Some EU citizens had not been aware they had to re-re-
gister, others had tried but their registration form was received too late or had got-
ten lost. The Electoral Commission pointed the ﬁnger at the UK Government, saying 
that it had already made a case for making registration easier in 2014 but that the 
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short notice of the UK’s participation in the EP elections limited the time available 
to raise awareness of the rules for registration (Electoral Commission, 2019).  
As most European countries did not vote until Sunday May26th, votes from the elec-
tion on Thursday May 23rd were not counted until polls in other EU Member States 
were about to close. The days between the election and the counting of the votes saw 
Prime Minister Theresa May announcing her plan to resign on June 7th, triggering 
a leadership contest within the Conservative Party. After weeks – if not months – of 
turmoil, her resignation was not at all a surprise and many Conservative MPs soon 
announced their candidacy for the leadership of the party. 
Turnout in the 2019 UK European Parliamentary election was 36.9%, up 1.5 per-
centage points in comparison to 2014. As expected, the new Brexit Party did well. 
It won 32% of the popular vote, got to send twenty-eight MEPs to Brussels, and was 
the largest party in nine out of twelve UK regions. The Liberal Democrats were the 
second largest party with 20% of the vote and ﬁfteen MEPs (up fourteen in compa-
rison to 2014). Not surprisingly, the LibDems topped the polls in pro-Remain Lon-
don. The Green Party increased its number of MEPs by four, sending a total of se-
ven to Brussels and garnering 12.1% of the popular vote. 
Both Labour and the Conservatives were punished in the election. Labour pla-
ced third with 14.1% of the vote, down 11.3 percentage points in comparison to 2014. 
It now has ten MEPs, half of the number it had previously. The Conservative Party 
placed ﬁfth with 9.1% of the vote – its worst performance in a national election in 
nearly two-hundreds years. It lost ﬁfteen MEPs and currently has four seats in the 
European Parliament. 
The two regional parties in Great Britain also won seats in the European Par-
liament. The Scottish National Party (SNP) garnered three seats (up one in comparison 
to 2014) and the Welsh Plaid Cymru kept its one seat. The three Northern Irish se-
ats went to Sinn Féin, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Alliance Party. It was 
the ﬁrst time in history that the region would send three female MEPs to Brussels. 
Newcomer Change UK did not win any seats, and UKIP lost all of its twenty-four se-
ats in the European Parliament after shifting to the far-right under the leadership 
of Gerard Batten. 
united kingdom: european elections in the run-up to brexit
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Table 1- Results of the 2019 European Parliament elections – United Kingdom
party ep group votes (n)
votes 
(%) seats
votes 
change 
from 
2014 
(%)
seats 
change 
from 
2014
The Brexit Party EFD  5,248,533 31.6 29 +31.6 +29
Liberal Democrat ALDE  3,367,284 20.3 16 +13.4 +15
Labour S&D  2,347,255 14.1 10 -11.3 -10
Green G-EFA  2,023,380 12.1 7 +4.2 +4
Conservative ECR  1,512,147 9.1 4 -14.8 -15
Scottish National Party G-EFA  594,553 3.6 3 +1.1 +1
Plaid Cymru G-EFA  163,928 1.0 1 +0.3
Sinn Féin GUE-NGL  126,951 1
Democratic Unionist 
Party NI  124,991 1
Alliance Party ALDE  105,928 1
Change UK EPP  571,846 3.4 +3.4
UK Independence Party EFD/NI  554,463 3.3 -24.2 -24
Ulster Unionist Party ECR  53,052 -1
Total  16,794,311 100 73
Turnout (%) 36.9
Legal threshold for  
obtaining MEPs (%) none
Vote share ﬁgures do not include Northern Ireland as it has a separate electoral system to the rest of the 
UK. Vote totals for Northern Ireland are ﬁrst preferences only. 
For parties running in both Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the vote share is just for England, Sco-
tland and Wales, but the vote total is the sum of all GB votes plus the ﬁrst preference votes in Northern 
Ireland.
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Whilst the Brexit Party garnered the largest vote share in the election, it is cle-
ar that Brexit remains a highly divisive issue in the UK. Comparing the vote shares 
of the explicitly pro-Leave parties (the Brexit Party and UKIP) and the explicitly pro-
Remain parties (the LibDems, Green Party, the SNP, Plaid Cymru and Change UK), 
the balance seems somewhat in favour of the pro-Remain parties with a total vote 
share of 40.4%. The pro-Leave parties together garnered 34.9% of the vote. The last 
word on Brexit has clearly not yet been said and the direction the UK takes in the next 
months will largely depend on who becomes the new Prime Minister. 
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